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Abstract 
This thesis investigates possible future threats to human autonomy created by 
currently emerging ICT’s.  Prepared for evaluation as PhD by Publication, it consists of 
four journal papers and one book chapter, together with explanatory material. 
The ICT’s under examination are drawn from the results of the ETICA project, 
which sought to identify emerging ICT’s of ethical import.  We first evaluate this 
research and identify elements in need of enhancement – the social aspects pertaining to 
ethical impact and the need to introduce elements of General Systems Theory in order to 
account for ICT’s as socio-technical systems.  The first two publications for evaluation 
present arguments from marxist and capitalist perspectives which provide an account of 
the social dimensions through which an ICT can reduce human autonomy. 
There are many competing accounts of what constitutes human autonomy.  
These may be grouped into classes by their primary characteristics.  The third 
publication for evaluation cross-references these classes with the ICT’s identified by the 
ETICA project, showing which version of autonomy could be restricted by each ICT 
and how.  Finally, this paper induces from this analysis some general characteristics 
which any ICT must exhibit if it is to restrict autonomy of any form. 
Since ICT’s all operate in the same environment, the ultimate effect on the 
individual is the aggregated effect of all those ICT’s with which they interact and can be 
treated as an open system.  Our fourth paper for evaluation therefore develops a theory 
of ICT’s as systems of a socio-technical nature, titled “Integrated Domain Theory”.  Our 
fifth publication uses Integrated Domain Theory to explore the manner in which socio-
technical systems can restrict human autonomy, no matter how conceived.  This thesis 
thus offers two complementary answers to the primary research question. 
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1. Introduction - Project Summary 
This section summarises the entire project, outlines the most important points relating to the 
choice of research question and summarises findings and the contributions to knowledge. 
1.1. Preamble 
As a PhD by Publication, this thesis cannot follow the same format as is taken 
in a traditional Research PhD.  The lack of canonical guidelines for evaluation of PhD’s 
by Publication is notable (Frick 2016).  Three approaches are possible.  Where 
publications are spread over many years, the aim is to recognise the individual’s 
contribution to their field and so it is accepted the thesis should focus on demonstrating 
the impact those publications have had (such as by citation indexing) (Durling 2013).  
There are two possible approaches where PhD by Publication examination is limited to 
publications produced while registered as a PhD candidate (Badley 2009), as occurs at 
Maynooth.  Maynooth University’s guidelines are clear on format, but neutral on the 
assessment methodology.  One approach is to produce a thesis which provides the same 
material as would appear in a traditional Research PhD, but cannot appear in 
publications, such as formal literature reviews.  The aim is to produce something 
identical to a traditional thesis, in which the publications are used as notes on which to 
base the thesis.  The aim in this approach is to enable assessment of the thesis in the 
same way, and on the same grounds, as a traditional Research PhD (Durling 2013).  The 
alternative approach, which we1 have taken here, is to provide material which directly 
supports assessment of the publications by means of contextualisation and linkage into a 
coherent narrative (Badley 2009).  In our view, the primary focus for examiners in PhD 
by Publication is the evaluation of the publications, so the function of the thesis is to 
provide material aiding understanding and assessment of the published works.  It is 
therefore most appropriate to provide a descriptive chronological account of the 
research process contextualising the publication of each paper.  This means the chapters 
in such a thesis may not focus as tightly on the central argument as much as would be 
found in a traditional Research PhD.  Instead, this account will provide a chronologically 
                                                 
1 There is much debate regarding whether it is better to use the first person (‘I’) or third person (‘we’) in formal documents such as 
this.  In our view, neither is better.  Some literary cultures (defined by nation or publication) preference one, but there is no 
authoritive reasoning in preference to either.  Neither is there universal agreement on the importance of this issue.  Our approach has 
always been to follow the conventions of the publication and so our useage varied according to the style of the journal.  Since three 
of the five publications used the third person, we have adopted the third person throughout the thesis in order to minimise the 
variance from published format. 
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organised account of the problems which arose during the research process, the steps 
taken to address them and the manner in which this was represented within the 
published works.  Due to the necessarily short length of a journal publication, much of 
the background understanding used to produce a paper is often contained in little more 
than a quick reference to something already familiar to the readers.  It is therefore 
appropriate that this thesis sometimes provide additional detail regarding the author’s 
understanding and use of such concepts, how they are integrated into the research 
process, what methodological or other issues they addressed, and how they contributed 
to answering the research questions.  However, this is appropriate if, and only if, such 
issues are relevant to assessment of the publication and are not apparent in the published 
material.   
1.2.  Research Questions 
The primary research question is:  
 “What are the possible threats to human autonomy generated by emerging 
ICT’s?” 
Answered in the following publications for consideration: 
Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICTs (Dainow 2017b) (see Chapter 6. 
Autonomy under Emerging ICT’s, p.112). 
Binding the Smart City Human-Digital System with Communicative Processes 
(Dainow in-press) (see Chapter 8. Autonomy within the Integrated Node, p. 148). 
Secondary questions which must be answered first are: 
1. What are the emerging ICT’s? 
Answered in the following publication for consideration:  
Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICTs (Dainow 2017b) (see Chapter 6. 
Autonomy under Emerging ICT’s, p.112). 
2. What is human autonomy? 
Answered in the following publication for consideration:  
Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICTs (Dainow 2017b) (see Chapter 6. 
Autonomy under Emerging ICT’s, p.112). 
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3. By what mechanism can an aspect of an emerging ICT have a restrictive effect on 
human autonomy? 
Answered in the following publications for consideration: 
Key Dialectics in Cloud Services (Dainow 2015b) (see Chapter 4. The Current State of 
Affairs – Poles of the Debate, p.73) 
Digital Alienation as the Foundation of Online Privacy Concerns (Dainow 2015a) (see 
Chapter 5. Digital Alienation - ICT’s as Socio-Technical Systems, p. 91)  
1.3. Key terms in the research questions  
1.3.1. “Emerging ICT’s” 
ICT’s were defined as “emerging” if they were not merely theoretical, but were 
in prototype or early production, had not yet developed into their final form and/or 
usage in society, and were likely to have a significant impact on individuals or the wider 
society (Stahl 2013).  This definition is drawn from the ETICA project, which sought to 
identify these emerging ICT’s.  From an initial examination of 107 technologies, ETICA 
produced a taxonomy of eleven emerging IC technologies.  The ETICA project’s 
definitions and taxonomy constitute the primary dataset upon which this research is 
based.  The findings of the ETICA project were accepted as answering the secondary 
research question of “what are the emerging ICT’s?” 
ETICA’s work is covered in detail and critically evaluated in 2.4 Dataset: The 
ETICA Project (p.30) and 3. Evaluation of ETICA’s Technology Analysis (p.33). 
1.3.2. Why autonomy? 
This section explains why autonomy was selected as the topic of research, as opposed to any 
other ethical value.   
It is beyond the scope of a single PhD research project to consider all the 
ethical issues of all emerging ICT’s.  It is therefore necessary to restrict the scope of 
research to that which will yield the most results within allowed timeframes.  The 
justification for focusing on autonomy is its central and foundational position in modern 
applied ethics; underpinning the capacity to give consent (Agich 2003) and being an 
enabling condition for human rights, such as freedom (Cannataci 2016).  Western society 
holds an assumption that personal autonomy is an absolute good (Chirkov, Ryan, and 
Sheldon 2011; Dworkin 1988).  The capacity for autonomy is what gives humans dignity 
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and the right to be treated as an end in themselves, not a means to an end (Kant 1998; 
Schneewind 2007; Buss and Zalta 2015).  This position underpins European and related 
legal and ethical codes, as well as international regulatory regimes developed under 
international law since the Second World War (Dainow 2013).  For example, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights is based on the premise that all humans have the 
capacity for autonomy (Marshall 2008).  Consequently, autonomy provides the basis for 
all human rights legislation, much international law and provides the justification for 
democratic politics.  In many countries the human capacity for autonomy is the basis for 
equality before the law (Dworkin 1988; Marshall 2008; Chirkov, Ryan, and Sheldon 
2011; Schneewind 2007; Buss and Zalta 2015).  The capacity for autonomy is thus the 
single point of ethical interest with the widest range of implications.  Because autonomy 
is necessary (though not sufficient) for so many aspects of human flourishing, 
restrictions on human autonomy have the capacity to be serious and harmful, both to 
individuals and society as a whole.  Consequently, the exposure of risks to autonomy 
before they actualise is an important and practical application of ICT ethics.  However, 
there are competing definitions of autonomy in modern philosophy.  Analysing the 
impact of a technology on autonomy therefore requires reference to the definition of 
autonomy being used.  This issue is considered in depth in the third publication for 
consideration, Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICT’s (Dainow 2017b), which can be 
found in Chapter 6. Autonomy under Emerging ICT’s (p.112). 
Technologies alter the way humans interact with the world (Stahl 2011b; Misa 
1994; Jonas 1984; Spiekermann 2015; Brey 2012) and so emerging ICT's change the 
conditions and possibilities for human action – the way people live.  The concern 
motivating this research is that emerging ICT's could force people to live in ways which 
they would not have chosen.  This is not affected by whether these ICT’s provide other 
benefits.  That they may do so is irrelevant to the research questions.  We are concerned 
purely with identifying the characteristics of a potential threat.  We are especially 
concerned with empirically verifiable characteristics extant today and with demonstrable 
trends in current innovation which have the potential to bring the threat into reality 
unless addressed.  These trends constitute evidence that the threat is a genuine possibility 
and that this research is not merely a rhetorical exercise, but rather there is a 
demonstrable basis for the concern.  This analysis of current characteristics of concern is 
found in the first two publications - Key Dialectics in Cloud Services and Digital Alienation as 
the Foundation of Online Privacy Concerns, which can be found in Chapter 4. The Current State 
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of Affairs – Poles of the Debate (p. 73) and Chapter 5. Digital Alienation - ICT’s as Socio-Technical 
Systems (p. 91) respectively. 
1.3.3. Defining ‘privacy’ - pros hen ambiguity 
This section outlines our use of the term ‘privacy’ in the publications.  No 
publication offered a formal definition, nor was the term used in the same manner 
throughout all publications.  The purpose of this section is to defend this treatment and 
to summarise how the term was used in the different publications. 
It is generally accepted that the term ‘privacy’ is difficult to define because it has 
multiple legitimate interpretations.  The term has different meanings in different cultures 
(Capurro 2009; Whitman 2004; Ess 2013), while the meaning also varies under different 
usages (Tavani 2007).  However, ‘privacy’ is not unique in this respect.  There are many 
terms which can have more than one referent.  Such terms are said to have a pros hen 
ambiguity (Aristotle 2014a).  The example offered by Aristotle is ‘health.’  Some things 
can be healthy, which means they promote health.  Healthy things can be foods or 
behaviours.  Health can be a non-material quality.  We can have a “healthy” 
conversation, meaning it is experienced as robust, vital and other qualities which we also 
experience when our bodies are in a state of health.  In such cases, exploration of the 
term can occur via discussions of usage or through attempts to characterise the referent.  
However, it is impossible to discuss the details of the referent of a pros hen term unless 
one first restricts the range of relevant referents.  Some disagreements over definition 
occur because of disagreements regarding what the appropriate referent should be. 
Others occur because the competing definitions use different referents, but the 
protagonists have not noticed.  Disagreements can also occur regarding whether one 
should be using analysis through usage or working from the referent.   
This is the case with definitions of ‘privacy.’  Descriptive accounts of ‘privacy’ 
define it in terms of what it is made of.  Here it is defined as information with particular 
attributes, most importantly that it is about an individual.  Interest-based accounts define 
‘privacy’ in terms of its relationship to people, such that people have an interest in the 
use of this information for some reason.   Rights-based accounts follow a similar track, 
defining ‘privacy’ in terms of actions and their associated norms.  This includes accounts 
which define privacy in terms of seclusion (Camp and Osorio 2003).  These accounts are 
compatible with each other because they discuss different referents.  They are all 
plausible in that they accurately reflect the manner in which the word ‘privacy’ is used.  
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The meaning of the term ‘privacy’ is thus contextual and so the meaning of the term 
varied between the different papers as appropriate.  Digital Alienation used the term in 
reference to information, rights and interests.  Here, alienation involved (among others 
things) issues of rights and interests with reference to the production and use of private 
information, as did the  discussion of privacy protection in Key Dialectics.  The latter 
sections of this paper focused on privacy in terms of information type within the context 
of access control, which includes, but is not limited to, issues of rights and interests.  In 
both papers, information said to be “personal” if it pertained to a single individual.  This 
is not a universally accepted definition.  In some Asian cultures privacy is held to be a 
property of a group, such as a family, not the individual (Ess 2013).  However, we have 
consistently used a Western understanding of privacy (Capurro 2009) as pertaining to the 
individual and being an enabling condition for dignity and liberty (Whitman 2004).  This 
relation of privacy to the individual is consistent throughout all published works and 
holds that being personal information is necessary, but not sufficient, for information to 
be private.  We have noted our adherence to Western concepts when discussing the 
limitations of the project. 
Threats to Autonomy did not devote much attention to privacy.  It was most 
prevalent in discussions of affective computing, with regard to the potential of affective 
systems to detect emotions which someone would choose to hide.  This treatment is 
consistent with a number of accounts of privacy, including seclusion theories (the right 
to be secluded from others) (Hadley 1895) and access theories (control of access to 
private information) (Tavani 2007). 
The last two publications describe Integrated Domain Theory.  This theory 
does not treat of the individual per se, but works at the higher ontological level of the 
integrated personage.  Most theories of privacy are compatible with, but insufficient for, 
privacy within the integrated domain.  Here ‘privacy’ is maintained as a pros hen term and 
so relates to a number of elements.  The “zone” of privacy is those areas of an integrated 
personage containing processes and data relating to the individual.  Here we understand 
that privacy may relate to the processing of personal information as well as that 
information itself.   We also recognise it is possible that those processes themselves may 
be private even if they do not process private information.  For example, that someone’s 
integrated personage contains processes for controlling blood pressure is private, though 
it contains no data about their blood pressure, because the existence of the process itself 
reveals private information.  Similarly, mere knowledge of the existence of certain 
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integrated devices may also be private, such as knowing someone has a pace maker.  
Thus the content, processes and composition of the integrated personage all constitute 
aspects of the integrated personage’s privacy. Information, such as passwords, which 
grants access to private information may also be regarded as private if it is unique to that 
individual.   
In all papers, a privacy “violation” is held to occur whenever private 
information is gathered, processed or used against or without the person’s consent.  Our 
concern is with autonomy, so a privacy violation is relevant to our analysis if, and only if, 
it results in a reduction of autonomy.  Under many accounts of autonomy, such as those 
of Frankfurt, Dworkin and Meyers, failure to obtain permission does not restrict 
autonomy if the individual would have consented had they been given the opportunity 
(Frankfurt 1971; Dworkin 1988; Meyers 1989a).  On this basis, it is not possible to assert 
that any given usage of private information is necessarily a restriction on autonomy.  If 
the individual concerned accepts such a definition of autonomy for their own life, and 
would have consented had they had the chance, then their autonomy has not been 
violated.  However, if they do not live by such a version of autonomy or would not have 
consented, then their autonomy has been violated. 
1.3.4. Defining ‘surveillance.’ 
Surveillance involves gathering information of any type about an individual for 
a purpose over time (Galič, Timan, and Koops 2017).  Mere observation without an aim 
is not sufficient to qualify as surveillance.  Surveillance contains acts of observation.   
Observation is an individual act of gathering data.  It may, but does not necessarily, may 
be a portion of a process of observation.  However, this depends on the usage made of 
the data gathered, not the nature of the act of observation itself.  Some of the sources we 
used, such as Fuchs (Fuchs 2013) and Andrejevic (Andrejevic 2011b) hold that 
surveillance necessarily includes usage of this information (such as control of the subject) 
for observation to constitute surveillance.  We did not include reference to specific 
forms of usage in the concept of surveillance for two reasons.  Firstly, accounts which 
include control regard surveillance as a two-stage process of first gathering information 
and then using it.  On this basis, theories of surveillance can be divided into those which 
require only goal-oriented observation, without reference to usage, and those which 
require some form of usage in order for it to qualify as suveillance.  Both versions thus 
include the requirement for goal-orientation in observation.  Goal-orientation is 
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therefore agreed upon as a necessary characteristic of surveillance under all accounts.  
Thus, in practical terms, the treatment of the process from observation to useage is the 
same under both types of accounts – first observation must be described, then useage.  
For our purposes of analysis, it therefore makes little difference whether useage is held 
under the heading of ‘surveillance’ or something else.  We can therefore accommodate 
the observational act shared by both accounts.  When we then consider useage, it makes 
no difference to our analysis whether this is labelled ‘surveillance’ or not.  Secondly, this 
is not to say we do not consider the nature of the goal motivating the surveillance.  Since 
our concern is only with threats to human autonomy, we are only concerned with 
surveillance which will be used in a manner which has the potential to reduce human 
autonomy.  Our concern is therefore only with surveillance where the goal is to achieve 
effects which could reduce human autonomy.  In practical terms, the vector of most 
interest is personalisation services, in which device output is skewed in favour of the 
system’s understanding of the individual.  The axiom of digital scepticism dictates that 
the system’s understanding of the individual is never complete or objective, nor can it be 
assumed to be accurate.  In political terms, we can therefore state that surveillance is the 
process of gathering data about an individual through multiple acts of observation for 
the purposes of maintaining that individual’s personal profile. 
The term was used consistently throughout the first two publications, in which 
it referred to the tracking and recording of user activity on the internet and focused on 
the industrial-scale creation of personal profiles.  This was included in the term in Threats 
to Autonomy from Emerging ICT’s (see p. 112).  This paper also allowed for the emergence of 
new possibilities for surveillance through emergent technologies, such as ambient 
intelligence and affective computing.  The last two publications assumed surveillance 
would be an ambient characteristic of digital environments.  Some mention was made of 
the necessary scale and complexity of such surveillance, and to some early developments, 
such as Cobham Plc’s “Smart City Surveillance Architecture” (Cobham Plc 2012). 
1.4. Summary of Research Process 
The research can be divided into two phases.  Phase One followed the original 
plan, which was to examine emerging ICT’s individually and consider how each could 
threaten human autonomy.  However, in answering this question two things were 
discovered which required a change of approach.  Firstly, there are multiple contested 
versions of what constitutes autonomy.  It was found that the concept becomes prone to 
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several systemic problems once it is expanded from Kant’s original strict definition.  
Modern philosophy’s attempts to resolve these issues have led to competing definitions 
of autonomy.  Secondly, empirical research into the effects of contemporary digital 
systems has revealed that the effects on a person do not derive from only that one 
technology.  Because the person is exposed to multiple technologies at the same time, a 
more effective way of examining the problem is to treat of a digital environment composed 
of multiple technologies.  Phase Two therefore explored the manner in which this digital 
environment may restrict autonomy.  The five publications for consideration herein can 
therefore be grouped into these two phases.  The first three publications constitute the 
steps towards the first answer - how do specific individual technologies impact different 
versions of autonomy?  The last two papers seek to supersede these divisions of 
technologies and autonomies by developing a model of a digital environment, then 
suggesting ways in which that environment could restrict human autonomy, no matter 
how autonomy has been defined. 
1.4.1. Phase One - how do specific individual technologies impact 
specific versions of autonomy?   
It was beyond the scope of this research to independently determine what 
constitute today’s significant emerging ICT’s.  Such a task is a considerable research 
project in its own right.  This work had already been undertaken by the ETICA project, 
the largest and most comprehensive such analysis in technology studies, ICT ethics and 
related fields to date (Brey 2012).  Furthermore, the findings of the ETICA project are 
now foundational to many more recent projects, indicating its acceptance and utility by 
the research community (see 3.3. ETICA’s Wider Contribution, p.34).  The initial task was 
therefore to assess the quality of the relevant ETICA findings.  The ETICA project 
created a taxonomy of eleven ICT technology groups and identified their key ethical 
issues (Stahl 2013).  Our research therefore commenced with evaluation of ETICA’s 
findings (see 3. Evaluation of ETICA’s Technology Analysis, p.33).  Accepting ETICA’s 
definition of technologies as socio-technical systems (Stahl 2011b), ETICA’s analysis was 
found to be acceptable but incomplete, needing a more substantive account of the social 
forces underpinning ICT innovation and its impact in order to be useable for our 
purposes.  Research was therefore needed in order to deepen the account of the social 
aspect of technologies.  This was not aimed at a general description of the position of 
technology within the social, but focused on the mechanisms by which social forces 
interact with the individual in the context of ICT design and use.  Even this is a large and 
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complex area, and no attempt was made to develop a comprehensive account.  Instead 
the aim was limited to explanatory frameworks sufficient to account for ICT processes 
which could impact human autonomy.  This resulted in the first two publications, Digital 
Alienation as the Foundation of Online Privacy Concerns (Dainow 2015a) and Key Dialectics in 
Cloud Services (Dainow 2015b).  These sought to demonstrate that ICT’s could have 
negative ethical impacts on humans, to provide a language by which to describe this and 
to provide a preliminary account of the mechanisms by which ICT’s could reduce 
human autonomy.  While each paper addressed different specific issues, taken together 
they constitute a comprehensive answer to the secondary research question “by what 
mechanisms can ICT’s restrict human autonomy?”  The reason for using two papers to 
answer the one question is our desire to avoid committing ourselves to either a marxist 
or capitalist position.  Instead, we sought to analyse the question from both perspectives.  
Digital Alienation as the Foundation of Online Privacy Concerns (Dainow 2015a) developed a 
marxist analysis, while Key Dialectics in Cloud Services (Dainow 2015b) considered the 
matter from a capitalist perspective.  It is notable that certain features emerge as 
problematic under both analyses.  For example, user lock-in through lack of 
interoperability by service providers violates the need for a free market under capitalist 
analysis while also constituting coercion under a marxist analysis. 
In brief, the account we developed may be summarised as follows: 
Our account commenced with acceptance of the following premises.  The 
impact of technology on the person is mediated by social and biological factors within 
the individual.  The concept of affordances (Hutchby 2003) provides the theoretical 
explanation of the way physical, psychological and biological elements are linked at the 
moment of perception (Zhang and Patel 2006), while Signal Detection Theory provides 
empirical evidence in support of affordances (Balakrishnan and MacDonald 2001; 
MacMillian 2002; Verghese 2001).  Operant conditioning provides an account of the 
mechanisms by which user behaviour changes over time and by which affordances are 
formed, reinforced or extinguished (Killeen and Jacobs 2016; Nawyn, Intille, and Larson 
2006).  Advertising and other manipulations of symbolic capital provide the cognitive 
drivers controlling the attributions of value which drive the cognitive elements of 
affordances (Bernays 1928; Eshraghi and Harwood 2013; Hartson 2003).  It is outside 
the scope of our research to provide arguments in support of these premises.  However, 
they would not be considered controversial within many related fields, especially user 
interface and other forms of technology design, and have received empirical support 
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(Nawyn, Intille, and Larson 2006).  This account is most formally represented in the 
second publication for consideration, Digital Alienation (see Chapter 5. Digital Alienation - 
ICT’s as Socio-Technical Systems, p. 91).  However, it is used throughout the research 
project. 
Our own investigations revealed that, though rarely recognised in law or 
politics, there are many different definitions of autonomy extant within philosophy.  We 
organised them into six categories, such as procedural (thinking in certain ways), 
coherentist (acting in ways consistent with your values), and theological (acting as God 
intended).  Rather than seeking to adopt a single definition of autonomy, we cross-
referenced each category with each of ETICA’s eleven technology groups so as to 
identify how each technology could restrict each version of autonomy.  This cross-
referencing used the premises listed in the preceding paragraph to understand the 
mechanisms by which each technology impacted human autonomy.  This formed the 
first answer to the research question and was published as Threats to Autonomy from 
Emerging ICTs (Dainow 2017b)2.      
1.4.2. Phase Two – accounting for the impact of multiple ICT’s on 
multiple versions of autonomy 
However, while this paper adequately answered the research question in terms 
of the typical approach in technology studies, and would therefore be considered a 
satisfactory answer by many, we felt alternative approaches could be valuable.  While 
ICT ethics typically explores technologies in isolation, sociological and psychological 
research reveals that humans do not respond individually to each technology as if they 
were unconnected, but to the combined effects generated by all of them impacting at the 
same time.  Furthermore, these findings accord with the intended aim of ICT innovators 
to create a seamless integration of personalisation services such that the switch from one 
delivery system to another as the person moves about is invisible to the user.  We first 
                                                 
2 The methodology therein treated the social dimensions of technology as the same across all ICT’s.  We recognise that there may be 
individual differences with specific contexts, but we also recognise there are many common factors.  Human autonomy, no matter 
how conceived, involves a long-term element of one’s life, and, under all accounts, involves the relationship between current actions 
and long-term dispositions or values.  While there may be important variations in social dimensions of ICT’s within different 
contexts, and these may have ethical dimensions, we believe there is sufficient commonality of effect, mode of interaction and social 
dynamics that one can understand the impact on human autonomy of any individual ICT through shared social mechanisms.  
However, any substantive argument to prove this would take us too deeply into the philosophical analysis of autonomy and the 
sociology and philosophy of technology and would therfore be beyond the scope of this research. 
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encountered this when reviewing statements made by leading automotive innovators at 
the TU Automotive Detroit 2016 Conference (Bedigian 2016), such as 
“We very quickly discovered that customer expectations really aren’t 
based on our Jaguar Land Rover  competition – they’re based on the 
smartphone. They’re based on the tablet. They’re based on the home 
entertainment experience, which kind of makes complete sense.” - Matt 
Jones, Director of Future Technology, Jaguar Land Rover (Bedigian 2016, 7). 
“[Consumers] want their seamless life. It doesn’t matter if we’re 
here in North America if we’re in China or if we’re in Japan or India, that 
seamless life is where people want to be.” - John Schnoes, Programme 
Director of Vehicle Information Technology and Autonomous Drive, Nissan 
(Bedigian 2016, 7). 
We are also aware that companies may attempt to own the entire ecosystem 
around any commercial service in order to dominate their market (Hannaford 2007) and 
that this trend is especially strong in ICT’s (Fontana and Nesta 2009; Assink 2006).   We 
therefore considered it appropriate to extend the research to consider the manner in 
which autonomy could be threatened by this combined effect of a seamless digital 
environment.   
The methodological problem here was the lack of a pre-existing framework 
which could both describe this combined effect and account for the mechanisms by 
which it impacted autonomy.  We therefore developed a formal methodology for 
describing and examining ethical processes within multi-dimensional technological 
environments.  This was published as Smart City Transcendent - Understanding the Smart City 
by Transcending Ontology (Dainow 2017a).  This framework was then used to develop 
descriptions of the mechanisms by which an all-encompassing digital environment can 
restrict human autonomy, found in the book chapter Binding the Smart City Human-Digital 
System with Communicative Processes (Dainow in-press).   This latter publication also 
identifies systemic dangers present in all ICT innovation and operation which can 
threaten human autonomy, irrespective of the nature or purpose of that ICT.  These 
latter two publications constitute a second alternative, but compatible, answer to the 
research question. 
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1.4.3. Summary – how did we answer the research question? 
We have answered the research question twice. The third and fifth publications 
directly answer the research question, though in different ways.  The third publication, 
Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICT’s (Dainow 2017b), takes the technologies identified 
by ETICA and explores each individually to determine if it can be a threat to any of the 
major versions of autonomy currently extant in modern philosophy.  Where a threat 
exists, the paper identifies which versions of autonomy are threatened by that particular 
technology and how.  However, this account treats each technology in isolation and does 
not account for their combined effect.  Treatment of technologies in isolation like this is 
typical in ICT ethics, computer science and technology studies and so the answer 
provided is coherent with mainstream practice within these disciplines.  The fourth 
publication, Smart City Transcendent (Dainow 2017a), develops Integrated Domain Theory 
as a way to analyse the combined effects of all technologies on the individual by treating 
them as a “digital environment.”  The fifth publication, Binding the Smart City (Dainow in-
press), uses Integrated Domain Theory to provide detailed accounts of the processes by 
which this digital environment can threaten human autonomy.  The advantage offered 
here is that Integrated Domain Theory can show restrictions on human autonomy which 
apply to any and all versions of autonomy. 
The two answers are complementary.  Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICT’s is 
of value to those wishing to explore the ethical impact of a specific technology.  In 
particular, by surveying all major accounts of autonomy in context with each technology, 
it extends the more common analyses, which typically focus on a single version of 
autonomy (and usually fail to recognise that it is just one of many versions).  Binding the 
Smart City will be of value to those who work at the level where multiple technologies are 
considered in combination, such as urban planning (especially smart cities), architecture, 
sociology and broader social analyses within computer science.  Here the ethical concern 
is with populations of individuals, who will have differing conceptions of what it means 
to live autonomously, yet have equal right to consideration. 
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1.5. Contributions 
This research offers a number of contributions: 
1.5.1. Resolving difficulties in marxist analysis of the digital 
economy 
A central tenant of marxist social analysis is the concept of alienation (Ollman 
2001).  Simply put, under this view, people are coerced into undertaking work in which 
they have no interest so that their labour may be exploited in order for their employers 
to extract a profit.  The problem which confronts marxist analysis is that value is 
extracted online from voluntary activity.  This is activity which people have not been 
coerced into undertaking and to which people feel connected.  Furthermore, as this is 
not paid work, it does not fall under the traditional definition of labour.  This generates 
difficulty for marxist analysis of the internet economy because of the presumption that 
value can only be extracted from paid labour and that no one would undertake such 
labour unless coerced into doing so.  The approach to these problems within the 
scholarship has been to attempt to cram the internet economy into the traditional 
terminology, usually by redefining key terms, such as ‘labour.’  For example, it has been 
argued that labour is not paid employment, but any activity which someone else can gain 
value from (Scholz 2013).  Digital Alienation as the Foundation of Online Privacy Concerns 
(Dainow 2015a) bypasses these difficulties by instead retaining Marx’s original 
definitions and accepting the traditional marxist analysis regarding how value is derived 
online, the nature of coercion, and so forth.  However, this accepted state of affairs is 
used to argue that Marx’s mechanisms by which alienation occurs in the traditional 
workplace are not applicable to the internet.  Instead, the paper offers an alternative 
mechanism specific to the internet economy, under the term ‘digital alienation.’  In other 
words, we retain the terminology and instead update the processes by which alienation 
arises.  Digital alienation occurs where digital systems impose on the user modes of life 
which are contrary to their wishes or which fail to allow them to express aspects of 
themselves or their life in the manner which they would wish.  The paper explains the 
mechanisms by which this occurs, taking into account both engineering aspects, such as 
the variables used to encode information about people, and social aspects, such as 
business model, as well as specific models of perception and cognition.  While the 
description of this mechanism is specific to the modern internet economy, it does so in a 
generic manner which is also applicable to the future state of affairs our research is 
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concerned with.  The changes to Marx’s account are intentionally as small as possible so 
as to retain the majority of marxist analysis.  Given the presence of ubiquitous 
commercial surveillance as the originating source of income on the internet, we simply 
replace labour with existence.  In other words, people are exploited on the internet 
simply by using it, not by engaging in specific forms of activity.  Not only does this 
resolve the difficulties marxist scholars have been struggling with, it better positions 
marxist analysis for the future state of affairs in which digital systems, such as IoT, will 
record all human activity (and possibly speech) and value will be extracted from this data 
by service providers.  This contribution is of value in media studies, social analysis within 
computer science, critical theory and any other analysis of digital environments working 
from a marxist perspective.  Simply put, the digital economy does not exploit labour, but 
existence itself.  We do not believe marxism will be capable of understanding the smart 
city and other future digital environments unless it follows this move. 
1.5.2. Development of a formal, generic, methodology for evaluation 
of large foresight research projects which combine multiple 
methodologies.   
This evaluation protocol is not dependent upon the individual methodologies 
used in a foresight studies research project.  The lack of such a methodology, and the 
need for it, is well documented in foresight studies.  We believe, as do many others, that 
a formal methodology is needed to ensure all important aspects of a research project are 
evaluated.  While there are accepted evaluation methodologies within individual 
disciplines, research projects like ETICA’s combine multiple methodologies.  It is not 
sufficient to evaluate these methodologies individually since it may be the way in which 
they were combined which undermines the research findings.  Indeed, we found this to 
be the primary criticism which could be made against the ETICA project.  It is therefore 
necessary to evaluate such multi-disciplinary research at a level which considers the 
coordination of multiple disciplines.  For example, one concern is to determine whether 
the data output from one step in the research process was accurately passed to the next 
when that next step uses different methodologies and datatypes, or whether it was 
“translated” in a manner which lost essential elements.  This need is recognised in the 
field and several attempts to create such evaluation techniques were considered.  The 
most widely used assessment protocol is Impact Assessment (Poteralska and Sacio-
Szymańska 2014).  However, this does not evaluate the methodologies or validity of the 
findings, but the changes in planning and policy which result from the findings.  Even 
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here, no formal methodology exists, so much as non-specific approaches.  Medicine 
frequently encounters the same issues with multi-disciplinary research and has developed 
a formal methodology, CASP (Singh 2013), for evaluation.  The chapter evaluating 
ETICA’s technology findings which we use as our dataset offers arguments in favour of 
adapting CASP to foresight studies (see 3. Evaluation of ETICA’s Technology Analysis, p.33).  
We then develop a formal CASP evaluation technique from multiple versions of the 
CASP methodology.  The subsequent CASP evaluation of ETICA reveals variance 
between researchers as to what the aim of the project was.  This resulted in variations 
between the project’s reports.  However, these were not so severe as to undermine those 
of ETICA’s findings which were used in this research project.  We believe this 
adaptation of the CASP approach offers the most detailed and structured methodology 
for evaluation of foresight studies research extant today and is therefore of significant 
value to the discipline. 
1.5.3. A catalogue of potential threats to human autonomy across 
the range of emergent technologies.   
Of particular import is the recognition that there are competing versions of 
autonomy and that the catalogue of threats published accommodates all of them.  This 
was published in Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICT’s (Dainow 2017b).  This is the first 
time any analysis of autonomy under ICT’s has considered the different versions of 
autonomy rather than assuming there is just one (which is rarely defined).  The paper 
identifies six species of autonomy within modern philosophy.  While some versions 
simply disagree on relevant factors, others are diametrical opposites.  This is particularly 
important for any area considering issues of consent, including design of systems for 
assisted living, bioethics and legal development.  It renders attempts to predict a new 
technology’s impact on autonomy much more complex, but also allows for anticipation 
of aspects only a minority may object to.  For example, under some versions of 
autonomy it is possible to argue that it violates human rights to be educated or nursed by 
a robot.  It also explains why it is possible for some to view a technology as liberating, 
while others view exactly the same thing as restricting their autonomy.  It cannot be 
overstated how important this is nor how rarely it is mentioned in the relevant literature.  
Even when it is acknowledged that more than one definition exists, it is typically 
assumed that the concept can be treated at a higher level without reference to internal 
details, such as by considering context, aims or outcomes.  However, this fails to 
recognise that even such factors as these may not hold consistent across all definitions of 
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autonomy.  This contribution is of value to any ethical analysis of ICT’s which is 
concerned with human rights or any other rights or values dependent upon autonomy.  
This includes future efforts regarding legislation or other efforts to maintain or enhance 
human autonomy. 
1.5.4. Development of Integrated Domain Theory, a detailed 
conceptual model by which to formalise accounts of the ways in 
which multiple ICT’s ethically interact with the individual.   
Integrated Domain Theory is the focus of the latter two publications and 
comes out of our research into the smart city.  Having determined that humans are 
affected by ICT’s in combination, rather than as a set of discrete individual technologies, 
we sought for a framework by which to describe and assess the future of emerging ICT’s 
without differentiating between them.  This framework was found in the concept (or 
vision) of the smart city.  However, ICT ethical literature on the smart city and most 
other computer science literature on the smart city, focuses on individual technologies, 
rather than the city as a whole.  Where the city as a whole is discussed, there is no linkage 
with the individual technologies of which it is composed.  That this is a difficulty is 
indicated by the number of attempts to construct a model which can accommodate both 
top-level management systems and lower level devices, a survey of which is provided in 
our fourth publication, Smart City Transcendent (Dainow 2017a).  Most models within ICT 
ethical literature (and computer science literature in general) follow the template of 
layered models similar to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model (OSI Project 
1994).  Urban Planning, Architecture, Geography and other disciplines which deal with 
the built environment have a number of conceptual models and supporting 
methodologies by which to consider the urban environment and its inhabitants as a 
single system.  These are necessary in order to cross-reference between macro-level 
aspects, such as street design or urban management, and the effect on people, and vice 
versa.  A popular approach within these fields derived from sociology is Actor Network 
Theory (ANT), which is more methodology than theory (Latour 2005).  The essence of 
ANT involves treating the subject as a system and tracing patterns of interaction, 
especially cause and effect, between nodes while ignoring what the node is made of.  
Thus, it is possible to consider the impact on human behaviour of an inanimate sign, 
treating the sign as a cause of behaviour.  Similarly, it is possible to treat the sign as being 
caused by human behaviour.  ANT treats all technology as socially embedded through 
mechanisms of non-linear causality.  Our research into smart city literature within ICT 
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ethics revealed a lack of awareness of ANT and its potential to resolve analytic 
difficulties encountered when trying to deal with the complexity of the smart city’s ICT 
infrastructure and its interactions with people.  However, we did not consider ANT 
alone sufficient for a computer science analysis because it lacks components to describe 
the unique properties digital devices possess which render them able to create a cohesive 
digital environment.  In that societies are organised from within by their members, they 
can be said to be self-organising, or autopoietic.  Autopoietic systems have been examined 
in both biology and sociology, but also exist in IT systems such as TCP/IP’s dynamic 
routing (Graziani and Johnson 2008).  We fused the sociological work on autopoietic 
social phenomena with ANT to produce a descriptive framework (with an implied 
analytic methodology) for any complex environment composed of both digital systems 
and humans.  The first portion of this work is found in the paper Smart City Transcendent, 
while a second portion is found in the book chapter, Binding the Smart City.  This latter 
work goes into more detail regarding the nature of the nodes and uses the framework to 
explain the different mechanisms by which ICT’s may restrict human autonomy.  This is 
primarily of value in the social dimensions of computer science, especially with regard to 
issues of algorithmic justice and automated decision making, software modelling, smart 
cities and other “coded” environments.  It is the only methodology available within ICT 
ethics by which to account for complex socio-technical relationships, where we may 
want to trace relationships back and forth between human activity and engineering 
feature, or between across ontological levels, such as tracing the relationship between an 
API standard and automotive traffic patterns.  The value of this methodology is 
exhibited in Binding the Smart City, which demonstrates how the model can be used to 
identify specific autonomy-limiting characteristics applicable to any ICT and any context.  
ANT has already proven its value in other fields.  The contribution here is to bring ANT 
into computer science by adding new features meeting the requirements unique to the 
discipline. 
1.6. Findings 
This section briefly outlines the overall findings of the research process by summarising the 
accounts of Integrated Domain Theory found in the fourth and fifth publications. 
Just as we cannot separate the impact of one technology from another when 
looking at how they affect the human, so we cannot remove the human element from 
the technology itself.  If we are to examine human autonomy, the phenomenon we must 
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consider is an open system composed of all the technologies which impact on a person 
and the mechanisms by which the system can restrict autonomy.  This must include the 
human element which designs and delivers the system’s components and largely 
determines the uses to which they are put.  Modern society is moving into a state of 
affairs which can best be characterised as a new form of environment.  Until now, 
humans have only had two types of environment to inhabit - the natural world and the 
built urban environment.  We are in the process of creating a third type of environment 
which has not existed before, characterised by increased intelligence and response 
capabilities.  This “digital environment” has such a deep and wide-ranging integration 
with human society and the individual's personal experience that it constitutes a new way 
of living.  Our fourth publication, Smart City Transcendent, argues this can be best 
described as a self-aware autopoietic system composed of human and digital agents 
equally, which we term an “Integrated Domain”.  Here the human and the digital are 
integrated to such a degree that processes or events are not caused by either a human or 
a digital process, but by the two acting in a manner which makes them inseparable.  
Ways of living will emerge within this hyper-complex system which cannot be 
anticipated now, but will still exhibit the power dynamics we see in current society, in 
which organisations use technologies to vie for economic and political power in a 
pluralistic society.  On the basis that ICT technologies have not fundamentally changed 
the nature of society so far (Curran, Fenton, and Freedman 2012), we do not anticipate 
future technologies are going to do away with the tensions between individual and 
institution we have experienced since the rise of complex societies 10,000 years ago.   
Threats to autonomy will occur wherever the human user would want control 
over those aspects of their digital environment which they consider necessary for their 
autonomy (however they conceive it) which are not available to them, but which could 
have been available to them had some aspect of the technology been different.  Our first 
two publications demonstrated there are many existing trends which could lead to a lack 
of autonomy.  The worst case scenario for the final outcome of these trends can be 
described in terms of previous social structures which exhibited similar restrictions on 
autonomy in the past.  These are feudalism, totalitarianism and slavery.  Current trends 
in innovation have the capability to lead to a situation in which one’s ability to be alive 
becomes dependent upon renting services under terms of obligation from an elite, 
resistance to which results in (at minimum) social deprivation or (at worst) death; a 
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feudal system which permeates, surveils and controls every aspect of one's existence - 
the ultimate totalitarian vision.   
In sum, the threat to autonomy is that the digital environment into which we 
are emerging will be controlled and used by a few in a manner which reduces the 
autonomy of the many, or which denies them new liberatory forms of autonomy which 
the technology could have produced.  At its worst, this new environment may create 
levels of oppression unseen since the Middle Ages. 
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2. Background 
This chapter contextualises the research project.  We will briefly introduce the topic, the main 
disciplines used and how they relate to the research questions.  We will also provide a short summary of 
the ETICA foresight studies project, which provided the initial data for analysis. 
2.1. Disciplinary Context – Computer Science 
This research falls into the discipline of computer science.  There are various 
ways of defining the field of computer science, such as whether it is a branch of 
engineering or science (or both), or whether the primary foundation is the study of 
algorithms or information (or both) (Rapaport 2017).  However, all but the narrowest 
definitions include a role for consideration of the context in which the discipline exists, 
including its relation to other disciplines.  Much significant work in computer science 
involves collaboration with other disciplines, either through drawing on research, 
concepts or methodologies, or through collaborative research projects.  Computer 
science overlaps with philosophy in two respects; as a topic of philosophical enquiry 
itself and as a branch of applied philosophy.  As a direct topic of philosophical enquiry, 
common concerns are the nature of the topic, such as the relationship between data and 
information or the relationship between an algorithm and code, and the nature of the 
discipline, such as what form of science it is.  Applied philosophy is concerned with the 
use of philosophy within other disciplines.  The central methodology is the application 
of traditional philosophical methods, concepts and concerns to a particular discipline or 
to the context of that discipline.  Computer science can, under most definitions, include 
the study of the use and consequences of the products of its discipline (Schneider and 
Gersting 2010; Rapaport 2017).  For example, Invitation to Computer Science (Schneider and 
Gersting 2010) uses a seven-layer model to organise the field of computer science, 
consisting of an ascending ontological scale of algorithms, hardware, abstraction layer 
(their term is ‘virtual machine’), software, applications and social issues.  Social issues of 
computer science have been most frequently examined using techniques of sociology 
and psychology under the term ‘technology studies’ (Brey 2005).  A relatively new, but 
growing, field is the application of ethics to computer science under the often misleading 
title of ‘ICT ethics’.  ICT ethics may be defined as the branch of computer science 
concerned with the ethical dimensions of the topics studied within computer science  
(Spiekermann 2015).  This can include the ethical dimensions of methodologies and 
procedures as well as the application of research in technology innovation (and the 
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consequences thereof).  Because ethical positions frequently depend on underlying 
positions in other philosophical fields, including metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy 
of language, philosophy of mind, political philosophy and philosophy of law, these fields 
may be drawn into ICT ethics and applied to computer science.  This research project is 
concerned with ethical aspects of the potential consequences of current computer 
science activity.  For reasons listed above, the ethical dimension is limited to human 
autonomy, while the potential consequences are limited to threats to, or limitations 
upon, that autonomy.  In that this research looks to the future, it combines ICT ethics 
with foresight studies. 
2.2. Disciplinary Context – Foresight Studies   
This is a work of intentionally negative imagination.  This research asks “how 
bad could it get?”  The objective is to develop a description of the ways in which future 
ICT’s could make things worse.  As a philosophical work, this research distinguishes 
itself from most foresight studies, which are more usually concerned with extrapolating a 
future state of affairs from current trends (Glenn 2009b).  We do not seek to explain 
how current states of affairs will lead to the future digital environment, but to evaluate 
the place of human autonomy within that future state of affairs.  We do not seek to 
assess the probability that such a future state of affairs will occur.  For reasons which will 
be explained below (see 2.4 Dataset: The ETICA Project, p.30), we do not seek to explain 
the mechanisms by which the current state of affairs could lead to such a future.  Our 
role is simply to understand human autonomy and its interaction with ICT’s to the 
degree that we can postulate the mechanisms by which autonomy could be threatened by 
ICT’s in the future.  Doing so requires a detailed understanding of autonomy, which is a 
much more multifaceted concept than most recognise when they use it.  Similarly, 
emerging ICTs and their direction of travel must be understood in detail.  A significant 
methodological problem occurs in the unpredictability of future technologies and how 
people will use them.  The solution requires a way of talking about human-ICT 
interactions in the future which can discuss ethical issues in detail without going into 
specifics about technical operations.  Such a methodology does not exist and so had to 
be developed as part of the research process.    
‘Foresight studies’ refers to a variety of methodologies by which to undertake a 
structured examination of the future.  Ways of describing the current state of the world 
are organised into the disciplines.  Foresight studies uses those same systems for 
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describing future states of affairs.  Foresight studies must therefore overlap with the 
discipline which provides the desired way of looking at the world and may combine 
several such disciplines (Glenn and Gordon 2009). As a work of applied philosophy, our 
overarching approach is exploration of ethical concepts in a philosophical, not empirical, 
legal or technical mode of enquiry.  Ethical implications of emerging ICT's are 
contextualised within the philosophical tradition, though some reference may be given to 
their treatment in other disciplines.  In that this work must account for the mechanism 
by which ICT’s can affect human autonomy, which is a property of individuals, it must 
include an account of the manner in which technical features create psychological effects 
which is at least coherent with psychological theories and empirical evidence.  In that it 
examines socio-technical systems, it must include some sociology.  Our primary focus 
here is those aspects of the social which stand between the technical artefact and the 
psychology of the individual.  As we demonstrate in the fifth publication, Binding the 
Smart City  (Dainow in-press), it is here that mechanisms which promote or inhibit 
autonomy are to be found. 
We are not concerned with the internal details of technologies unless relevant 
to understanding their ethical impact.  Our concern is for the effect a technology has on 
people, not the manner in which it works.  As a system, technology is subject to 
common axioms of General Systems Theory, most importantly equifinality.  In an open 
system the same final outcome can be achieved in different ways (Von Bertalanffy 1968).  
Given that any specific output can be achieved by more than one method of technical 
construction, this means we consider types of technologies rather than individual 
instantiations.  The engineering details become relevant only when we consider whether 
a given technology must have a given ethical effect or whether it is technically feasible to 
create something which achieves the same purpose without that negative consequence.     
2.3. Research Approach 
2.3.1. Premises 
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate a systematic analysis of the validity of research 
question, with particular focus on whether the question has been framed in a manner which assumes 
debatable premises, disagreement with which could undermine the project’s findings.   
The primary research question raises some secondary questions which could 
legitimately have been investigated within the research topic, but which were not.  
Instead, answers to these questions were accepted as premises.  A position was accepted 
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as a premise where there existed a general consensus in favour of it, such that acceptance 
would generally be considered unremarkable or reasonable.  Potential questions were so 
treated where the scale of the task required to investigate the matter would have 
compromised research into the primary question due to time constraints. 
The secondary questions “what are the emerging ICT’s?” and “what is human 
autonomy?” address the meaning of key terms in the primary question.  Another 
question intrinsic within the primary research question is the connection between these 
terms; i.e.: “is it possible for an ICT to threaten autonomy?”  This question considers the 
role of technology within society and what, if any, impact technological changes can have 
on the society in which it occurs.  This is a complex question, but the general consensus 
is that technological change causes social change, though there may be disagreement 
regarding how much and in what way (Brey 2005; Disco 2005).  Mainly because of the 
scope of the question, but also considering the broader consensus, this research project 
does not investigate this matter.  Instead, it is accepted as a premise that technological 
change causes social change and that this social change occurs though the aggregated 
effects of technological features upon individual people.  Similarly, we accept as a 
premise that social factors significantly influence the nature of technological innovation. 
For similar reasons, we also predicate this research on the premise that society 
can be analysed as a system (Parsons 1991; Luhmann 1995; Von Bertalanffy 1968; 
Latour 2011), and therefore may exhibit emergent properties not discernible from the 
properties of the individual nodes.  We also accept that social changes are mediated 
through psychological changes in the individual and so social change cannot occur unless 
individual’s change their behaviour (Castoriadis and Blamey 1997).  This is not a 
reductionist view of society as nothing more than aggregated individual behaviour.  In 
accord with our acceptance of society as a system, we accept the premise that changes at 
an individual level may result in the emergence of features at a social level not 
predictable from the behaviour or other properties of individuals. 
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2.3.1.1. Premises in ICT innovation 
The research accepts some common premises about trends in ICT innovation3:  
Miniaturization 
Moore’s Law has been a reliable summary of key trends in ICT innovation 
since the 1960’s (Powell 2008). The number of processing units which can fit into a 
given amount of space has been increasing continually for many decades (Mollick 2006).  
While there are some concerns this may be slowing, others argue it can be sustained 
through strategies like improved coding (Palem et al. 2009) and better energy supply 
(Dreslinski et al. 2010).  While Moore’s Law refers to the reduction in size of circuitry, it 
also reflects the resultant reduction in size of the devices housing them. We expect 
computing devices to continue to reduce in size and it is possible nanoscale devices will 
be common within the timeframes under consideration, though our findings are not 
dependent upon this.  We also note the development of smart materials (Addington and 
Schodek 2005), which may make the distinction between computing device and the 
material in which it is embedded obsolete, or even provide “smart” capabilities to 
traditional materials, such as wood (Ugolev 2014; H. C. Kim et al. 2016). 
Convergence 
Miniaturization allows for more functions to be embedded within a device of 
any given size.  Over time, ICT’s have “absorbed” capabilities of other devices (Mueller 
1999).  For example, the smart phone has absorbed the capabilities of the telephone, the 
still camera, the movie camera, the voice recorder, the fax and the radio.  In addition, 
there is a tendency in the ICT industry for larger companies to absorb smaller ones, both 
as a competitive strategy and as a means of acquiring innovations (Gates 2000; Hacklin, 
Marxt, and Fahrni 2009).  We therefore assume both forms of convergence will 
continue; that devices will become more powerful and multi-functional and that the 
industry will, unless prevented in some way, contract to near monopoly levels. 
Intelligence 
Miniaturization combines with ongoing developments in computer science 
such that devices become more “intelligent.”  Here “intelligence” is founded on 
increasing rates of instructions per second, which make possible more complex 
                                                 
3 While these are commonly accepted, it is worth noting that ETICA reported finding empirical evidence of these trends in their raw 
data, though this evidence was not published. 
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processing in any given unit of time, in combination with development of more complex 
algorithmic processes, such as those seen in machine learning and neural networks.  
Over time this leads to the ability of ICT’s to take into consideration more variables and 
to do so in a wider variety of ways.  We expect this trend to continue, especially in the 
development of soft AI systems.  We do not anticipate the rise of hard AI systems which 
emulate human consciousness within the timeframe considered within this study.  
Indeed, we are sceptical that such emulation is possible at all.  However, we do anticipate 
that future ICT systems will be able to process context and social nuances to a degree 
not possible today. 
Ubiquity 
The above trends lead to wider usages for ICT’s, an improved price-
performance ratio (Barroso 2005), and a wider range of environments in which ICT’s 
can be placed, making any given usage progressively cheaper and easier.  As a result, ICT 
devices have spread throughout society and across the globe  (M. I. Wilson and Corey 
2011).  We expect this trend to continue.  We anticipate that it will be practical to install 
ICT systems in places and for roles which are currently uneconomic.  We therefore 
anticipate that the future urban environment will contain many more ICT’s – to the 
degree that the absence of some form of ICT in any given context will become notable 
(Dodge and Kitchin 2005).  
2.3.2. Normativity & Feasibility 
This research is a normatively neutral ethical study.  It examines an ethical issue 
but does not recommend any responses to that issue.  The goal of this research is to 
determine how human autonomy can be threatened.  The individual reader will decide 
for themselves the role and value of human autonomy.  From this they will determine 
the severity, or otherwise, of the threats identified in this research.  It follows that it is 
not the task of this research to recommend remedies to avoid such dangers.  Remedies 
are based on one's assessment of the importance of the threats identified, especially 
when it comes to trade-offs against other benefits.  However, as will be discussed later, 
the treatment of autonomy herein is often founded on the availability of choice.  We do 
not consider autonomy is restricted if something is physically impossible.  It follows that 
an ICT’s operations do not restrict autonomy where alternatives are technically 
impossible.  A key point argued for repeatedly in our publications is that many specific 
implementations of tasks in ICT’s are treated as unavoidable on the mistaken 
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assumption there is no technically viable alternative.  It is therefore frequently necessary 
to demonstrate the technical feasibility of alternative ways of achieving the same ends 
which do not restrict autonomy.  Offering technical alternatives is therefore a side-effect, 
not goal, of this research.  As with assessment of severity, the advisability of preferencing 
such alternatives will depend on one’s assessment of the role and value of autonomy in 
human flourishing.  It would be a mistake to believe this normatively neutral position 
means we assume any “reasonable” person would take a position in favour of human 
autonomy and oppose features of ICT’s which restrict it.  This is not the case.  Our 
publications make several references to the Chinese Social Credit system, a vast complex 
of ICT’s in deployment now which will eventually permeate most aspects of the Chinese 
citizen’s life, and which is designed specifically to restrict individual autonomy and 
remove “social contradictions” (State Council of People’s Republic of China 2014, 3).  
Though it is outside the scope of this work to offer detailed examinations of cultural 
differences towards ethical values, we do not accept that emerging ICT’s will be 
governed by the same values in all parts of the world.  Instead, we assume that different 
countries will evolve in different ways, such that we will see a range in the ways 
autonomy is restricted. 
 Similarly, this work seeks to assess ICT innovation against the widest possible 
range of accounts of what constitutes autonomy, and has not taken a position in favour 
of one account.  Indeed, the position taken here is that thinking there is a single correct 
account of what constitutes human autonomy is to misunderstand the concept itself.  
Instead, we examined each definition of autonomy individually to determine how that 
version of autonomy could be threatened.  By cross-referencing each form of emerging 
ICT with each form of autonomy, we were able to deduce features any ICT must have if 
it is to restrict autonomy under all definitions.  These are defined in the third publication, 
Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICT’s (Dainow 2017b).  Use of this understanding is 
demonstrated in two subsequent publications, Smart City Transcendent (Dainow 2017a) 
and Binding the Smart City (Dainow in-press).  The intent is that, by remaining at the level 
of discussing all forms of ICT’s and all forms of autonomy, this research is relevant to 
the widest possible community.  
 28 
 
2.3.3. Our use of foresight studies 
2.3.3.1. Background 
‘Foresight studies’ is one of the terms used to describe the discipline of 
considering the future in a methodical manner.  Foresight studies are not attempts to 
predict the future, but to reduce uncertainty about it (W. Bell 1996).  Foresight studies 
can be used in any discipline and so the objectives in such research vary widely.  What 
will be considered depends on who is considering the future and why (Glenn 2009b; 
Godet 2009; Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009).  Typical examples include assessment of 
existing visions of the future, the implications of new technologies, identification of 
opportunities or threats in the future and the assessment of possible impacts of policy 
decisions (Popper 2009).  This growth within many disciplines has led to a variety of 
terms being used to describe the activity.  Common alternative terms for foresight 
studies are “future studies” (most commonly used in the USA), “futures research” 
(Europe), “futurology” (Australasia), “prospective studies” (France), “futures field” 
(Europe) and “prognostics” (Russia) (Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009).   
The origins of foresight studies are typically traced back to H.G. Wells’ 1902 
widely-disseminated lecture at the Royal Institution, The Discovery of the Future, in which 
Wells described the possibility that science could produce “an ordered picture of the 
future” (Wells 1913, p.36).  Future-looking policy research commenced formally in the 
1930’s under the US government, becoming an independent discipline with the 
formation of the RAND think tank in 1946.  The 1960’s saw the rise of non-commercial 
foresight studies with the founding of institutes such as Bertrand de Jouvenel’s 
Association Internationale de Futuribles (1960), Herman Kahn’s Hudson Institute (1960) 
and the American Academy of Art’s Commission on the Year 2000 (1965).  The field 
can be said to have reached maturity with the publication of Wendell Bell’s The 
Foundations of Future Studies (W. Bell 1996). 
2.3.3.2. Our approach to ethical foresight studies 
A wide variety of foresight methodologies have evolved and most foresight 
research projects combine several methodologies.  A survey of 1,000 foresight research 
projects across sixty countries identified twenty-five discrete methodologies being used 
(Popper 2009).  Conducting their research over the same time period, Glenn and 
Gordon identified thirty-eight different methodologies used in foresight research (Glenn 
and Gordon 2009).   It is generally accepted that a number of foundational premises 
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underpin all foresight research.  Foresight studies are epistemologically premised on the 
position that there is an objective reality which exists independent of our knowledge of 
it.  Foresight researchers generally agree that the future is not predetermined and that 
people can influence the development of the future through their own actions (Aaltonen 
and Barth 2005; Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009).   
Foresight research is not, therefore, an attempt to predict the future, but to 
develop “conceivable” future states of affairs.  It is expected that some of the elements 
described will occur in some form, but it is considered unlikely in the extreme that the 
future will exactly match the state of affairs described in the research project (Glenn 
2009b).  One of the field’s pioneers, Herman Kahn, argued that history shows that 
unpredictable events frequently cause radical changes and that much of history would be 
completely implausible, if it were not for the fact it actually had happened (Kahn and 
Wiener 1967).  A common aim is to identify possibilities for change which could 
influence key aspects of potential futures.  Perhaps the most well-known example of 
such a “foresight effect” is Orwell’s “1984” (Orwell 1983).  While no one expects the 
world it describes to come about, the concept of pervasive government surveillance 
encapsulated under the label “Big Brother” has served as a powerful symbol with real 
political impact (Kellner 1990).   
This approach is central to our own methodology.  At all times we have sought 
to avoid analyses which are based on predicting specific technological implementations 
or human practices in the future.  Instead, we have confined ourselves to consideration 
of classes of functionality, especially where these can be described in terms of their 
interactions with people.  In Aristotelian terms, we have focused on teleological analysis 
(final causes) and processes (efficient causes) (Hocutt 1974; Aristotle 2014b).  Our 
concern has been with higher level functional analysis, rather than the form in which 
technologies are instantiated in specific instances. 
The different methodologies used within foresight studies can be divided 
between quantitative and qualitative in technique, and between normative and 
exploratory in purpose, though some methodologies bridge these divides (Veikko, 
Kanerva, and Kouri 2009; Haegeman et al. 2013; Gordon and Glenn 2004).   Ethical 
assessment of the future is rarely a formal component of foresight research projects.  
This lack of ethical assessment in foresight research is widely recognised (W. Bell 1996; 
Poli 2011; Brey 2012; Clarke 2005; Grunwald 1999; Harris et al. 2010).  It has been 
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argued the dominance of the paradigm of the material sciences within foresight 
methodologies promotes a belief in “universal” ethical values, which, like the constants 
of physics, are applicable in all places at all times (Poli 2011).  Philosophy has pursued a 
quest to discover such universal ethical values for literally thousands of years without 
achieving any consensus (MacIntyre 1998).  Key foresight research figures like Wendell 
Bell have attempted to determine what ethical values are universally accepted by all 
peoples in all cultures (W. Bell 1996).  However, Bell has since been criticised for 
accepting as objective and universal what are merely western cultural values (Poli 2011; 
Dator 2011; Rubin 2011).  A less controversial approach has been to incorporate ethical 
values as research data.  For example, the functionality of future technologies can be 
drawn the visions of those creating them, after which philosophical sources can be 
mined for ethical treatments of these functions.  This was the approach taken by the 
ETICA project and our own work.  It is for this reason we do not ground our normative 
assessments in either marxist or capitalist premises, but seek to view the same subject 
matter from both.  We regard our assessments as strengthened wherever both forms of 
analysis come to the same conclusion, though they may use different terminologies to 
describe the same phenomena. It is also for this reason that we do not preference one 
version of autonomy over any other, but seek to examine all major accounts. 
2.4. Dataset: The ETICA Project 
The ETICA project was a large foresight studies research project designed to 
identify emerging ICT’s and outline their ethical concerns.  Our research project used 
ETICA’s technology groups as the emerging ICT’s for analysis.  We did not examine any 
individual technologies which ETICA had used to develop this set, nor did we seek to 
validate the assignment of an individual technology to a particular group.  Much of 
ETICA’s original data is no longer available, so it is not possible to reproduce the 
ETICA research leading to the ICT taxonomy.  Validating it would therefore have been 
an original research project of similar scale and scope to the original ETICA project, 
something beyond what could be accomplished within our own project.  This acceptance 
of ETICA’s technology findings was not reflexive, but based on a formal and detailed 
analysis of the technology identification phase, contained in the following chapter (see 
Evaluation of ETICA’s Technology Analysis, p.33). This evaluation identified some issues 
within the research project which allowed for drift between individual researchers and 
for minor variations in normative stances between different reports.  However, these 
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were not sufficient to invalidate the technology findings.  In addition, we monitored the 
developments in ICTs during the five years of our own research project in order to 
detect any ICT’s which emerged since the ETICA reports were published.  The only 
significant technology not anticipated in ETICA was self-driving vehicles.  However, we 
determined that self-driving vehicles fit within ETICA’s definition of robotics as 
“machines  with  motor  function  that  are able to perceive their environment and 
operate autonomously” (Ikonen et al. 2010, 114).   
Some use was made of ethical implications ETICA identified which pertained 
to human autonomy.  However, ETICA did not attempt to undertake detailed ethical 
analyses.  Instead, we used ETICA to identify topics of concern, which were then 
researched in peer-reviewed publications.  ETICA’s final recommendations, being 
intended for EU authorities, and concentrating on the need and methods for further 
research, did not form part of our own research.   
The most significant issue found with the ETICA research was a 
preponderance of focus on technical characteristics, which contrasted with very limited 
analysis of the social aspects of technologies.  This indicated the need to provide a more 
detailed account of the social aspects of technologies as socio-technical systems.  This 
account forms significant portions of three of the five publications for evaluation; Digital 
Alienation (Dainow 2015a), Smart City Transcendent  (Dainow 2017a) and Binding the Smart 
City (Dainow in-press). 
2.5. Addressing the social aspects of technology 
As indicated, the research to develop a social framework arose from the 
conclusion that ETICA’s technology definitions focused primarily on functional 
specifications, with little reference to social dimensions.  It was therefore necessary to 
develop an account of the social aspects of emerging ICT’s to complement ETICA’s 
focus on engineering.  It was determined that the most advantageous strategy was to 
provide an account of the social which could be applied to all the technology categories, 
rather than attempt different accounts for each technology.  There were two reasons 
guiding this decision.  Firstly, doing so limited the scope of the research to what was 
feasible.  It was considered that a social taxonomy of similar depth to the technical 
definitions in ETICA would require a research project large enough to be a Ph.D. in its 
own account.  Secondly, by having an account of the social which spans all technologies, 
all technologies can be subjected to the same ethical analysis.  Doing so places their 
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ethical status on the same basis and makes possible the deduction of general principles 
applicable to all.  
As a result, it was determined that before analysis of ethical impacts could be 
considered, it was necessary to produce an explanatory framework which could account 
for the mechanisms by which technical artefacts produce ethical effects.  This research 
commenced with the formulation of the third secondary question: “what is the 
mechanism by which a technical feature can produce a psychological factor?”   This was 
answered in the paper, Digital Alienation as the Foundation of Online Privacy Concerns (Dainow 
2015a). 
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3. Evaluation of ETICA’s Technology Analysis 
This chapter seeks to validate ETICA’s identification of what are the emerging ICT’s with 
specific regard to the use of these findings as the primary dataset of emerging ICT’s in our own research.  
The aim is to demonstrate that the technologies identified by ETICA were sufficient for our own 
purposes. 
Our research design called for a pre-existing set of emerging ICT’s we could 
examine.  Due to the scale of such a task, it was beyond the scope of our project to 
undertake the research necessary to develop such a set ourselves.  Furthermore, such 
work had already been done by the ETICA project, one of the largest technology 
foresight studies ever attempted in (Brey 2012).   Our first task was therefore to critically 
assess the ETICA project’s findings in order to determine their suitability as the 
foundational dataset of emerging ICT’s.  Our aim was to determine if ETICA’s findings 
could be used as the basis for our ethical analysis, or if they needed enhancement, or 
were so inadequate that alternatives should be sought.  It is important to note the limits 
of our assessment.  Due to the scale of the task we could not assess ETICA’s 
conclusions by seeing if we could reproduce them.  Instead we focused on an analysis of 
ETICA’s methodology.  Our reasoning was that, if ETICA’s methodologies (including 
their own data) were adequate for the task, the technologies ETICA identified were 
sufficient for our purposes. 
We shall first provide background information regarding the project as a whole 
and then summarise the technology identification research process and findings.  Finally, 
we shall develop a formal assessment methodology and offer a structured assessment of 
the ETICA research process4. 
3.1. About ETICA 
3.1.1. Aim 
The  ETICA  project’s aim were  to  identify  emerging  information and 
communication technologies (ICT’s)  and  the  ethical issues these gave rise to and to 
make policy recommendations.   
                                                 
4 This chapter contains argues for and develops a formal methodology for assessment of complex future studies research projects.  
However, as it does not address the research questions, no attempt has been made (as yet) to publish this work and so it does not 
constitute one of the publications for assessment.  However, we consider the methodology outlined below of value to the foresight 
studies community and so anticipate it will be developed into a formal paper at some future stage. 
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3.1.2. Output 
The project’s ultimate goal was to produce a series of recommendations for 
those policy-makers and commercial interests whom the project had determined should 
be considering the ethical issues of ICT’s as they emerged (Stahl 2011b).  These are 
contained in the ETICA Project Final Report and in the project’s governance 
recommendations, D.4.2 Governance Recommendations (Rainey and Goujon 2011).  
Summaries of recommendations were delivered to the European Parliament in 2011 and 
are contained in Policy Brief of STOA on the ETICA Project (European Parliament 2011).  
ETICA’s findings have been fed into the work of the European Group on Ethics in 
Science and Emerging Technologies, part of the Bureau of European Policy Advisors 
(Stahl 2011b).   ETICA was one of a number of related EU FP7 projects concerned with 
ethics, innovation and ICT’s, such as the Governance for Responsible Innovation 
Project (GREAT) (http://www.great-project.eu/) and the Ethical Governance Of 
Emerging Technologies Project (EGAIS) (http://www.egais-project.eu/).  ETICA 
contributors have produced papers in several journals, many book chapters and 
conference presentations. 
3.2. Context 
The ETICA project was an EU 7th Framework Programme (FP7) research 
project funded under the Science and Society funding stream from April 2009 to May 
2011.  The objectives of FP7 were to strengthen the EU’s science and technology base, 
improve the EU’s competitiveness and support policy development within the EU.  
ETICA’s context within the EU superstructure was to support policy development.  The 
ETICA project itself is an exercise in both ICT ethics and classical foresight studies. 
3.3. ETICA’s Wider Contribution 
ETICA’s primary impact has been with regard to methodologies by which to 
engage with ethical issues rather than on investigation of the issues themselves.  The 
majority of ETICA’s deliverable content is concerned with methodology, while the 
project’s findings have mainly been used to develop further research apropos bringing 
ethics regarding ICT innovation into public discourse and policy development.   
On March 31st, 2011, the ETICA consortium delivered its key findings to the 
European Parliament at a workshop delivered in conjunction with Science and 
Technology Options Assessment, Policy Department E: Legislative Coordination and 
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Conciliations, Directorate General for Internal Policies, European Parliament.  The 
governance recommendations therein are exclusively concerned with mechanisms for 
engagement with ethical issues, not with the content of those issues themselves, such as, 
for example, recommending specific policies regarding specific issues.  The main 
governance recommendations are aimed towards enhancing ethical discourse and ethical 
considerations within ICT development; development of a regulatory framework 
supporting (and possibly even demanding) ethical impact assessments for ICT research 
and development; the development of an ICT “ethics observatory” which would 
communicate the methodologies and content of ethical ICT discourse within academia; 
and the development of mechanisms for institutional discourse regarding ICT ethical 
issues (and research methodologies) within the broader range of civic institutions, such 
as NGO’s and commercial enterprises (European Parliament 2011; Stahl 2011b).  
ETICA’s work was later incorporated into the research project Framework for 
Responsible Research and Innovation in ICT, funded by the UK Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council, while the “ethics observatory” has since commenced in the 
form of the Responsible Research and Innovation Project (http://responsible-
innovation.org.uk) (‘ETICA Project Website’ n.d.).  ETICA’s work is cited as 
foundational to the Governance for Responsible Innovation Project (GREAT) (Pellé 
and Reber 2013) and members of the ETICA project have continued work in related 
projects, such as EGAIS.  Perhaps more importantly, ETICA’s work has been cited in 
reviews of foresight ethics methodologies, such as PHM-Ethics and ETICA: Complementary 
Approaches to Ethical Assessment (Stahl, Mittelstat, and Fairweather 2013), Anticipatory Ethics 
for Emerging Technologies (Brey 2012) and GREAT’s DEL.2.2. Theoretical Landscape (Pellé 
and Reber 2013). 
3.3.1. The ETICA Project’s Technology Identification 
ETICA deployed a variety of established foresight studies methodologies, 
including bibliometric analysis (Porter 2009), expert groups (Glenn 2009a), scenarios 
(Glenn 2009c), scanning (Gordon and Glenn 2009) and morphological analysis (Ritchey 
2009).  Commencing with accounts of hundreds of ICT innovations, ETICA developed 
a taxonomy of eleven groups through identification of the essential functional 
characteristics which were shared by all members of that group.  The focus for 
characteristics was identification of the manner in which they altered human being’s 
interactions with the world (Stahl 2011b).  ETICA found innovation paths in all ICT’s 
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shared some trends; convergence, increasing penetration of daily life, reusability and 
adaptability, reduction in size, increasing mediation of human perception and rising 
intelligence (Stahl 2011b).  Note that many of these are the premises listed above as 
underpinning our own research (see 2.3.1.1 Premises in ICT innovation, p.25). 
3.4. Ethical Issues Identified by ETICA 
The most complete statement of the ethical concerns identified by ETICA can 
be found in D.2.2 Normative Issues Report (Heersmink, van den Hoven, and Timmermans 
2010).  Summaries of these issues may be found in other reports, such as D.3.2. 
Evaluation Report (Rader et al. 2010) and D.4.2 Governance Recommendations  (Rainey and 
Goujon 2011).  However, no other documents describe the ethical concerns to the same 
extent as the Normative Issues Report or offer any additional information regarding said 
concerns.  Reportage of ETICA’s ethical findings will therefore be drawn from the 
Normative Issues Report. 
The ETICA project can be said to have identified ethical topic areas rather than 
specific issues themselves.  No formal exposition of the issues was undertaken, such as 
statements of conflicting rights or duties, discussions of moral causation or consequence, 
applicability of universal moral principles or expositions of moral reasoning.  For 
example; when discussing ethical issues associated with privacy and affective computing, 
the following analysis is offered: 
“For Affective Computing to be effective, a lot of personal 
data is needed sometimes even from external sources accessed via the 
web.  Even when maximum efforts are taken to protect personal data 
and privacy we cannot go around the dreary fact that privacy will surely 
be eroded.  All that remains is a recurring trade-off between the gains of 
affective computing and the loss of privacy.” 
(Heersmink, van den Hoven, and Timmermans 2010, 23) 
No further analysis is offered regarding this issue - the above is the complete 
text regarding privacy issues in affective computing.  As can be seen, no analysis is 
undertaken to establish why the use of external data must inevitably lead to reductions in 
personal privacy or why the only solution to such a dilemma is to accept this.  
Furthermore, these projections are, to a large degree, based on two questionable but 
uninvestigated assumptions of ethical import regarding the manner in which such 
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technology must be constructed; that additional data cannot be stored locally, but must 
be web-based and that algorithmic use of personal data must make that data accessible 
by third parties (and hence lead to reductions in privacy).  Neither of these is a necessary 
aspect of the technology required to develop affective computing; they are merely 
extensions of current dominating, economically-determined models, of ICT 
development (Curran, Fenton, and Freedman 2012).  There is no technical reason why it 
is impossible that all relevant data could be stored locally (Dainow 2015b; Langheinrich 
2001).  Nor is there any technical necessity that such data, even if stored elsewhere, 
should be accessible by others and therefore constitute a reduction in privacy. 
Nevertheless, even if we accept these assumptions, it is clear that this passage 
does not constitute a detailed or developed ethical analysis.  It does not, for example, 
detail what rights, duties, or other ethical values pertain to this conflict between affective 
computing and privacy, what moral or ethical precepts are involved, what relevant ethical 
theories or approaches are relevant and so forth5.  As such, this cannot be described as 
an ethical analysis, but rather the identification of an area of ethical concern.  A later 
section does discuss resolving these issues via informed user consent, but does not state 
the ethical values, processes or logic by which user consent would actually resolve such 
ethical issues.  Furthermore, informed consent does not automatically or necessarily 
prevent a reduction in privacy, merely (at best) transfers responsibility or culpability for it 
by asking the user to agree to it.  Because the discussion of reduced privacy does not 
elucidate the ethical variables involved in the matter, it is not possible for discussions of 
resolution via user consent to explain the logical operations by which this consent 
addresses or resolves the ethical concern. 
Another example will suffice to show this level of analysis is consistent 
throughout the ETICA analysis.  The section on neuroelectronics discusses the impact 
this area of technology has on the mind-body problem and related concerns: 
“It is also argued that Neuroscience demonstrates that mental 
states may be reduced to brain states.  These reductionist concepts of the 
                                                 
5 Ethical discussions within philosophy and ICT ethics may include a range of different elements.  For example, discussion may 
include logical operations by which moral components of responsibility and obligation are transmitted via act and consequence or by 
mediation through ICT systems.  There may, or may not be, reference to “universals” - values or schema held to apply to all people 
in all places.  Some discussions may make reference to metaphysical or epistemological positions held to justify ethical stances.  To 
some degree, the factors mentioned can be determined by the ethical school within which the discussion is situated.  For example, 
Marxists may make reference to alienation while a capitalist neo-liberal is unlikely to recognise, or use, the concept... 
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mind–body problem and the self entail serious ethical questions such as (a) 
Can the attribution of personal responsibility be reconciled with a 
neurobiological account of correlated brain processes?  (b) Should we treat 
mental disorders merely as brain diseases?  (c) Can the traditional notions 
of the unity and autonomy of the person be maintained in the face of their 
being questioned by neuroscience?  Is the self only an illusion produced by 
the brain?  Although the reductionist view of the self received 
counterarguments by several critics, for instance stating that the self cannot 
be found in somewhere in isolation, Neuroscience does affect the view of 
the self and consequently raises ethical questions.” 
(Heersmink, van den Hoven, and Timmermans 2010, 83) 
This passage demonstrates very clearly the level of analysis at which ETICA is 
working.  The mind-body problem is one of the most complex and important problems 
in philosophy (Robinson 2011).  Positions within the debate have strong implications for 
the nature of the human, law, politics, religion, civic and personal goods, and even the 
direction of science, to mention but a few.  The above passage has not listed all the 
ethical issues associated with mind-body identification in neuroscience and could not do 
so without burdening the project’s workload beyond feasibility.  Given that several 
thousand years of philosophy has failed to resolve these issues, it is unreasonable to 
expect ETICA to do so.  However, we can see from this passage that ETICA’s analysis 
has merely identified a topic area and has not attempted to even list all the ethical 
questions raised, much less discuss them. 
The above is not intended as evidence that the ETICA project failed, merely as 
evidence that the ETICA project did not attempt detailed ethical analysis.  The aim of 
ETICA was to identify ethical concerns, not explore them in depth; much as an 18th 
century naval cartographer might map the location and outlines of a chain of islands, but 
not explore their interior.  As such, it is not surprising that ETICA’s recommendations 
focus on processes of engagement with ethical concerns, rather than the issues 
themselves.   
3.5. ETICA Methodologies 
“The ETICA approach is a recent method for the ethical 
assessment of emerging information and communication technologies 
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(ICTs).  It is so general in scope, however, that nothing prevents its 
application to other types of technology as well.”  (Brey 2012, 5) 
ETICA deployed a variety of established foresight studies methodologies, 
including bibliometric analysis (Porter 2009), expert groups (Glenn 2009a), scenarios 
(Glenn 2009c), scanning (Gordon and Glenn 2009) and morphological analysis (Ritchey 
2009).  Commencing with accounts of hundreds of ICT innovations, ETICA developed 
a taxonomy of eleven groups through identification of the essential functional 
characteristics which were shared by all members of that group.  It developed formal 
structures for technological descriptions and scenario construction.  Bibliometric analysis 
was then used to assess academic discourse regarding ethical issues associated with these 
ICT’s.  The project sought to validate and enhance these findings by using focus groups 
and surveys to assess corresponding concerns amongst experts outside academia.  
Finally, the project developed a series of recommendations, together with supporting 
philosophical and methodological expositions. 
Our concern when evaluating ETICA was the methodology it used to identify 
the technologies of concern, so as to establish they are a reliable dataset for our own 
purposes  We shall first summarise the processes ETICA followed to identify the 
emerging technologies, then undertake a structured assessment of that work. 
3.5.1. Step 1: Development of data schemas 
Identification of technologies and concerns was undertaken by “distillation of 
published views on these issues”  (Stahl 2011b, 11).  ETICA restricted project scope in 
the first instance by keeping its analysis at a general level, avoiding too much 
development of individual instances.  This was accomplished through a focus on the 
essential functional capabilities of technologies, rather than individual artefacts.  
However, it was felt that reportage on this level alone could, in some cases, be too 
abstract to permit elucidation of specific ethical concerns on the grounds that ethical 
concerns are “always contextualised” (Stahl 2011b, 12).  It was therefore decided to 
develop more detailed descriptions of example artefacts as illustrations for each 
technology, termed “vignettes” (Stahl 2011b, 12) .  This represents an example of 
scenario construction (Stahl et al. 2010), an established foresight studies methodology 
developed by Herman Kahn in the 1950’s and most famously pioneered by the RAND 
Corporation (Glenn 2009c).  An additional rationale for the development of vignettes 
was that the range of possible ethical dilemmas was so large that it was “fundamentally 
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impossible” (Stahl et al. 2010, 25) to identify them all6.  It was determined that vignettes 
would offer the opportunity to provide illustrative examples, but it was also noted choice 
of vignettes could introduce researcher bias.  It was hoped that bibliometric analysis 
would be uninfluenced by researcher bias and would compensate for this concern (Stahl 
et al. 2010; Brey 2012). 
The process of identification of emerging ICT’s by ETICA follows a classical 
Aristotelian approach to definition (Deslauriers 2007) through the development of an 
ontological taxonomy.  The range of possible future ICT applications and the 
impossibility of describing all of them led the researchers to move the focus of attention 
to a higher ontological level and work at the level of the species rather than the 
individual instantiation.  Each ICT species was characterised through the identification 
of the essential characteristics of that technology which would be shared by all instances 
thereof.  The initial task required was therefore a determination of what constituted an 
ICT and what made it “emerging.”  Information and communication technology is a 
species of the genus technology, but what constitutes a technology is contended within 
the philosophy of technology (Introna 2011).   It was determined that the defining 
characteristic pertaining to the genus of technology of relevance for the development of 
ICT species was that technologies alter the way humans interact with the world (Stahl 
2011b)7.  The defining characteristics of each ICT species would therefore distinguish 
the manner in which that technology altered human interaction with the world from the 
manner in which other technologies did so.  Because such a “high-level system” (Ikonen 
et al. 2010, 3) could represent such a wide range of artefacts and situations it was further 
felt it needed to be “associated with a vision that embodies specific views of humans and 
their role in the world” (Ikonen et al. 2010, 4).  A secondary criteria for the selection of 
defining characteristics was methodological - their potential utility towards the 
development of a “convincing normative issues matrix” (Heersmink, van den Hoven, 
and Timmermans 2010, 13).  In addition to these two formally identified criteria, we 
                                                 
6 From this we may understand that ETICA researchers consider “ethical concerns” to refer to specific instances of an ethical nature, 
not generalised ethical principles.  Such instances are typically used within ethical discourse concerned with determination of 
appropriate actions, such as how one should act in such a situation or what governance framework is appropriate.  Such instances 
may also be used as the basis for the induction of universals or to develop procedures for ethical reasoning.  Given this framework, it 
would be unreasonable to expect ETICA to develop a list of ethical concerns in terms of universal principles or by offering 
generalised processes for resolution of ethical dilemmas. 
7 This position regarding ICT may be termed ‘instrumentalist’ and is far from universally accepted within philosophical, psychological 
and sociological discourse relating to technology (Introna 2011).  This conception of ICT represents a particular and arguable 
position within philosophy of technology that must strongly determine the range of problems conceivable and their characteristics. 
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note the possibility that characteristics were chosen according to the degree to which 
they suited the normative positions of the researchers.  Other ETICA documents, such 
as the Heuristics and Methodologies Report (Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009), state that all 
foresight studies evaluations should be, and cannot be other than, normative, rather than 
descriptive: 
“The practice of futures research has always a normative aspect to 
it because each scenario, forecast and image of the future have a potential 
and usually also an effort to affect the future.  Therefore futurists have a 
responsibility to make value judgements about the futures they portray.” 
(Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009, 9) 
It should be noted this is not a universally accepted position within foresight 
studies, which typically distinguishes normative from exploratory studies (Coates and 
Glenn 2009).  This introduces the possibility that characteristics were selected, or not 
selected, because they did, or did not, support a normative position the researcher 
wished to promote.  This concern will be dealt with in more detail below. 
The result of these deliberations was a simple schema for the identification of a 
species of ICT composed of the following elements: 
1. Technology Name 
2. History and definitions 
3. Defining features (how it changes the way humans interact with the 
world) 
4. Application areas and/or examples 
5. Taxonomic relationship to other ICT’s 
6. Ethical and other concerns 
7. References 
(Stahl 2011b) 
3.5.2. Step 2: Identification of Technologies 
Technology identification proceeded by (human) textual analysis of 27 sources.  
The information was recorded in an online database.  This database is no longer 
available, nor have its contents or schema been published, so it is not possible to 
interrogate this stage of the project as a data source nor validate it by attempting to 
reproduce the work.  ETICA documents reference a number of Work Packages 
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explaining the processes in more detail, but these are no longer available.  The research 
design called for population of this database via analysis of governmental documents 
related to funding of ICT projects and of documents from “scientific/implementation” 
sources (Ikonen et al. 2010, 5).  No precise definition is given for this phrase, nor is it 
apparent from the list of sources in what manner ‘scientific’ and ‘implementation’ are 
linked together, or what is meant by ‘implementation.’  The surveyed documents came 
from foresight studies organisations (such as the RAND corporation), technical 
standards bodies (such as the European Telecommunications Standards Institute), 
NGO’s (such as Greenpeace), commercial enterprises (such as Microsoft), research and 
commercialisation organisations (such as the National ICT Research Centre of 
Australia), and EU organisations (such as the FP7 Funding program).  No information is 
provided regarding on what basis these particular documents were selected, whether 
work was done to determine how typical they were, or whether other candidates were 
considered but discarded (and if so, on what basis). 
Each candidate technology’s record in the database contained a “general 
description” which “could contain” a number of fields (Heersmink, van den Hoven, and 
Timmermans 2010, 4).  It is not stated in the ETICA documentation whether all fields 
were populated in all records, so we cannot determine whether all technology candidates 
contained the same data points. 
The elements in the general description were: 
1. Technical System (e.g. ICT, biotech, nanotech) 
2. Field of Application (e.g. ageing, automotive industry, environment) 
3. Target Audience (e.g. children, consumers, scientists) 
4. Budget (numerical, if available) 
5. Time Scale (numerical, if available) 
6. Source 
Additional fields could be attributed to each record.  These were described as 
falling into four classes: 
1. Social Impact (e.g. access, security, economic consequences) 
2. Critical Issues (i.e.  ethical  issues,  such  as  data  protection,  freedom, 
employment) 
3. Capabilities (e.g. connectivity, interoperability, miniaturisation) 
4. Constraints (e.g.  complexity, reliability, safety).  
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Each class offered the researcher a limited range of choices and the option of a 
free-text entry.  
This data structure was termed an “analytic grid” (Ikonen et al. 2010, 3) and 
represented in many ETICA documents with the following diagram: 
 
Figure 1 ETICA analytic grid  (Ikonen et al. 2010, 3) 
A number of questions arise as a result of the loss of the database and the lack 
of detail in the descriptions of it contained in the ETICA documentation.  These will be 
dealt with below. 
This stage of the analysis identified 107 different technologies.  This data was 
cross-referenced against a list of technologies compiled from ten foresight studies 
research publications, eight from within the European Union and two from the USA.  
No information is provided as to the methodology by which these ten documents were 
selected.  The resultant data was then condensed to a more limited list of higher-level 
technologies.  Finally the technological identification data was standardised by the 
production of  “meta-vignettes,” described as “encyclopaedia-like” records containing  
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“sufficient  information”  for  ethical analysis (Heersmink, van den Hoven, and 
Timmermans 2010, 8). 
The use of the term “meta” by ETICA indicated that these vignettes were to 
describe the technology in question at a high level of abstraction, rather than offer 
descriptions of sample artefacts, situations or other case-specific examples.  The meta-
vignettes contained a history of the technology, example applications drawn from the 
source literature, defining characteristics induced from these examples which focused on 
emerging features, related technologies and critical issues identified within the source 
literature.  Of critical importance for understanding the methodology behind the creation 
of the meta-vignettes is that researchers had the option to supplement the database with 
their own sampling of “pertinent” literature (Ikonen et al. 2010, 8).  What literature was 
sampled and the criteria by which it was selected is not documented. 
3.5.3. Technologies Identified 
The project identified the following eleven technology groups: 
 Affective computing 
 Ambient intelligence  
 Artificial intelligence 
 Bioelectronics 
 Cloud computing 
 Future internet  
 Human/machine symbiosis  
 Neuroelectronics 
 Quantum computing 
 Robotics 
 Virtual/augmented reality 
(Ikonen et al. 2010; Stahl 2011b) 
ETICA found the developmental trends in these technologies exhibited some 
common characteristics, which may be seen as the features of trends within ICT 
development in general; convergence; increasing penetration of daily life, reusability and 
adaptability, reduction in size, increasing mediation of human perception and rising 
intelligence (Stahl 2011b).  Note that many of these trends detected by ETICA are 
 45 
 
referenced above as some of our own research premises (see Premises in ICT innovation, 
p.25). 
The following summaries of ETICA’s technology groups are taken from D.1.2 
Emerging Technologies Report (Ikonen et al. 2010). 
3.5.3.1. Affective Computing 
ETICA fused emulation and understanding of human emotion under the same 
term.  In our view this is a problematic fusion of two distinct technologies, with distinct 
challenges, features and applications.  While it is possible to develop systems which both 
interpret emotion and emulate it, the essential definition of technology provided was that 
it altered the way humans interact with the world.  The ability of ICTs to understand 
human emotion produces a fundamentally different set of changes from the ability of 
ICTs to offer emotional output to humans.  Fusing these two does serve to limit the 
complexity of the taxonomy, but makes it difficult to talk of affective computing as if 
there were a common set of features and concerns.   
The primary features of this technology which form the foundations of ethical 
concern relate to the centrality of human emotion in communication and thought and 
the consequential risks of manipulation and misunderstanding.  The critical issues 
identified were that ICT developers lack sufficient understanding of what emotion is, 
how it works, and its role in human society; and the encroachment on human autonomy 
of affective computing as a result. 
3.5.3.2. Ambient Intelligence 
 Ambient intelligence is technology which embeds input, processing and 
response into the environment.  ETICA identified the primary defining characteristic as 
the invisibility of the input devices, often associated with involuntary input (for example, 
a change in room temperature) and less-than obvious responses by the ambient system 
(for example, changing the air conditioning settings).  Ambient intelligence was 
characterised by six features: 
 Embeddedness: Ambient technology is embedded into the environment 
and may not be noticeable. 
 Interconnection of ambient devices into complex distributed multi-
function systems. 
 Adaptive networking.   
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 Personalisation to the characteristics of each user. 
 Anticipation of user needs or desires, with consequent response. 
 Context Awareness8. 
 Innovative interaction paradigms. 
3.5.3.3. Artificial Intelligence 
It is unlikely Artificial Intelligence fits within ETICA’s research scope of having 
a significant influence on society by no later than 2026.  While reference is made to the 
distinction between “hard” and “soft” AI, the primary focus was on the emulation of 
human thought.  Soft AI was only referenced in terms of expert systems.  The features 
underpinning ethical concerns were competition with humans by artificial intelligences, 
the implications for law and human autonomy of automated decision processes, and the 
unpredictable consequences of independent machine learning. 
3.5.3.4. Bioelectronics 
Bioelectronics was defined as ICT systems which interact directly with the 
human (or other animal) bodies.  Primary ethical dimensions relate to the use of ICT 
systems in health care but reference was also made to interest in the ultimate potential of 
bioelectronics to provide artificial human bodies.  Here we can see that bioelectronics 
positions human physicality on a continuum with inorganic ICT systems and offers the 
potential for technological modification of the human form.  It therefore directly 
confronts issues related to the essential and potential nature of the human and concerns 
regarding human autonomy. 
3.5.3.5. Cloud Computing 
It is notable that ETICA’s definition of cloud computing is simpler and less 
technically nuanced than those of technical bodies, such as the US National Institute for 
Standards and Technology’s NIST Definition of Cloud Computing (Mell and Grance 2011).  
Cloud computing may be seen as a re-working of the traditional client-server networking 
model (Voorsluys, Broberg, and Buyya 2011).  Though ETICA’s researchers did not use 
these terms, ETICA’s characterisation distinguished cloud computing from traditional 
client-server network models by reference to the global nature of current cloud 
computing services, complexity of service provision, use of the Internet and an implied 
                                                 
8 Incorporation of context as input and as processing variables. 
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strong scalability.  In this sense, ETICA’s characterisation of cloud computing can be 
described as primarily based on economic models and current (contingent) deployment 
practices, rather than the technology functions used when defining other technology 
groups.  As a result, it is possible some of ETICA’s ethical assessments regarding cloud 
computing are reflections of current economic circumstances or deployment practices as 
opposed to necessary characteristics of the technology itself.  This concern is reinforced 
by the characteristics identified in the technology identification as of ethical concern.  
With the exception of privacy and data ownership issues, the features of concern are not 
so much ethical as engineering, such as quality of service and security.  This issue is dealt 
with in more depth below (see 4.2 Key Dialectics in Cloud Services, p.74).  
3.5.3.6. Future Internet 
ETICA used the concept of Future Internet as “a higher level concept that 
refers to the Internet in the future in  general  regardless of what it will be like” (Ikonen 
et al. 2010, 80).  The functional aspects of Future Internet described in the Emerging 
Technologies Report focus on issues related to the Internet as a (complex) transport 
mechanism.  ETICA’s assessment focused on current trends relating to the connectivity 
of non-traditional devices to the Internet, the development of increasingly complex 
services and the underlying communications protocols.  As such, the features of Future 
Internet which give rise to ethical concern overlap those of ambient intelligence and 
cloud computing, most especially privacy, intellectual property and transparency.   
3.5.3.7. Human-Machine Symbiosis 
ETICA characterised human-machine symbiosis as the pairing of natural 
human capabilities with ICT.  This definition covers an extremely large range of artefacts 
and ICT systems, including virtual and augmented reality, expert systems and direct 
neural interfaces.  Thus, as with Future Internet, there is considerable overlap with other 
technologies, especially bioelectronics and artificial intelligence. 
3.5.3.8. Neuroelectronics 
“Neuroelectronics, sometimes referred to as neurotechnology, is 
the discipline that deals with the interface between the human nervous 
system and electronic devices.  It is a highly complex and interdisciplinary 
field with contributions from computer science, cognitive science, 
neurosurgery and biomedical engineering.  Neuroelectronics has roughly 
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three related branches: (1) neuroimaging, (2) brain-computer interfaces, and 
(3) electrical neural stimulation…  The only defining feature these three 
branches have in common is that they all interface electrical devices with 
the brain, either to extract information from the brain or to send electrical 
signals to the brain.” (Ikonen et al. 2010, 98–99) 
ETICA focused on neuroelectronics mainly as a mechanism for using the 
neuronal activity of the human brain as input, either for control systems or for imaging.  
Significantly less discussion was devoted to output directly to the brain.  However, 
discussion of critical issues (which serves as the basis for ethical concerns) focused on 
the use of neuroelectronics as a means of processing thought, on the highly problematic 
assumption that  “neural signals may indicate  -  even represent  -  thoughts” (Ikonen et 
al. 2010, 100).  This potentially limits the ethical considerations within a fairly narrow 
and highly contentious materialist view of humanity and simplifies to an extreme degree 
the difficulties associated with developing an account regarding how neuronal activity 
gives rise to the phenomenological experience of thought (Halliday 1998), the attendant 
metaphysical and epistemological difficulties and their impact on ethical considerations. 
3.5.3.9. Quantum Computing 
No definition of what constitutes quantum computing is provided by ETICA.  
However, the discussions of quantum computing in the ETICA documents imply a 
broad definition of “computational machines that use … quantum  effects” (Ikonen et 
al. 2010, 103).  Quantum computing clearly falls outside the temporal scope of the 
ETICA project, and is indicated as such within the ETICA reports.  ETICA did not 
consider it likely, or even plausible, that quantum computing would have a significant 
impact on society by 2026.  However, no explanation is provided as to why it was 
nevertheless included in the ETICA study.  Its presence in the technology taxonomy 
enhances the value of that taxonomy as a general description of current areas of ICT 
activity, but offers nothing towards the ethical concerns which form the focus of 
ETICA’s activities.  No critical issues were identified which could give rise to ethical 
issues of concern today. 
3.5.3.10. Robotics 
ETICA defined robots as “machines  with  motor  function  that  are able to 
perceive their environment and operate autonomously” (Ikonen et al. 2010, 114).  It is 
worth noting this includes self-driving cars, which were not anticipated by ETICA.  
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ETICA’s characterisation focused on new developments which increase the mobility and 
intelligence of robotic devices, permitting their deployment into wider areas of society, 
such as the home and healthcare.  Application discussions focused on robots built for 
specific and narrowly defined roles within these contexts, rather than more speculative 
concerns about theoretical general-purpose, fully mobile devices controlled by strong 
artificial intelligence.  However, discussions of the critical issues which could found 
ethical concerns reversed this emphasis to focus on the latter rather than the former, 
such as the danger of the human race being taken over by robots. 
3.5.3.11. Virtual/Augmented Reality 
ETICA’s union of virtual reality with augmented reality into a common 
technology was based on the common feature shared; the imposition of digital output 
into human sensory input.  Virtual reality occurs where that digital output substantially 
or completely replaces sensory data from outside the ICT system.  Where it does not it is 
termed ‘augmented reality.’  ETICA’s concerns were founded on the fact that such 
systems mediate or replace interaction with the physical environment. 
3.6. Assessment of ETICA’s Technology Findings 
3.6.1. Assessment Methodology 
There are many methodologies for assessing qualitative research, some 
competing and some complementary.  Many have supported this state of affairs with a 
variety of arguments in favour of such a pluralist approach (Stige, Malterud, and 
Midtgarden 2009).  The case for the pluralist approach is further strengthened if one 
accepts that evaluation of foresight research, in particular, cannot be independent of the 
context and purpose for which it was undertaken (Georghiou and Keenan 2006).  One 
could further argue that the pluralism of research assessment methodologies is 
appropriate to the pluralism of foresight research methodologies.  For example, Futures 
Research Methods identifies thirty-nine distinct methodologies within foresight research 
(Glenn 2009b).  A variety of assessment approaches facilitates the selection of the 
assessment methodology best suited to a specific research methodology.  However, the 
selection of a particular assessment methodology also brings with it concerns as to the 
basis for that particular choice.  The selection of an assessment methodology is not, in 
and of itself, a neutral or automatic choice.  Dominant paradigms within particular fields, 
such as that of qualitative scientific experimentation, may bias the selection of 
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assessment criteria (Northcote 2012; Hannes 2011).  In addition, the individual assessor’s 
own understanding of critical assessment criteria, such as trustworthiness, reliability and 
validity, may vary according to their understanding of the research material itself, or their 
background philosophical understanding of these concepts or even of the assessment 
process itself (Krefting 1991).  Furthermore, the method by which one selects an 
assessment methodology can, itself, be subject to the same forms of scrutiny.  Thus is 
becomes possible to first assess the of the choice of assessment, and then to assess the 
assessment of the choice of assessment, and thus fall into an infinite regress of 
assessment of assessments.  Such a process is clearly to be avoided by mere mortals with 
finite lifespans.  Nevertheless, it is important to have a clearly defined methodology by 
which to assess foresight research projects in order to ensure assessment covers all 
relevant aspects of the research.  Furthermore, an explicitly documented assessment 
methodology exposes assumptions regarding what are the important aspects for 
evaluation, why and by what methods, so that the assessment of the research may itself 
be evaluated (Kothari 2004; Lakatos 1970). 
 Our methodology for assessment of the technology identification phase of 
ETICA’s research will seek to address these concerns by selecting an assessment 
methodology which is of general application and which is used by the widest possible 
audience.  Such an assessment methodology has several merits.  In that it is general and 
intended to assess a wide variety of research projects, it must be limited in the degree to 
which it relies upon, or reflects, specific methodological approaches or paradigms, either 
in the assessment or the research itself.  Secondly, a methodology which is used by a 
wide range of assessors must be limited in the degree to which it reflects particular 
cultural, disciplinary or philosophical premises and practices.  Finally, we accept the 
argument that an assessment needs to give some space to the peculiarities, or even flaws, 
of a specific research project’s methodology in order to avoid obscuring the value of its 
findings (Edwards et al. 2000).  This last point argues in favour of an assessment 
methodology with a “loose fit” to the research methodology in questions.  It is also likely 
that such a neutral approach, in not being too closely tuned to a specific research 
methodology, will better accommodate research projects which utilise multiple 
methodologies.  We shall therefore use a framework adapted from the Critical Appraisal 
Skills Program (CASP) developed in Oxford in 1993 by Dr. Amanda Burls (Dixon-
Woods et al. 2007).   
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The CASP methodology has been widely accepted in public health and related 
circles for the methodological assessment of research and is now widely used in many 
countries (Singh 2013).  A review of journal publications reveals many articles explaining 
how to apply it to specific fields of medical research, which we have taken as evidence 
that the CASP methodology provides satisfactory working methodology for many 
professionals, including those upon whose decisions lives depend.  In addition, the use 
of the CASP methodology has spread and continues to spread, which we take as further 
evidence of its utility.  While the methodology originated, and is most popular, within 
medical research, there is nothing within the methodology itself which is restricted to any 
specific research discipline.   
3.6.2. Assessment Checklist 
CASP research assessment methodologies consist of series of questions 
(typically referred to as ‘checklists’) designed to ensure appraisal covers the full range of 
assessable variables by which to determine the quality, trustworthiness, methodology, 
context, implications and importance of any particular research project.  The CASP 
methodology can be therefore profitably applied to assessments of any form of 
methodological research, qualitative or quantitative.  There are multiple versions of these 
checklists available, none with canonical status.  Some variations reflect increasing 
sophistication of approach over time, in that older checklists are often shorter than more 
recent ones.  In addition, some have been tuned for specific fields of medical research 
and contain questions meaningless outside their medical speciality.  Our protocol for 
selection was that checklists should contain questions which were applicable outside 
medical research; that they should come from reputable organisations; that they should 
be intended for an audience actively engaged in assessing research and which was 
compelled to use these checklists, thus ensuring they were actually using them.  Our 
rationale for this last requirement was that we can assume the checklists in question are 
capable of being used to fulfil their purpose when they are being used for said purpose 
and enough time has elapsed for them to have been modified if they were unfit for 
purpose.  Furthermore, we have drawn checklists from two such sources and combined 
them.  The rationale for doing so is to increase the chance that relevant questions will be 
included in our final version by drawing from more than one data source.  In addition, 
doing so provides the opportunity to fill gaps in the areas covered should a single 
checklist need to have questions removed because they are too specific to the medical 
field.  To this end checklists from ten different sources were examined.  However, we 
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have chosen only two sources from which to draw checklists; the UK National Institute 
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), which lays down operative regulations for the 
entire UK health service, and the UK Civil Service.  It was found that other sources 
either copied from these sources exactly, simplified their checklists so that they 
contained fewer questions, or modified the questions to make them specific to a 
particular branch of research.  The NICE checklists were drawn from the UK’s National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) Guidelines Manual Appendix B: 
Methodology Checklist: Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (NICE 2012) and Guidelines 
Manual Appendix H: Methodology Checklist: Qualitative Studies (NICE 2007).  Our rationale 
for selecting these two checklists is that it is appropriate to treat the bibliometric and 
textual analysis as a form of systematic review, while the surveys and the focus groups all 
constitute examples of qualitative research.  The Civil Service guidelines, 10 Questions to 
Help You Make Sense of Qualitative Research (Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) 
2006) are widely distributed within many UK government departmental websites in PDF 
format. 
We have combined the checklists and removed several questions applicable 
only to medical research on human subjects.  This yields the following questions for a 
review of the Phase One of the ETICA project, the identification of ICT’s of concern: 
1. Was there a clear statement of the research aims? 
2. Were qualitative and quantitative methodologies used as appropriate? 
3. Are the roles of researchers clearly described? 
4. Was the research design appropriate to address the aims of the research?  
5. Was the sampling strategy used appropriate to the research question(s)? 
6. Are methods of data collection adequate to answer the research 
question(s)? 
a. Was an adequate description of the application of the methodology 
provided? 
b. Was the literature search sufficiently rigorous to identify all the 
relevant studies? 
c. Were the search and collection methods used appropriate to the 
research question(s)? 
7. Was the data analysis sufficiently rigorous? 
8. Are the findings relevant to the research question(s)? 
9. Are the findings internally coherent, credible (valid)? 
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10. Is there a clear statement of findings? 
11. Is there adequate discussion of the study limitations? 
12. How valuable is the research? 
We have modified the wording of some questions to cater for quantitative 
methodologies and the bibliometric analysis.  Additional supplementary questions have 
been added to Question 6 (data collection) regarding the review of existing journals and 
other publications.  These were adapted from the NICE Guidelines Manual Appendix B: 
Methodology Checklist: Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (NICE 2012). 
3.6.3. Assessment Questions 
1. Was there a clear statement of the aims of the research? 
A formal and explicit statement of a specific research question or set of such 
questions does not exist in any ETICA publication.  Reasonably clear statements of the 
project’s aims can be found in most deliverables, but they tend to be nuanced to suit the 
topic of each particular deliverable.  We have selected a sample set of five variations in 
the statement of research aims from different ETICA publications to serve as data 
points for our analysis: 
Sample A: Deliverable D.1.2 Emerging Technologies Report: 
“The  overall  aim  of  the  ETICA  project  is  to  identify  
emerging  ICTs  and  the  ethical issues these are likely to raise with a view 
to providing policy recommendations to the EU as well as other policy 
makers.” (Ikonen et al. 2010, 2) 
Sample B: Deliverable D.4.2 Governance Recommendations: 
“The ETICA project aims to analyse emerging technologies in 
order to evaluate ethical issues that arise from them, rank them, and assess 
current  governance approaches to these  issues  in  order  to  determine  
the  nature  of  current  ethical  governance.  It  aims further  to  formulate  
new  ethical  governance  recommendations  based  upon interpretations of 
these analyses in order that ethical issues can be addressed before or as they 
arise.” (Rainey and Goujon 2011, 7) 
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Sample C: D.1.1 Heuristics and Methodologies Report: 
“The Ethical Issues of Emerging ICT Applications (ETICA) 
project will move beyond the state of the art in ICT ethics by offering a 
comprehensive overview of ethical and social issues in ICT that are likely to 
develop in the medium term future.  ETICA will do this by providing a list 
of emerging technologies and their applications as well as develop a matrix 
of technological applications within which ICT ethical issues can be easily 
identified.  The potential ethical issues will be subsequently ranked and 
graded by evaluating them according to top priority issues.” (Veikko, 
Kanerva, and Kouri 2009, ii) 
Sample D: Final Report:9 
“The ETICA project identified ethical issues of emerging ICT 
applications.  …  It also described ethical issues related to these 
technologies.  Furthermore,  the  project  described  the  methodology  
used  to  arrive  at  these  findings.  On  the  basis  of  the identified  
technologies  and  their  ethical  aspects,  the  ETICA  project  evaluated  
and  ranked  them.  It investigated  current  and  possible  ways  of  
implementing  governance  that  are  conducive  to  addressing  the ethics 
of emerging ICTs.” (Stahl 2011b, 1) 
Sample E: D.1.3. Emerging Technologies Workshop Report 
“The  workshop brought  out  clearly  the  vast  challenge  of  
ETICA  project:  its  ultimate  goal  is  to construct  feasible  and  usable,  
concrete  tools  or  framework  for  anyone  to  explore ethical issues when 
developing and designing future ICTs.” (Veikko, Panu Kouri, and Ikonen 
2011, 5) 
Sample A can be summarised as a) identify technologies b) identify ethical 
issues c) make recommendations.  Sample B contains an additional aim of assessing 
“current ethical governance.”  This aim is also found in Sample D, but not samples A, C 
or E.  It does, however, find expression in formal ETICA output, D.4.1 Governance 
Approaches (Goujon and Flick 2011), which addresses the “characteristics and limitations”  
                                                 
9 The Final Report does not contain an explicit account of ETICA’s aims.  Instead it contains a summary of what ETICA did.  We 
have included it in our sample because, as the final report, it constitutes the most authoritive account of the ETICA project. 
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(Goujon and Flick 2011, ii) of current ethical governance.  Sample C introduces “social 
issues” as an additional area of concern not listed in the other samples.  Sample D adds 
the publication of methodologies.  Sample E’s term ‘framework’ summarises the 
taxonomic developments referenced in Samples B, C and D, and brings further 
understanding to Sample A’s term ‘identify.’  We can therefore understand Sample A’s 
phrase “identify emerging ICT’s” as creating and populating an organising structure 
(“framework”) and developing methods for dealing with it (“tools”).  This reference to 
tools is reflected in Sample D’s reference to publication of methodologies, which would 
support an aim of developing tools.  Furthermore, the majority of the content of 
ETICA’s publications are concerned with methodology, not findings.  Thus, 
methodological development constitutes a significant, possibly the main, research 
output.  In that this is reported as the aim project participants had in mind when 
participating in a project workshop, it is reasonable to assume this aim was operative 
throughout the project.  However, it is, at best, implied, but not explicit, in most 
samples. 
In addition to the imposition of additional aims in different statements, some 
of the terms used are ambiguous.  It is not clear what constitutes an “evaluation” of 
ethical issues.  This could, for example, be nothing more than a simple ordered list of 
ethical topics arranged according to a simple set of criteria.  Conversely it could be an in-
depth exploration of the philosophical thought relevant to each issue.  Sample C’s 
reference to “social issues” is similarly problematic in that it is far from clear what is 
meant by the term, or by what discipline or methodology they will be examined; political, 
philosophical, or sociological or some other. 
It is therefore our conclusion the ETICA project did not provide a clear (and 
therefore unambiguous) statement of the project’s research aims.  While there is 
considerable overlap in various descriptions, there are subtle nuances of difference 
which, when guiding the formation of a full report, can easily become magnified into 
large variances of content, premises, arguments or other elements with a determinant 
effect on analysis and conclusions.  It is further our conclusion that a single clear, short 
and standardised statement - formally stated - of the research question(s) would have 
benefited the project in two ways.  First, such a statement would increase ease of 
understanding for those reading the reports and thus facilitate effective communication 
and reception of project findings.  Secondly, in terms of project operational efficiency, 
such a statement could have served as a common reference point by which to orient all 
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ETICA researchers.  It is likely the process of formulating such a statement would have 
necessitated discussion amongst the ETICA participants in order to achieve consensus.  
This would have helped to ensure a common understanding of the projects aims to a 
detailed degree amongst all project participants.  This could have provided additional 
potential benefits by promoting more uniform communication of the project by 
researchers to subjects during the various focus groups and surveys. 
2. Were qualitative and quantitative methodologies used 
appropriately? 
ETICA devoted considerable effort towards methodological exactitude.  
Checks were put in place at each step of data gathering or analysis to verify 
methodological compliance.  Selection of appropriate methodological procedures were 
the topic of a specific deliverable; D.1.1 Heuristics and Methodologies Report (Veikko, 
Kanerva, and Kouri 2009).  This document demonstrated a concern for bias within the 
raw data itself, constraint of data sources via reference to project aims, justification for 
the data sources selected being consistent with intended methods of analysis and with 
project aims, and a number of further verification steps, such as surveys and focus 
groups with which to cross-reference ETICA researcher findings.  These concerns are 
reiterated in depth in other deliverables, most notably D.3.2 Evaluation Report (Rader et al. 
2010), which provides detailed justification for the methodologies chosen for each phase 
of the research. 
The other aspect of appropriate choice of quantitative versus qualitative 
methodologies arises regarding the data to be processed.  ETICA’s raw data sources 
were textual.  To analyse this data quantitatively would involve bibliometric analysis.  
Qualitative analysis would require human reading of the text and reflection upon it, the 
traditional form of textual analysis and the only one available until recent years.  It is 
notable that ETICA used both forms of analysis in a complementary fashion, such that 
they supported each other. 
It is our conclusion that the combination of methodologies, the reasoning in 
determining their usage, and the documentation of methodological procedures, can be 
regarded as a paradigm of foresight research.  The combination of methodologies with 
the quantity of data analysed has been cited elsewhere as a model of foresight research 
(Brey 2012; Stahl, Mittelstat, and Fairweather 2013; Pellé and Reber 2013), which 
constitutes further evidence of the paradigmatic status of this project’s methodologies. 
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3. Are the roles of researchers clearly described? 
While it is clear from ETICA documentation which functions ETICA 
researchers undertook, it is less clear what approaches and operational methodologies 
each used in performance of their individual tasks.  Of particular concern are occasional 
references to normative imperatives, suggesting the possibility that the normative values 
of researchers could have affected data selection, gathering, processing or the 
development of recommendations.  For example, the Heuristics and Methodologies Report 
states: 
"The practice of futures research has always a normative aspect to it 
because each scenario, forecast and image of the future have a potential and 
usually also an effort to affect the future.  Therefore futurists have a 
responsibility to make value judgements about the futures they portray.” 
(Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009, 9) 
This is reiterated in D.4.1 Governance Approaches: 
“When we talk about the future, it is impossible to know the context 
that the future might be framed by.  This means that we cannot really analyse it 
except through some sort of normative approach ... we have approached the 
problem [by] investigating the possible approaches that are available, from a 
normative perspective, to address issues found in future conditions.” (Goujon 
and Flick 2011, 1) 
A normative approach would have the greatest influence on the more explicitly 
ethical portions of the ETICA project; the ethical considerations and the governance 
analysis.  However, there remains the possibility that normative stances may have 
influenced the technology analysis itself.  D.4.1 Governance Approaches states that the 
foundation for the normative approach is the work of Lenoble and Maesschalck, 
advocates for specific and innovative changes in law and governance, especially with 
regard to public-private interactions and issues of legislative legitimacy, and who work 
from a pragmatic theory of law (Lightcap 2011).  It is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to critique their work.  However, it is important to note our concern that Lenoble and 
Maesschalck’s work presupposes an essentially static structural and institutionalised 
power arrangement and may have insufficient regard for the dynamics of power within 
social discourse (Lightcap 2011).   In that this could promote a skewed selection of 
technological trends, this could lead to bias in selection of the data points for analysis 
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leading towards technology identification.  Critical technologies can emerge from sources 
or methodologies which are not dominant within the power structures of their field at 
the time of their development (Day and Schoemaker 2004; Curran, Fenton, and 
Freedman 2012; Limonard and de Koning 2005; Assink 2006; G. M. Schmidt and 
Druehl 2008).  Their effect is often to upset existing economic or power structures.  It is 
for this reason they are termed “disruptive” technologies.  It can be argued, therefore, 
that one needs to take into consideration power structures underlying those who provide 
accounts of technology trends (Curran, Fenton, and Freedman 2012; Hillis, Jarrett, and 
Petit 2013) and correct for sampling bias by drawing data from non-institutionalised 
sources.  For example, one could seek to explore technology developments within de-
institutionalised funding, such as crowd funding (Belleflamme, Lambert, and 
Schwienbacher 2014).  Alternatively, one could survey the product aims of start-ups 
populating the multitude of digital incubation hubs found in many cities (Tötterman and 
Sten 2005). 
We must therefore conclude that the influence (if any) of the researcher’s 
norms on the project are indeterminable.  However, this may be said of most research 
projects.  All aspects of a research project must inevitably be influenced by the premises 
and normative values of the researchers.  Indeed, all research depends upon the 
participants being influenced by key normative values such as the desirability of accuracy.  
Much of the emphasis in any methodological design is focused on minimising such 
background influences.  However, it is not practically possible to do this to an absolute 
degree, so some uncertainty must always remain.  The concern for normative bias in the 
identification of emergent ICT does not therefore, in and of itself, invalidate the 
resultant findings.  It may, however, suggest an area which could profit from further 
development.  It may be possible to refine the technology projections by greater 
reference to power dynamics in technology innovation, or by contextualisation within a 
different theory of law.  Alternatively, it is possible that such approaches would yield 
conflicting results.  These possibilities do not constitute flaws in the ETICA project, for 
all research projects contain areas of work suitable for further development, and thus are 
able to serve as foundations for further research. 
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4. Was the research design appropriate to address the aims of 
the research?  
Assessing whether the research design was appropriate to the research aims is 
complicated by the lack of a single clear and explicit statement of those aims.  
Nevertheless, there is sufficient overlap between the different versions, and they possess 
sufficient accord with what the ETICA project actually did, to make such an assessment. 
The aims of the ETICA project were to enhance the capability of the EU’s 
private and public sectors to anticipate and respond to ethical developments stemming 
from ICT innovation.  This was accomplished by providing three research outputs.  
Firstly, the project organised understanding of the field of emerging ICT’s.  This was 
accomplished by developing conceptual frameworks which organised the field of enquiry 
and provided tools of description and analysis.  These were designed with an emphasis 
on features which would support ethical analysis.  This aim was successful in that they 
did serve as the basis for development of ethical issues.  In parallel with the development 
of data and data structures, methodologies were developed by which data processing 
occurred.  Two complementary taxonomies were constructed; a taxonomy of emerging 
ICT’s, from which a second taxonomy (of ethical concerns) was developed.  The third 
and final output was a review of the existing state of ethical governance and consequent 
recommendations regarding the integration of the data and methodological output into 
the ethical governance processes of EU public and private sectors. 
It is clear that the research design supported these aims because the project 
produced several thousand pages of relevant output spanning fourteen reports.  
However, some variations of emphasis between aim and design may be problematic.  It 
was stated that ICT analysis “needs to be associated with a vision that embodies specific 
views of humans and their role in the world” (Ikonen et al. 2010, 4; Stahl 2011c, 63).  In 
addition to its relevance at this stage of the research, this is important during ethical 
consideration because said vision largely determines the intent of the actor, which 
impacts on moral culpability and other ethical dimensions under many ethical systems.  
However, it is not clear that this consideration was actually a factor during analysis 
because it is not discussed with reference to the technologies identified in any of the 
deliverables, nor is it formally represented in the analytic grid or technology accounts. 
An additional area of concern lies in the view taken of what constitutes 
technology.  Here is the greatest area of methodological weakness.  What constitutes 
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technology at this level of analysis is far from indisputable (Reyden 2011).  ETICA’s 
stated definition of technology was as “high-level socio-technical systems that 
incorporate a view of humans and have the potential  to  change  the  way  humans  
interact  with  the  world” (Stahl 2011b, 11). However, an examination of the analytic 
grid reveals no elements for the recording of social, economic or similar characteristics.  
The technologies are in fact, described in terms of their operational purpose and their 
instantiation in artefacts.  Social factors are mentioned in some publications, such as IT 
for a Better Future (Stahl 2011a), but they are discussed only in relation to ICT’s in general 
and not as characteristics of individual ICT’s.  Hence two areas of departure occur 
between aim and methodology.  First, as a disputable definition of technology it would 
have been appropriate to devote more emphasis to explaining and defending this 
position.  However, this is a minor point.  Secondly, and of greater concern for this 
aspect of analysis, is the lack of socially-related characterisation of technologies.  It is 
frequently the case that social aspects of a technology system, such as patterns of user 
reception, influence not just how a technology influences society, but also on how that 
technology itself develops (Limonard and de Koning 2005; Hillis, Jarrett, and Petit 2013) 
while economic power structures exert a similar influence (Bogliacino and Pianta 2013; 
Fontana and Nesta 2009).  In both cases we see not only the impact of factors 
contextualising the technological artefacts, but also feedback loops illustrating the 
systemic quality of ICT innovation.  Indeed, in the previous discussion regarding 
ETICA’s characterisation of ambient intelligence (see p. 45) we noted an apparent 
conflation of contingent economic structures with necessary technical characteristics.   
We must conclude, therefore, that while the initial design defined technology as 
a socio-technical system, this definition was not fully reflected in the design of data 
structures, which lacked elements in which to record both social and systemic data.  We 
consider the absence of social data to be of greater concern for ETICA’s findings than 
the absence of consideration of ICT’s as systems, because of the immediate and direct 
relevance of social data for ethical and governance issues. 
5. Was the sampling strategy used appropriate to the research 
question(s)? 
In some ways ETICA’s approach to sampling documents shares the same logic 
as the scenario development seen in the meta-vignettes.  In using as the core data 
multiple papers from multiple authors in multiple publications, ETICA was not wedded 
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to a single scenario regarding the future.  In fact, it was “expectationally neutral” (so to 
speak) in that assessments of ethical concerns within the source papers took no account 
of the futures anticipated by the authors of these papers.  This is an accepted approach 
within foresight studies regarding specific visions of the future (Glenn 2009c).  However, 
no attempt was made to consider alternative sources outside mainstream institutional 
structures.  This issue is relevant because it speaks to the representativeness of the 
sample.  The delimitation of data sources was justified on the grounds it would: 
“Give a good view of what is intended and envisaged by 
organisations that are in a position to enforce their view of the world.” 
(Stahl et al. 2010, 30) 
Elsewhere the justification for source provided is that: 
“It was felt that governmental sources and research sources would 
provide a more reliable picture of emerging ICTs.  Such sources are related 
to research and development activities and therefore less likely to be 
speculative than other future-oriented research, which can be motivated by 
aims to raise attention or create markets.” (Ikonen et al. 2010, 17–18) 
However, ICT innovation has a clear pattern of frequent and significant user-
driven invention, in which people use a technology in a manner not anticipated by its 
inventors (G. M. Schmidt and Druehl 2008).  This suggest that academic, corporate and 
other large institution’s understanding of ICT trends is often unable to anticipate 
innovative impetus from non-institutional actors (Day and Schoemaker 2004).  It is 
therefore appropriate to consider the wider social setting when selecting sample texts 
and, if selecting a sample from one discipline, to consider the variation between that 
sample and the general population, to what degree it is representative, and how this is 
demonstrated, or if not demonstrated, how that is accounted for, during data processing 
and analysis.  While it is sufficient to maintain result validity by qualifying predictions 
with the fact they are from a limited range of possible sources, the report produces 
policy and governance recommendations to legislative bodies and so should, if it does 
serve the purpose for which it was intended, produce real effects within society.  It is 
therefore important that the original sample set represent the full range of relevant social 
perspectives. 
We have indicated above concerns regarding the limitation of the sample set to 
institutional sources and the potential value of examining other sources of ICT 
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innovation (see Are the roles of researchers clearly described?  p. 57).  The value of drawing 
from a wider range of sources is that it draws on wider society’s technological 
imagination.  As the power of technological innovation grows so the proportion of 
society which can harness it and contribute to ICT innovation grows, and so the range of 
causative agencies of ICT development expands beyond the traditional institutional 
structures and processes.  The popular social imagination is a significant and meaningful 
source of data because it represents the imaginative foresight of the larger group of 
innovation initiators existing outside mainstream institutions.  Such foresight 
considerations are most easily seen in science fiction movies and books, which offer 
analysis of near future ICT’s and the ethical implications arising therefrom; such as the 
TV series Continuum (Barry 2012), the movies Minority Report (Spielberg 2002), The 
Bicentennial Man (Columbus 2000) and Blade Runner (Scott 1982), and works of literature 
such as Brave New World (Huxley 2006), 1984 (Orwell 1983) and the works of many other 
science fiction writers.  Indeed, criticism was directed at ETICA in this respect before 
the project had finished (Christensen 2009).  It is impossible to know if analysis of 
fictional sources would have yielded additional insights, contradicted the present 
findings, or merely confirmed them.  It remains, however, clear that a potentially 
valuable source of data was untapped.  Only a comparable exercise on such data would 
reveal to what degree failing to use it weakened ETICA’s output, if at all. 
6. Are methods of data collection adequate to answer the 
research question? 
a. Was an adequate description of the application of the 
methodology provided? 
The algorithms and data structures used by VOSViewer are not documented 
within ETICA, though much of this material is available in external publications (Van 
Eck and Waltman 2009, 2007; Heersmink et al. 2011).  However, the underlying data 
structures giving rise to the cloud map images has not been published and is not 
available.  This makes it impossible to reproduce or validate this step in the research.  
Particularly problematic is the lack of clear information regarding the dimensions of the 
bibliometric analysis.  External publications regarding VOSViewer provide general 
information regarding its algorithms (Van Eck and Waltman 2009, 2007) and its 
implementation within the ETICA project (Heersmink et al. 2011), but these are not 
sufficient to enable reproduction of the VOSViewer phase of the research.   
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The loss of the online database for technology determination is also 
unfortunate.  The system contained a wiki which “reflected  the  dynamic  of  the  
decision  process  with  regards  to  the technologies  to  be  included  in  further  
analysis  and  was  linked  to  the  individual documents that contained the meta-
vignettes” (Heersmink, van den Hoven, and Timmermans 2010, 21).  Access to this wiki 
would have enabled examination of the reasoning behind the output. 
b. Was the literature search sufficiently rigorous to identify all the 
relevant studies? 
ETICA own evaluation considered the sample set limited in terms of being 
restricted to English-language documents of Western origin.  These limitations are 
indisputable, though their impact is less clear.  The source countries from which the 
samples were drawn are responsible for a considerable degree of the innovation in the 
ICT’s identified, if not the majority.  As such, other sources are likely to reflect 
innovative agents of less importance.  It is the case that this weighting of influence in 
favour of Western English-language nations, such as the USA, is at least partly a feature 
of current contingent global economic and power structures.  As such this dominance 
may change within the temporal scope of the project’s projections.  However, because 
the ICT data structures characterising the technologies lacked the capacity to hold such 
data, it is doubtful if considering changes in global innovative influence over the next ten 
to fifteen years would have been possible within the ETICA research design. 
c. Were the search and collection methods used appropriate to the 
research question? 
It is implied in D.1.2 Emerging Technologies Report (Ikonen et al. 2010) that the 
technology database was organised around the technology groups, rather than other 
features such as functionality, scale, or relationship with other technologies.  This implies 
that determination of technology groups was made prior to analysis of distinguishing 
features and that determination of technologies was not induced from analysis of data.  
If this is the case, then technologies were identified by an unknown method, possibly 
varying from researcher to researcher, and then defining characteristics were identified 
which conformed to the pre-determined technological classification.   
No definition is provided to explain what constitutes each of the items in the 
database description.  In particular, no information is provided as to whether textual 
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data, such as Field of Application or Target Audience, was constrained in any fashion or 
whether contributors were permitted to write whatever they wanted.  This raises, but 
does not answer, questions as to the precision and consistency of the data points from 
which the technology identification was based. 
Select lists at end of the data entry process may have been a methodological 
weak-point.  These offered the researcher a limited range of choices and the option of a 
free-text entry.  The list of what choices were offered and what they meant is not 
documented in the ETICA publications.  It is not documented whether the researchers 
had guidance as to the meaning of the terms they selected amongst, nor whether any 
processes were in place to assess or ensure consistency of understanding amongst the 
researchers.  However, each entry was peer-reviewed by other researchers within the 
project.  Furthermore, since these were not the sole sources of the final technology 
groups, inconsistencies in understanding at this stage are unlikely to have had any 
significant effect. 
7. Was the data analysis sufficiently rigorous? 
VOSViewer only used a limited range of bibliometric techniques, primarily 
word frequency and proximity analysis, without synonym inclusion (Heersmink et al. 
2011).  This is but one form of bibliometric analysis and operates only at the word level.  
Of particular significance for an effort to gain a conceptual understanding of published 
discourse, VOSViewer does not take into consideration the semantic relationship 
between pairs of terms.  Other dimensions of bibliometric analysis which could have 
been of value include some form of discourse level analysis, such as discourse structure 
analysis, which builds upon analysis of sentences or phrases to construct hierarchies of 
discourse segments (Ide 2007).  In that a taxonomical hierarchy was constructed, co-
referent analysis, which analyses the referencing structures of key terms in a document, 
could have provided bibliometric data in a hierarchical ordering which could have been 
mapped onto the ICT taxonomy.  
It is clear bibliometric analysis could have offered more to the project.  
However, bibliometric analysis was not used to produce the final results of this phase of 
the research, but merely to guide the further work of human researchers.  As such it is 
legitimate to argue that the modes of bibliometric analysis used were appropriately 
determined by the use to which bibliometrics results were to be put.  From this 
perspective, other bibliometric research methods could only have yielded data which the 
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project was not designed to analyse.  Incorporating this data would have required 
considerable resources and thus substantially altered the research processes.  There is no 
indication such a change would have yielded better results and so has nothing to 
recommend it.  It does, however, illuminate an opportunity for a research utilising 
deeper and wider bibliometric analysis in this area. 
The use of foresight studies material to cross-reference against the original 
technology database permits the technology database to act as a constraint on the 
material drawn from foresight studies in terms of timescales and practical application (ie: 
probability of emergence).  As discussed above, the original selection of source material 
was based on the aim of understanding predictions and expectations of those who 
materially affect what technology emerges.  The aim is to restrict consideration to ICT’s 
more likely to develop.  By contrast, foresight studies need not involve those who are 
involved in developing new technology, nor is it necessarily restricted to the possible, but 
may discuss technologies which may never come about or which may not be practical.  
As a research design methodology, it therefore becomes possible for ETICA to limit the 
foresight studies research used as source material in terms of timeframe and probability 
through use of the initial technology descriptions as topic filters.  However, this is only 
possible if the following conditions are met; 
 The original technology descriptions had themselves been strictly limited in 
accordance with these principles;  
 The data structures encoded these limitations in a manner which permitted their 
reapplication during foresight studies analysis;  
 Said data was incorporated as constraints when sampling the foresight studies 
sources. 
The ETICA research methodology regarding these issues is not documented.  
However, we do find “speculative” technologies within the ETICA considerations in the 
form of quantum computing.  This suggests some technologies were evaluated without 
reference to their probability of appearance within the twenty year timescale to which 
ETICA was limited.  However, it is acknowledged that the emergence of this technology 
is outside the temporal scope of the project within the ETICA documents themselves 
(Ikonen et al. 2010).  Many of the aspects of artificial intelligence discussed are similarly 
outside the project’s timescale.  This suggests the foresight studies review was not 
constrained by the findings in the initial technology descriptions.  This in turn suggests 
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the source material used for the final technology identifications was not selected 
according to the criteria listed by ETICA.   
It is our assessment that this reduces the utility of the list of technologies as a 
complete definitive list of emergent technologies of concern upon which further 
foresight research can be based.  Any future research which is based upon or uses the 
ETICA technology taxonomy needs to establish a timescale which matches that of the 
actual ETICA technologies, or refine the ETICA list to reduce the range of timescales 
for emergence.  This does not, however, reduce the reliability of the technology 
descriptions or meta-vignettes themselves because the analysis conducted by the ETICA 
researchers introduced appropriate limitations of scope by confining the defining 
characteristics to those which within a ten to fifteen year scope.  Since it was these 
defining characteristics which formed the data from which the ethical concerns were 
developed, aspects of a technology which were outside the scope of the project but 
present in the technology descriptions were filtered out of the research process at this 
point. 
However, this introduces a concern that there may be a variance between the 
project’s designed role for the bibliometric data and the actual use to which it was put.  
As indicated above (see Step 1: Development of data schemas, p. 39), it was considered that 
research bias may unduly influence meta-vignette creation and that the bibliometric 
results would function as constraints against this (Stahl et al. 2010; Brey 2012).  
However, we have demonstrated above that researchers were not limited by pre-existing 
data, but departed from it in order to correct for elements outside the project scope.  We 
must therefore conclude that the bibliometric results did not function as a corrective for 
researcher bias during meta-vignette construction as the research design called for.  In 
addition, as indicated above (see Step 2: Identification of Technologies, p.41) researchers could 
populate the database with their own sampling of “pertinent”  (Ikonen et al. 2010, 8) 
literature.  This adds an additional source of data to vignette creation, and an additional 
possible source of researcher bias, which was not subject to constraint by the 
bibliometric results.  This leaves the project without any identified process for correcting 
researcher bias during meta-vignette creation.  Determining to what degree meta-vignette 
construction was skewed by researcher bias is beyond the scope of this assessment.  
However, it is clear that the research design deemed the possibility sufficient to require a 
step in the research process to correct for it.  It is also clear that this step was not 
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implemented.  As a result we must conclude that, with respect to meta-vignette 
construction, the procedures followed were not consistent with the research design. 
8. Are the findings relevant to the research question(s)? 
In that the aim of this phase was the development of a set of emerging ICT’s, it 
is clear that ETICA produced a relevant list.  However, while technology is defined as a 
socio-technical system, it is apparent from discussions above that the social aspects were 
not given equal weight to the technical within the data structures.  It is also clear from 
discussions above that only a limited set of those involved in ICT innovation were 
sampled.  It is therefore apparent that, while the findings were relevant, the design of the 
ETICA project called for additional relevant information which was not included.  It is 
less clear, however, that such omissions damaged the findings to any significant degree.  
Determining the importance of such omissions is beyond the scope of this chapter and 
would, most likely, constitute a substantial research effort of its own. 
9. Are the findings internally coherent, credible (valid)? 
The taxonomy of technologies and associated descriptions are, for the most 
part, consistent.  However, there exist occasional points of inconsistency in terms of 
compliance with the research design.  These are rare and of limited significance.  For 
example, quantum computing is identified as being beyond the temporal scope of the 
project, yet included.  Here the application examples and explorations of social impact 
are far less detailed than those of the other technologies.  Thus quantum computing is 
inconsistent with the other technologies in terms of both timescales and depth of 
analysis.  A similar argument can be made regarding artificial intelligence.  However, in 
that a limited number of technologies give rise to a very large range of ethical concerns 
at the next step in the project, and that multiple technologies can intersect at individual 
ethical concerns, it is unlikely that the inconsistencies detailed above give rise to 
significant degradations of reliability in the project’s findings. 
10. Is there a clear statement of findings? 
This question is most important with regard to the project’s final reports, which 
address ethical and governance issues, not the results of the technology identification 
phase.  However, as we indicate below, the findings of the technology phase are of value 
in and of themselves.  It is therefore appropriate to consider the accessibility of the 
results of this phase for future researchers.  Here we regard accessibility of results to be 
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largely dependent upon clarity of description.  Three levels of increasingly detailed 
account were provided by ETICA concerning the findings regarding technology 
identification.  First, schema in the forms of a simple list of the technologies and a 
diagrammatic representation of the technology descriptions (the analytic grid).  Second, 
the technology descriptions themselves, typically around 2,000 words, provide more 
detailed information across a range of dimensions.  Finally the many procedural and 
methodological accounts offer a deeper understanding of the technology descriptions 
themselves and provide first steps towards critical assessment.  Accordingly, the 
technology findings are clearly stated and layered for a variety of audiences, enhancing 
the receptive potential of these findings for the project’s main aim of policy 
development, but also facilitating the potential of the findings as a platform for further 
research.  This is discussed in more detail below (see How valuable is the research? p. 68). 
11. Is there adequate discussion of the study limitations? 
As indicated above, ETICA documents discuss the limitations of the data 
sources analysed in terms of language and geography.  However, there is less concern 
with the more procedural limitations we have identified in this assessment, but which are 
not identified as limitations within the ETICA documentation.  In particular, no 
discussion occurs regarding the role of non-institutional actors in ICT innovation, the 
limited investigation of social factors at the level of the individual technology, or the 
social aspects of socio-technical innovation. 
12. How valuable is the research? 
This question is more relevant to assessment of an entire research project, 
rather than merely the first of three phases.  However, we consider the development of 
the ICT taxonomy to be of benefit for foresight research in general, not just as a step 
within the ETICA project.  It is not our position that the taxonomy is sufficiently robust 
to warrant use as a set of accepted premises upon which other research could be based.  
In our view additional work is required to enhance the social aspects of the technologies.  
Additional bibliometric analysis of the types indicated above (such as semantics) could 
add further depth to the understanding of the relationships between the technologies 
and issues, and could also be used in developing more detailed social analysis.  
Examining wider ranges of source material, including those from the social imagination, 
could lead to some restructuring of the taxonomy.  In terms of using the taxonomy as a 
basis for foresight projections, we believe it would need to be allied with a more detailed 
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analysis of innovation pathways which take greater account of disruptive innovations and 
non-institutional actors and of the interplay between innovation, adoption and power 
structures.  However, these opportunities also indicate the value of the work already 
accomplished in that it provides a solid basis for more refined work, serving as a 
significant, if not complete, platform. 
Even if the results themselves are not accepted, this phase of the ETICA 
project produced some valuable methodological innovations which can be used by 
others.  The methodological procedures are documented to a sufficient degree that they 
can be used without inordinate adaptation to individual research goals.  Here the 
extensive documentation of conceptual and procedural problems and their resolution 
processes is especially valuable.  Such documentation aids the understanding of ETICA’s 
methodologies, while also enabling one to adapt the methodologies if their underlying 
logic does not suit. 
3.7. Conclusions 
It is clear the ETICA project was a large and complex research project.  The 
technology identification phase alone constituted a considerable project in its own right 
and made a valuable contribution to foresight research generally, both in terms of 
findings and development of foresight studies methodologies.  The taxonomy of 
technologies and the analytic grid constitute significant conceptual developments of 
value to future researchers.  Even if one discounts the valuable data with which ETICA 
populated these schemas, they remain important systematising tools with which to 
organise data.  The use of meta-vignettes is an open-ended development which allows 
others to add further meta-vignettes to the existing set.  This may allow enhanced and 
more rounded descriptions of the technologies, but it also risks the danger of discourse 
falling to the level of simply creating competing vignettes in order to make one’s 
argument.  There is also the danger that subsequent vignettes may lose their “meta” 
status and degrade to artefact descriptions.  This suggests an need for further 
development of the meta-level analysis of the technologies themselves as a means of 
constraining vignette development. 
As indicated at various points in the preceding discussion, much of what has 
been accomplished offers profitable opportunities for further research building upon the 
progress ETICA achieved.  This does not require an uncritical acceptance of ETICA’s 
work.  Indeed, the most profitable avenues for further research stem from a critical 
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analysis of ETICA’s methodologies.  The so-called “gaps” in the project represent 
research possibilities whose scopes and methodologies are delineated by the context of 
what is present, both in methodology and findings. 
The key weaknesses of the technology identification phase of the ETICA 
project are likely to have only limited impact on the overall technology taxonomy, but 
have an undetermined effect on specific technology descriptions.  The data structures 
did not give equal representation to the social elements of which technology was held to 
be composed, lacking elements for recording social data.  The second potential weakness 
concerns possible researcher bias.  We have seen that at least one corrective mechanism, 
the bibliometric data, does not appear to have functioned as designed.  Furthermore, an 
apparent acceptance of normative framing by an indeterminate proportion of the 
researchers offers a vector for the introduction of bias and thus increases the possibility 
of its occurrence. 
The key strengths stem from the scope of what was attempted.  In attempting 
to cover the complete range of emerging ICT’s and in drawing on such a large volume of 
sample data, the project was forced to develop strong research processes.  Particularly 
noteworthy is the consistent attention to data validation at each step of the data 
processing through the cross-referencing against different sample formats via alternative 
research methodologies.  The scale, range and depth of published findings provides 
valuable material for a wide audience. 
In overall terms the technology identification phase can regarded as very 
successful; it produced findings in accord with the research goals, developed a strong 
framework for combining multiple foresight studies methodologies into a coherent 
research framework and followed those methodologies with only minor deviations.  The 
resulting technology descriptions and taxonomy offer both conceptual insights and 
reusable frameworks.  The issues we have identified as weaknesses do not significantly 
degrade the value of the findings at this stage of the ETICA process.  However, they left 
our research in need of a description of the social aspects of technology as a socio-
technical system.  
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3.8. Next Steps – Adding the social to ETICA’s technology findings and 
answering a secondary research question. 
The two papers published in 2015 in Computers & Society10 answer the secondary 
research question: 
“By what mechanism can an aspect of an emerging ICT have a restrictive effect 
on human autonomy?” 
These papers presented the results of our efforts to provide a social account of 
ICT’s and so fill the gap we identified in ETICA’s findings.  They also provided a 
generic characterisation of what it is to have human autonomy limited by ICT’s which 
was drawn from contemporary analysis of current practice.  
The purpose in producing such an analysis was to provide an account which 
could be used when analysing the future state of affairs which is the subject of the main 
research question.  During this phase of the research we sought to analyse current 
circumstances from both a marxist and a capitalist perspective.  The aim in so doing was 
to ensure the overall research project was not confined to either perspective, but offered 
findings which could be accepted under both.  Additionally, our research indicated each 
had something of value to offer, and that the two complemented each other by focusing 
on different aspects of the current situation.  Furthermore, both arrive at the same 
concerns, though they identify different causes and differ as to why these issues are 
worrisome.  That both forms of analysis identified the same features as being 
problematic strengthens the acceptability of our findings. 
 Digital Alienation as the Foundation of Online Privacy Concerns (Dainow 2015a) 
developed a description of our current digital environment in the terms of existing 
marxist scholarship, mainly from within Europe.  It extended the marxist concept of 
alienation into a uniquely “digital” form by revising Marx’s analysis of the causes of 
alienation by updating it for the internet.  By accounting for the mechanisms by which 
alienation occurs online today we developed a formal description of what it is to live in 
an autonomy-limiting digital environment and the mechanisms thereof.  In doing so, this 
paper also outlines the relation between affordances, symbolic capital and other social 
dynamics so as to answer the secondary research question regarding how technical 
                                                 
10 “Key Dialectics in Cloud Services” and “Digital Alienation as the Foundation of Online Privacy Concerns.” Computers & Society 
ETHICOMP Special Issue (2015): 52-59 and 109–17 
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characteristics can cause psychological effects as a result of design and operational 
characteristics. 
Key Dialectics in Cloud Computing (Dainow 2015b) provided an analysis of the 
current circumstances from a capitalist perspective, mainly from US scholarship.  It 
focused on important debates within ICT ethics concerning current circumstances.  This 
analysis provided an understanding of the mechanisms whereby the current capitalist 
model of digital services can cause ethically negative outcomes by focusing on specific 
issues.  It also provided a model of some of the more specific and contingent social 
aspects of technology than possible in the more over-arching marxist analysis.  In 
particular, we addressed issues of privacy, ethical responsibility, system architecture and 
business model, all of which have been shown to be influential in determining the impact 
the social dimensions of an ICT have on human autonomy.  Key Dialectics therefore 
provided an answer to the secondary research question with regard to how elements 
such as business model and regulatory environment can restrict autonomy.   
When considering the future in subsequent stages of the research, we projected 
the features described in the two papers onto the future state of affairs as demonstrably 
extant mechanisms with the potential to restrict autonomy.  There may be other 
mechanisms and new ones may appear in the future.  However, those we identified are 
sufficient in themselves to support restrictions of autonomy.  This is demonstrated by 
the manner in which they generate ethical concerns today, as discussed in the papers.  
Key Dialectics also addressed the issue of the technical feasibility of doing things 
differently by detailing formal approaches and already-deployed systems which offer 
viable alternatives to those ways of providing digital services which we considered 
problematic. 
The analyses in these two papers were used from this point forward in the 
research.  The features identified in the two papers were subsequently imposed upon 
ETICA’s technology groups as the model for how each technology may be deployed 
within the society in such a manner as to reduce autonomy.  This is not to say they are 
the only features which could so restrict autonomy, but they are worthy of attention 
because we had demonstrated they are present today.  We assume they will continue to 
be present into the future unless factors arise to address them, such as regulations.  It is 
worth noting here that new developments such as GDPR do address some of the issues 
we identified. 
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4. The Current State of Affairs – Poles of the Debate 
4.1. Introduction to the paper 
The publication presented in this chapter seeks to identify key elements of the 
debate regarding ethical dimensions of ICT’s relevant to autonomy.  It forms part of the 
attempt to address the secondary question of “by what mechanisms can emerging ICT’s 
threaten human autonomy?”  We sought to answer this secondary question from both a 
marxist and a capitalist perspective.  This paper uses the capitalist perspective, while the 
following chapter provides the marxist approach.  The accounts in these two chapters 
form the foundation of the analysis addressing the primary research question. 
The paper herein identifies three central dialectics within digital service delivery.  
These constitute defining positions regarding data privacy, ethical responsibility, 
technical architecture and economics.  These constitute the main frameworks within 
which ethical discussions of digital services occur.  While these are framed in terms of 
cloud computing, they are applicable to all systems which deliver personalised services to 
humans.  At present, such systems are almost exclusively based on a client-server 
architecture, in which the server occupies a virtualised cloud layer (Moglen 2010).  Such 
an architecture is our primary ethical concern regarding the socio-economic factors 
relevant within ICT’s because it places the data and algorithms outside the knowledge 
and control of the individual.  While it may be possible to restrict autonomy with purely 
client-based systems, it is significantly harder to do so.  Client-only systems grant control 
over data access and use to the individual concerned (Ng and Wakenshaw 2015).  Since 
the economic success of many online services has been dependent upon a client-server 
architecture, we anticipate considerable effort to maintain a client-server architecture on 
the part of major players in the digital industries, such as Facebook and Google. 
The rest of this chapter contains the paper as published.  Minor modifications have been made 
to ensure the writing style matches that of this thesis (such as changing “I conclude” to “we conclude”).  
The citation style has been changed to maintain consistency with the rest of the thesis.  In keeping with 
the need to present the published material in the format of a coherent sequence of chapters, journal meta-
information, such as keywords and categories, have not been reproduced here.  The original publication 
did not number headings.  Numbering has been added to maintain consistency with the rest of the thesis. 
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4.2. Key Dialectics in Cloud Services 
Computers & Society ETHICOMP Special Issue (2015): 52–59. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2874239.2874247. 
4.2.1. Introduction 
This paper explores dialectics within debates over key ethical issues pertaining 
to cloud services.   These issues concern privacy, responsibility for the actions of 
systems, and the development of monopoly service providers.  Between them these 
concerns largely dictate the shape and capabilities of current and future cloud-based 
services.  We shall show how the current state of affairs is dominated by a sense of lack 
of agency in terms of doing things differently from the current reflexive practice, an 
assumption that no alternatives to current practice are possible.  This paper will attempt 
to organise the key concerns with cloud services by organising them into three dialectical 
axes: 
 The nature of the relationship between personal privacy and service 
provision. 
 The degree to which people who build or operate cloud-based services are 
ethically responsible for the actions or effects of those services. 
 The nature of the marketplace for those services.   
Since this chapter considers cloud services in the broadest sense, it is 
appropriate to commence with the definition of cloud computing used here.  The US 
National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-145 defines the essential 
characteristics of cloud computing as being:  
 The ability to provide services whenever desired without human 
intervention.  
 Being available to a wide range of client devices via networking technology. 
 The “virtualisation” of computing resources, such that digital operations 
are not linked to specific servers or locations. 
 Scalability – the capability of the systems to scale up or down in response 
to changes in demand (a necessary corollary of virtualisation). 
 Often, but not necessarily, Software as a Service.  
(Mell and Grance 2011)  
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Clearly this definition applies to many, if not most, internet systems and digital 
services, not merely to the virtualisation of server functions previously found in the 
traditional client-server network.  Under this view, Facebook and Google’s search engine 
are both cloud services.  This is both valid and important - confining discussion of cloud 
computing to data processing or file storage functions limits discussion to a few 
contingent uses of a wider system and obscures the essential factors we need to consider. 
4.2.2. Privacy versus Security 
Our first axis is the necessity versus the contingency of reductions to privacy 
under new digital services.  That is to say, there is one body of opinion which holds that 
the erosion of personal privacy is a necessary and unavoidable consequence of, or 
precondition for, the delivery of digital services.  These positions tend to be a reflexive 
response within the development community, rarely stated formally, and is a minority 
view in the literature.  As a result, detailed arguments as to why privacy must be reduced 
to enable cloud services are scarce.  However, Professor Bergkamp’s paper, The Privacy 
Fallacy (Bergkamp 2002) marshals all the arguments in this camp. 
Professor Bergkamp argues there should be no privacy protection of any form 
because preservation of personal privacy is harmful to society in many ways.  He 
provides five main arguments; there is no need for data privacy, data protection reduces 
individual freedom, personal privacy is contrary to economic growth, EU data legislation 
is unenforceable and the EU’s data protection regimes put it out of step with the rest of 
the planet.  We will now explore each of these in more depth. 
Bergkamp argues there is no need for data protection or digital privacy because 
no one wants it and it serves no purpose.  He states there is no evidence anyone has ever 
been harmed by privacy violations or personalization of services based on personal data.  
He does not provide any evidence for this and it is contradictory to the reported activity 
of many data protection authorities.  For example, in 2014 the Data Commissioner of 
Ireland received 2,264 data breach notifications, investigated 960 complaints and 
launched 162 prosecutions.  Half (53%) of complaints involved disclosing personal data 
inappropriately, such as disclosure of personal financial data to relatives or the listing of 
email addresses and passwords on public websites (Office of the Data Protection 
Commissioner 2015).  The Verizon 2014 Data Breach Investigations Report (Verizon 2014) 
covers 63,000 data violations across 93 countries in 2014. It highlights financial theft and 
the cost of dealing with a breach, such as cancelling credit cards, as the main harms to 
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the individual.  Other research exists to show harm from less obvious privacy violations.  
RT@Iwantprivacy: Widespread violation of privacy settings in the Twitter social network (Meeder et 
al. 2010) details harm from privacy violations in Twitter when people reuse private 
tweets in public.  Privacy Violations Using Microtargeted Ads (Korolova 2011) examines harm 
from privacy violations in Facebook.  Privacy violations has also been shown to harm 
the companies themselves.  How Privacy Flaws Affect Consumer Perception (Afroz et al. 2013) 
shows how privacy breaches reduce the chance people will buy from a company, while Is 
There a Cost to Privacy Breaches? (Acquisti, Friedman, and Telang 2006) shows how privacy 
violations reduce a company’s share price.  Studies also exist to show harm from 
personalization of advertising and news.  The research findings of Sweeney’s 
Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery (Sweeney 2013) show how racial stereotyping in ad 
personalization harms Afro-Americans in many ways, including job prospects and access 
to financial services.  Bursting Your Filter Bubble (Resnick et al. 2013) shows harm from 
news personalization, while the famous Facebook news manipulation study, Experimental 
Evidence of Massive-scale Emotional Contagion through Social Networks (Kramer, Guillory, and 
Hancock 2014) shows how personalizing news feeds to contain more negative contents 
can depress people.  Bergkamp’s proposition that there has never been any harm from 
privacy violations or personalization appears to be contradicted by such evidence.   
Bergkamp also argues there is no need for data protection because no one 
wants it.  He argues that people don’t realise that data protection prevents 
personalization, but that when they do, they always prefer personalization over data 
protection.  He does not cite any evidence for this.  By contrast, Culnan’s 1993 study of 
personalization in shopping, How Did They Get My Name? (Culnan 1993) shows that when 
offered the choice, the people he surveyed preferred privacy over personalisation.  More 
recently, the 2013 Comres Big Brother Watch Survey (Comres 2013) polled 10,000 people in 
nine EU countries to find 75% were concerned about privacy and wanted data 
protection regulations, while 45% believed they were being harmed by corporate data 
practices.   
Bergkamp also argues there is no need to regulate sale of personal data because 
companies never sell it.  However, there is, in fact, a huge industry in the sale and 
aggregation of personal data, as the 2014 Federal Trade Commission’s investigation into 
data brokers found (Brooks 2005; Federal Trade Commission 2014).   
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Bergkamp argues that personalization results in cheaper prices.  However, he 
does not cite any empirical evidence for this or reasons why it should be so.  He cites as 
evidence a statement made by Fred Cate, Professor of Law at Indiana University, that 
personalization results in cheaper prices, but this was a statement made to a 
Congressional committee, not a research finding.  Prof. Cate’s own list of publications 
does not include any research into personalization; his speciality is data protection law.   
Later in the paper Bergkamp states that data protection costs money and that it is so 
burdensome and expensive that businesses can only survive by ignoring their legal 
obligations.  One may imagine he believes this is the cause of higher prices to 
consumers, though he does not say so.  However, research like Sweeney’s Discrimination 
in Online Ad Delivery (Sweeney 2013) shows how personalization actually increases costs 
to Afro-American consumers in the USA, while Turow’s The Daily You: How the New 
Advertising Industry is Defining Your Identity and Your World (Turow 2011) shows how 
personalization can reduce or increase prices, depending on whether you are the 
consumer companies want or not. 
Bergkamp also argues that privacy protection increases identity theft because 
data protection makes it harder to tell if someone really is who they claim to be.  He 
does not cite any evidence for this and it seems counter-intuitive.   Given that privacy 
protection reduces access to the personal data necessary for identity theft, such 
protection could be presumed to make it harder to commit, so one could argue the exact 
opposite of Bergkamp in the absence of any research.  Bergkamp’s position here allies 
with his arguments elsewhere in his paper that we all need to know as much as possible 
about each other in order to protect ourselves from one another and that privacy directly 
prevents this.  He states that one problem with privacy protection is that it allows an 
individual to control what they disclose to the world.  He does not explicitly say this is a 
bad thing, but it is clearly implied from his usage.  Here it is worth noting research 
showing the reverse, that lack of privacy restricts human freedom.  For example, 
knowledge one is being watched on the internet has been shown to have a chilling effect 
on what people say (Bass 2013) and what they search for (Marthews and Tucker 2014), 
even when engaging in legal and socially acceptable activity.  
Bergkamp claims there is a vast amount of money to be made acquiring and 
selling personal data, despite his earlier claim that there are no businesses selling it.  He 
provides no evidence for this economic activity, but the claim is supported elsewhere.  
For example, in 2013 the OECD estimated the personal data of each Facebook user to 
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range from $US40/year to $US400 (OECD 2013b).  Bergkamp claims that this data 
market alone is sufficient reason to remove privacy protections.  However, the mere 
presence of economic activity does not, in and of itself, mean we should encourage it.  
There is a vast amount of money to be made in drug smuggling, but no one uses that as 
an argument for encouraging it.  
Bergkamp also states that the EU’s data legislation is unenforceable.  He says 
the very concept of personal privacy is too vague to support regulation and that the 
regulations cannot properly specify what constitutes personal data.  Furthermore, he 
says, each privacy incident must be judged on its own merits.  He does not explain how 
judging a case on its own merits is a problem.  Each and every infraction of the law is 
judged individually, so arguing that this is also the case for privacy issues does not, in and 
of itself, constitute a sign of poor legislation.  Furthermore, it is difficult to imagine what 
the alternative would be if a regulator or judge was not allowed to consider the specific 
details of each case they were trying to adjudicate.    
As stated earlier, Bergkamp believes that data protection is so onerous that no 
business can do it properly and survive financially.  He claims the only outcome is that 
data regulations are never enforced.  Clearly the many cases of prosecution for privacy 
violations are not accounted for in this argument.  Bergkamp also states that EU data 
protection legislation is founded on a misunderstanding of how business works, but does 
not provide any further details regarding the nature of the misunderstanding or what the 
reality truly is, so this statement is impossible to assess. 
Bergkamp’s paper also states privacy protection damages society because it 
involves the government paternalistically interfering in people’s relations with each other 
in a misguided attempt to stop people hurting each other.  Such an argument can also be 
said of laws against violence and theft, so the logical consequence of such a position is 
that we should move to a state of complete anarchy.  However, Bergkamp does not 
address this implication.  Instead he goes on to state that government’s should never 
restrict any information under any circumstances.  Again no reasons are provided to 
justify this proposition.  Such a broad statement can also be used as an argument in 
favour of making child pornography freely available, so some additional clarification 
would seem appropriate. 
Finally, Bergkamp claims that EU data protection legislation is out of step with 
the rest of the world.  He does not provide any evidence to support this, but he clearly 
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thinks this is a bad thing and grounds for abandoning data protection.  This is a 
questionable claim.  The EU’s data protection regime was intentionally built to accord 
with pre-existing OECD guidelines, which were first developed in 1980 (OECD 2013a).   
Bergkamp never states it is technically impossible to maintain privacy while 
extending cloud services.  His arguments are merely that we should not.  Our position is 
that there is no necessary and unavoidable relationship between privacy consequences 
and functionality.  One does not have to reduce privacy in order to extend services.  
Rather, it is always a question of choice, either in how the system is constructed or in the 
type of business model under which it operates, and there are always alternatives.  It may 
be that some of those alternatives are more expensive than the privacy-reducing models, 
or that alternatives are more technically challenging.  However, that, in and of itself, is 
not an argument for the necessity of privacy-reducing models, but rather an argument 
underpinning a particular business model or software approach.   
Currently those who are building cloud-based services most commonly work 
on the basis that privacy is exchanged for digital services.  However, there is also a 
growing body of those seeking to develop alternatives, in terms of governance or 
business model or in terms of code.  The most notable is the Privacy by Design 
movement.  However, most of the Privacy by Design material is so vague as to be little 
more than statements of intent.  For example, IBM claim to have moved to Privacy by 
Design by doing nothing more than implementing awareness training and building an 
internal system for reporting data breaches (Office of the Information & Privacy 
Commissioner of Ontario and IBM 2011).  Here Langheinrich’s paper, Principles of 
Privacy-Aware Ubiquitous Systems (Langheinrich 2001) stands out as the exception, being a 
concrete statement of specific technical design principles which genuinely do embed 
privacy considerations into the technical architecture.  Langheinrich’s paper shows it is 
possible to build robust systems which have privacy protection embedded within the 
design and operation of the system. 
It is notable that Langheinrich has practical experience in the design of privacy 
systems, being one of the authors of the W3C’s technical standard, Platform for Privacy 
Preferences, or PPP (Cranor et al. 2002).  The PPP standard enables browsers to hold the 
user’s preferences for what data they will allow a website to gather.  The server 
component of PPP allows the web server to list its own data-gathering practices.  PPP 
then enables the browser to compare the web server’s practices with the user’s 
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preferences.  The system provides for warnings to the user and for compact and rapid 
communication between client and server of data practices.  The system was supported 
in Microsoft Internet Explorer 6 when it first emerged, but lack of support by website 
owners means PPP is largely unused today.  
The first of Langheinrich’s principles is the Principle of Openness, or “Notice.”  
This simply states that no device or service should gather data about someone without 
telling them.  Here he makes reference to PPP as providing a digital vocabulary which 
could be used to programmatically describe what data is being gathered, for what 
purpose and by whom.  This is paired with the second principle, the Principle of 
Consent, which encodes the legal necessity for informed consent.  A system must allow 
for someone to opt out of being tracked or recorded, and do so without denying service 
on a “take it or leave it” basis.  Thus, for example, buildings would need to disable 
tracking for some people and not simply refuse them entry. 
The third principle is termed “Anonymity and Pseudonymity.”  This states that 
people must have the option to remain anonymous.  The issue here is that some services 
are only possible if they know a user’s identity and history.  Here Langheinrich 
introduces pseudonymity.  Under this system a person may have a unique identifier of 
some form, such as a cookie or RFID chip, which anchors the data systems and forms 
the index key to their personal data history.  However, this identifier contains no 
personally identifiable information and is discardable at any time.  Furthermore, such a 
system permits people to have multiple pseudonymous ID’s and so prevent aggregation 
of disparate activities by data brokers.  It is noteworthy that EU data regulations have 
recently been updated to add the category of pseudonymous identity between personal 
and anonymous data (Ustaran and Macmillan 2015). 
Langheinrich’s fourth principle of “Proximity and Locality” limits the scope of 
data collection.  Looking to a future in which people have many devices capable of 
recording their surroundings, the principle of proximity states that these devices can only 
operate in the proximity of their owner.  This prevents people leaving devices to record 
data unseen then returning for them later.  Of wider application is the principle of 
locality; devices should not transmit data any further than absolutely necessary to fulfil 
their functions.  For example, Samsung’s voice activated TV’s transmit all conversations 
they hear to Samsung’s central servers.  Voice commands are interpreted there and the 
appropriate command then sent back to the TV.  All conversation recordings are stored 
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permanently for later analysis (‘Privacy | Samsung UK’ n.d.).  Under Langheinrich’s 
principles the TV would have been designed so that it did not need to involve cloud 
services.  Voice recognition chips have been around for 20 years and could easily have be 
used instead. 
The fifth principle is the “Need for Security,” in which Langheinrich advocates 
various levels of security depending on the nature of the data.  More importantly, he 
illustrates how the previous principles themselves enhance security.  If data is not being 
transmitted many security problems simply vanish.  Similarly, if data is not linked to an 
identifiable individual, but only to a pseudonymous ID, unauthorised access has less 
potential for harm. 
Langheinrich’s final principles are the principles of “Collection and Use 
Limitation.” These state that data collectors should only collect data for a specific 
purpose and not store it, as Samsung TV does, in case they want to use it in the future.  
Secondly, they should only collect the data they need in order to fulfil their task and 
nothing more.  Finally, they should only keep data as long as it is necessary for the 
purpose.  While these appear primarily legislative principles, they can be embodied in 
technical design through the use of the earlier principles.  For example, if data is housed 
in the user’s devices in accordance with the principle of locality, then the user can 
impose usage and storage limitations themselves. 
Langheinrich’s principles, if implemented, would solve many privacy concerns, 
enhance security and actually make many applications of ubiquitous and cloud services 
easier to construct.  What they show is that it is perfectly possible to design cloud 
services in a manner which enhances both security and privacy at the same time, while 
permitting all the personalization necessary.  They place control of personal data firmly 
in the hands of the user without compromising technical operations in any way.  In fact, 
their reduced dependence on permanent access to centralised services makes them more 
robust and reduces the burden of traffic on the internet.  These principles are easy to 
understand and yet produce powerful architectures.  They offer a practical and detailed 
response to the reflexive position that personalized cloud services must reduce privacy.  
In doing so they provide concrete evidence that it would be possible to move cloud 
service evolution into a path which fulfils all its potential, yet enhances privacy and 
security at the same time.  Langheinrich’s design principles demonstrate that the 
reduction of privacy in cloud services is a choice, not a necessity. 
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4.2.3. Ethical Responsibility 
Our second axis is concerned with the degree to which people who design, 
build or operate cloud services are ethically responsible for the consequences of the 
actions of those systems.  This question does not arise with regard to all cloud services, 
but only with the rising generation of autonomous services which process personal data 
in order to deliver personalised services, such as personalised search results, product 
recommendations and news feeds.  In the near future we will see the rise of more 
intelligent and more life-critical personalised services, most notably with bio-
implantation and other medical services (Ikonen et al. 2010).  The question is primarily 
one of who is responsible when such autonomous services make decisions which result 
in harm, but where these decisions are not the result of faulty design or incorrect data.   
The competing positions are that, on the one hand, programmers and operators 
are not ethically responsible for the actions of autonomous systems, versus a view that 
they are.  It is difficult to argue that the person holding a hammer is not ethically 
responsible for the consequences of whatever happens when the hammer hits something 
because the hammer is totally under the control of the user.  However, with large 
industrially-produced complex automated systems, especially those that include some 
form of AI functionality, arguments emerge in favour of the position that those who 
build the systems are not ethically responsible for the decisions those systems make.  
This argument will no doubt be exacerbated the more powerful and the more intelligent 
and autonomous these systems become.  This issue is discussed most frequently with 
regard to autonomous military systems, whose lethality makes the question of ethical 
responsibility both stark and urgent.  However, the question is just as pertinent for any 
form of autonomous system, including those cloud-based personalization systems 
already in operation.    
Andreas Matthias’ paper, The Responsibility Gap (Matthias 2004) offers a fairly 
straightforward account of the philosophical logic behind the position that programmers 
are not responsible for the actions of their autonomous systems, while Robert Sparrow’s 
Killer Robots (Sparrow 2007) presents the same view via an examination of the 
practicalities of creating and deploying autonomous systems.  Both take the position that 
no one at all is ethically responsible for the actions of autonomous agents.   
Sparrow’s argument is based on his particular understandings of the terms 
‘autonomy’ and ‘responsibility.’  Our view is that he defines these terms in such a way as 
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to make any contrary conclusion impossible.  Early in the paper, he defines autonomy as 
being free from external causation: 
“Where an agent acts autonomously, then, it is not possible to 
hold anyone else responsible for its actions.  In so far as the agent’s actions 
were its own and stemmed from its own ends, others cannot be held 
responsible for them.  Conversely, if we hold anyone else responsible for 
the actions of an agent, we must hold that, in relation to those acts at least, 
they were not autonomous.” (Sparrow 2007, 65–66) 
Sparrow does not defend this definition of autonomy.  However, once it has 
been defined this way, it becomes a matter of logical necessity that there is no ethical 
responsibility by the programmers or controllers.  It is also worth noting that Sparrow 
uses autonomy in an absolute sense, as if the agent were free from all influence except 
their prior experience.  In particular, he does not recognise the environment, the 
capabilities of the device or its internal structures as having any impact on decision-
making.  He argues the programmer cannot be responsible because the essence of an 
autonomous system is that it will make unpredictable decisions.  He argues the controller 
of the system is not responsible because they could not anticipate what it would do any 
better than the programmer.  In both cases, he ignores the fact the system is designed to 
perform a particular role in a particular environment.  A software agent is not free to do 
just anything, it can only recognise inputs of a type it has been designed for, and has a 
relatively limited range of actions it can take, and can only operate in a specific type of 
environment.  A share-dealing system cannot walk the dog or assess your exercise 
regime.  The type of decisions an autonomous system may make, and the range of 
options available to it, are not only predictable, they are the basis upon which it was 
designed and built - they define it.  An autonomous system may make its own decisions, 
even alter its own programming, but its range of actions and the forms of harm it may 
commit are knowable in advance in virtue of the type of system it is.  
Sparrow does not mention Strawson in his paper, but his conception of moral 
responsibility has close parallels to Strawson’s influential work.  Strawson’s position is 
that no one is morally responsible for anything because no one is free from external 
influence (Strawson 1994), though the details of why are beyond the scope of this 
research project.  Though Sparrow does not say so explicitly, his use of responsibility is 
clearly that one can only be responsible for specific actions.  In Sparrow’s view, the 
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design of the system and the decision to use it do not carry any ethical responsibility 
because neither gives one the ability to predict the specifics of an individual act the 
system may take. 
Sparrow also argues it is not possible to hold the system itself responsible 
because responsibility necessarily requires punishability which requires suffering.  Under 
his definitions, something can only be morally responsible if it can be punished and 
something can only be punished if it can suffer.  Since software systems cannot be made 
to suffer, they cannot be punished and so cannot be held responsible for their actions.  
Note here that we have switched from talk of “being responsible” to talk of “being held 
responsible.”  This demonstrates that Sparrow has conflated the moral state of being 
responsible with the social status of being eligible for punishment. 
Matthias’s The Responsibility Gap (Matthias 2004) also argues that no one is 
responsible for the decisions of autonomous software systems.  His position also links 
responsibility to individual acts, holding that one can only be responsible if one can 
know the internal state of the system and has control of each act it takes, at least to the 
degree where one could prevent it.  Under this analysis a programmer has no 
responsibility for the actions of a system once the owner takes control.  The owner is not 
responsible because they cannot know the internal state of the system.  Matthias spends 
some time examining different types of AI learning, showing how each makes their 
internal state unknowable in different ways, but the differences do not affect his final 
conclusion. 
The narrow understanding of responsibility seen in Matthias and Sparrow is the 
foundation on which their arguments rest.  In contrast, Miller’s Collective Responsibility and 
Information and Communication Technology (S. Miller 2008) confronts this issue by arguing 
there are different types of responsibility.  In addition to the responsibility for individual 
acts which Matthias and Sparrow focus on, Miller points out we also recognise one can 
have “structural” responsibility by creating the conditions which made the act possible 
or by ordering others to take actions which eventually led to the act.  Under Miller’s 
analysis both programmers and controllers of autonomous systems take structural 
responsibility for every act taken by these systems.  Miller then goes deeper, investigating 
the concept of collective responsibility.  He argues that to the degree that individuals 
contribute something to the shape and operation of an autonomous system, so they 
share in responsibility for its actions.  Here he acknowledges the existence of corporate 
 85 
 
responsibility, but argues that it does not provide a moral shield for the individual 
workers, whose individual contributions to a system’s operation convey a share in 
collective responsibility for its actions. 
Miller’s approach is a step towards recognition that software agents exist within 
the wider context of human activity.  This broader perspective is fully achieved in 
Software Agents, Anticipatory Ethics, and Accountability (D. G. Johnson 2011).  Reiterating the 
perspective that technology is socially situated, this paper argues that the concept of any 
digital service as an autonomous agent is merely metaphorical; that no such system can 
be autonomous in the sense we apply autonomy to humans in moral debates.  As such, 
the use of the metaphor is justifiable only by its utility.  Johnson criticises the concept of 
any software as an autonomous agent on the grounds it generates just these ethical 
problems.  Instead, Johnson argues we should recognise autonomous systems as 
elements within a larger socio-technical system, made by people and used by people for 
human purposes.  Under this view autonomous systems are not independent entities 
hermetically sealed from their environments, but systems which can only be understood 
by reference to the context of their use.  Johnson makes implied use of the different 
forms of responsibility seen in Miller, but does not elucidate the differences.  Instead she 
focuses on the arbitrariness of delimiting technical artefacts.  She denies that 
autonomous software agents are different in kind from any other form of automated or 
semi-automated device, being merely more complicated.  Autonomous systems are thus 
merely, like hammers, extensions of human will and intent.  Under this arrangement, 
ethical responsibility for their actions is not in any way changed by the mere fact of their 
complexity. 
4.2.4. Open versus Closed 
Our final dialectic concerns the form and marketplace of cloud services.  Here 
the dominating dialectic is that of open versus closed systems and open versus closed 
organisational contexts for such systems.   
The scene for this debate is best set by Eben Moglen in his presentation, 
Freedom in the Cloud, delivered to the Internet Society in 2010 (Moglen 2010).  Moglen 
argues that the internet was originally designed as a non-hierarchical peer-to-peer 
network.  However, under the influence of the architectural model of client-server 
networking, the services which evolved used a smart-server-dumb-client model, in which 
both algorithms and data were centralised.  Moglen maintains that cloud architecture 
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works on this thin client - fat server model and does not represent a new computing 
architecture, merely the virtualisation of some server operations within this traditional 
model.  These servers maintain activity logs.  These logs can be mined for behavioural 
data.  Marketing companies learned they could mine these logs to understand, predict 
and influence user behaviour in order to sell advertising.  Moglen contends that as the 
perceived value of this information grew, it spurred the development of a secondary 
internet infrastructure of tracking services designed to add to the growing database of 
what we now call user profiles. 
Thus, Moglen describes how an architecture which concentrates processing 
power and data at centralised locations promotes a concentration of both technical 
proficiency and economic power, while also promoting a top-down hierarchical 
organisational model and, in a global internet, the development of a limited number of 
very large monopoly service providers.  This has, he argues, produced an extreme power 
dichotomy between those who own the services and those who use them.  The business 
model which has come to dominate the internet is that of delivering services in exchange 
for spying on the users all the time.  Moglen describes this state of affairs as undesirable 
for two reasons.  Firstly, the price is too high and the services are not worth the loss of 
privacy. Secondly, the lack of alternative models for access to the same services makes 
this unfair arrangement unavoidable.  He argues that we need an alternative architecture 
in which the data about us stored on centralised servers is instead housed in devices we 
own and carry with us.  We can then control who accesses this data and how.  He argues 
that this is possible with current technology.  
There is an additional element of concern within Moglen’s model which he 
hints at but does not explore.  The combination of architecture and business model he 
describes has produced walled gardens.  These are silos of private technology and 
proprietary data formats which are not compatible with, or accessible by, other systems 
or organisations.  The patent system combines with a capitalist marketplace to financially 
reward such behaviour.  If I am the sole owner of a system everyone wants to use, I can 
make money.  If I create a system which I give away, I do not benefit.  What I therefore 
need to do is lock everyone into my technology, and then I will “lock in” the market 
(Crampton and Boudreaux 2003).   
The effect of this is to lock data and services into a single monopoly provider.  
The provider becomes the gatekeeper over the knowledge of what they do and how they 
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do it.  Users cannot migrate to a competitor without significant effort and loss.  For 
example, if you close your account with Amazon, they will remove all the books from 
your Kindle (Amazon 2017).  You cannot therefore switch to an alternative, such as 
Adobe Digital Editions, without re-purchasing your entire digital library.  Different legal 
regimes permit different levels of access inside these walled gardens, but in no case does 
a society have full knowledge or any substantive control.  Such a system has no interest 
in open standards, interoperability, or a free flow of information.  This lack of 
interoperability and open standards was why the internet and HTML were not developed 
by commercial enterprises.   Early pre-cursors of the web tried the same walled garden 
approach, including America Online, CompuServe and Lotus Notes.  It was only when 
Tim Berners-Lee gave HTML away that we broke free of this limiting system and gained 
the web.  Berners-Lee gave it away because he saw things in exactly this way and 
believed that if he patented or sold HTML, it would become just another walled garden 
(Berners-Lee 1999).  
However, as companies have developed services which sit atop these 
communally-owned standards, so they have developed further proprietary systems.  The 
final result is that companies have built a new layer of walled gardens and data silos on 
top of the open platform which is the internet (Dyhouse 2010).  The scale of the internet 
user base combines with a shared service delivery infrastructure to enable the rise of 
extremely large global monopolies, such Google, Amazon and Facebook.  The result is 
that cloud services are portioned out amongst a limited number of very large hierarchical 
organisations, each of which hides its use of data from public scrutiny and uses its 
monopoly position and ownership of personal data as a competitive advantage 
(McChesney 2014; Curran, Fenton, and Freedman 2012; Brown and Marsden 2013a).  
The net effect is that people are locked to service providers like serfs to their lord.  
However, unlike in the Middle Ages, there is no competing lord to flee to if you are 
unhappy with your lot.  This power is a concern to many.  Some argue, for example, that 
Amazon’s potential to control what books are available makes it a political institution as 
well as an economic one (Brown and Marsden 2013c), while Google is has consistently 
been one of the biggest spenders on lobbying in Washington since 2012 (Hamburger 
and Gold 2014).   
Opposing this state of affairs are a disparate range of alternatives, such as 
Moglen and his concept of a personal server.  Each alternative tends to focus on one 
aspect of this system, such as technical architecture or business model.   Technically, the 
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existence of the internet is based on open standards, such as TCP and IP (Stevens and 
Wright 1994), so alternatives have always been available on a technical level.  Here we 
have the open source activists, such as the Free Software Foundation and the IETF.  In 
addition, we have less obvious alternative architectures based on peer-to-peer (as 
opposed to client-server) models, such as the BOINC platform for community 
computing (D. P. Anderson and Fedak 2006) and the BitTorrent protocol (Pouwelse et 
al. 2005).   Standards like XML (XML Working Group 2015) and RDF (RDF Working 
Group 2015) provide a means of breaking open walled gardens through data exchange, 
while people such as Chris Marsden in the UK or Robert McChesney in the USA have 
developed the rationale for breaking down these proprietary data silos.  
McChesney argues that the development of monopolies and cartels has so 
dominated the internet that there has been little economic benefit for the rest of society.  
He argues that there is so little competition at the point of delivery that service providers 
constitute a cartel which should be forced into competition with not-for-profit public 
alternatives.  He calls for the monopolistic corporations dominating important services, 
like Facebook and Google, to be broken into smaller competing units and subject to 
much more stringent and detailed state control.  McChesney’s argument is that the size 
of these corporations is so great they pose a threat to democracy itself through their 
power to lobby politicians, dominate online debate and skew economic development 
(McChesney 2014). 
Concern over monopoly domination is addressed in a different manner by 
Brown and Marsden in a number of publications.  Instead of seeking a solution by 
changing the economic structure, they focus on the proprietary data structures which 
form the foundation of such domination.  In addition to rights such as the right to have 
one’s records deleted, they argue for the right to move such data to an alternative 
provider of the same service (Brown and Marsden 2013b).  They cite similar historical 
examples in which Microsoft, IBM and Intel have been forced into making their systems 
interoperable with competitors, mainly through antitrust approaches in the USA and EU 
(Brown and Marsden 2013a).  They argue that state intervention to break up these 
monopolies is not practical in a world dominated by competing national legislative 
regimes.  Instead, they argue that merely providing users the ability to switch to 
alternatives would be sufficient.  They believe that this would stimulate the development 
of service providers offering a range of alternative models (Brown and Marsden 2013c). 
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The approach of treating monopoly service providers as public utilities is 
gaining ground in government circles.  Recently the UK House of Lords called for the 
internet to be treated like a public utility rather than a market place of optional luxuries 
(The Select Committee on Digital Skills 2015).  International bodies, such as the EU and 
UNESCO, have started calling for wider civic involvement in determining how services 
are provided (UNESCO Secretariat 2014; Kroes and Buhr 2014) and for the 
development of alternative service provision models.  For example, the outgoing EU 
Vice President, Neelie Kroes, stated in November 2014: 
“Why should we have to give up our privacy for a “free” service if we 
prefer to pay for that same service with cash and keep our privacy?” (Kroes 
and Buhr 2014, 1) 
4.2.5. Conclusions - Agency 
While these three dialectics focus on different issues, the poles of each axis rest 
on competing perspectives on the possibility of agency.   Those who accept things as 
they are now do not see a possibility for agency, while their opponents do.  On the first 
axis we have those who hold that preservation of privacy and delivery of service are 
necessarily in opposition.  Here they are holding that there is no possibility of agency in 
the relationship between privacy and service design.  To the contrary, we have seen how 
Langheinrich’s design principles show multiple opportunities to intervene in the ways 
which deliver services while also maintaining privacy.   In our second axis of ethical 
responsibility, the position of there being no ethical connection between the creator of 
an autonomous system and that system’s effects is also a position of there being no 
agency.  Here lack of agency pertains not to the nature of the system, but to the 
consequences of the system’s actions.  Under this view, once an autonomous system is 
activated, human agency ceases.  However, as we have seen, preserving a lack of 
responsibility requires limiting the conception of where agency lies.  Responsibility has to 
be defined in a very constricted manner which focuses on the making of each individual 
decision and denies the influence of any context.  Instead, services are treated as 
independent of any human agency - in terms of their design, their environment, their 
purpose, how they are used and who benefits.  By contrast, once autonomous services 
are contextualised within a field of human practice, human agency becomes apparent 
throughout the construction and operation of such systems and human ethical 
responsibility becomes self-evident.  Finally, in our third axis of service architecture and 
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business model, we see a historical lack of agency in the development of the broader 
internet culture.  Here the client-server structure was accepted reflexively by developers 
and users, along with the most obvious reflections of this in organisational and economic 
models.   
In all three debates we see one pole in each dialectic disempowering itself, 
primarily because it simply fails to recognise that there is a choice and that agency, the 
power to act differently, exists.  The conclusion which emerges from this is that a key 
step to improving the current ethical status of cloud services is inculcating in 
programmers and leaders that they possess agency, bringing them to recognise there are 
alternatives and that they have the power to explore them. 
- end of published paper - 
4.3. Next Steps 
Accepting the analysis of some of the dynamics and structures of the internet 
economy which are ethically problematic, the following chapter seeks to describe the 
overall impact it has on the individual.  If these structures and dynamics continue as they 
are, they will provide the socio-economic structures by which emerging ICT’s may 
restrict autonomy in the future.  Having identified these structures and dynamics in Key 
Dialectics, the next task in the research process was to develop an account of how they 
can restrict human autonomy, to argue that they do so today, and to provide a 
framework for describing such a state.  The following chapter addressed these issues.  It 
was published as “Digital Alienation as the Foundation of Privacy Concerns” in 
Computers & Society ETHICOMP Special Issue (2015). 
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5. Digital Alienation - ICT’s as Socio-Technical Systems 
This chapter details our work to expand the social aspects of technologies as socio-technical 
systems and to account for mechanisms by which someone may be alienated from their digital 
environment.  It forms the second part of the answer to the secondary research question of by what 
mechanisms can ICT’s restrict human autonomy. 
5.1. Background to the Paper 
Our evaluation of ETICA’s technology groups indicated the need for additional 
work to provide an account of the social dimensions of ICT’s.  In particular, there was a 
need to account for social aspects of ICT’s which impacted human autonomy, especially 
those which were not dictated by the necessities of engineering.  These are important 
because they indicate that it is technically feasible to achieve the same goal without the 
attendant ethical concerns.  In order to have any practical application in computer 
science, a social account within computer science must take into consideration how the 
created output of the field, such as user interfaces or algorithms, can have the non-
technical effect of restricting human autonomy, as was summarised above (see 2.5 
Addressing the social aspects of technology, p.31). 
The following section contains the published paper addressing this issue, Digital 
Alienation as the Foundation of Online Privacy Concerns (Dainow 2015a).  Accepting and 
building on the analysis in the preceding paper, it explored the difficulties of using a 
traditional marxist analysis to account for digital alienation.  The problem for marxist 
analysis is that the activity people undertake online does not look coerced nor does it 
appear estranged from the creator’s individuality, both of which are typically seen as 
necessary for the production of alienation.  As a result of this apparent difficulty, much 
of the existing scholarship has focused on the relationship between alienation and labour 
on the internet.  We overcame these difficulties by discarding the traditional approach to 
argue one can better understand alienation online by focusing on the relationship 
between user intent and technical infrastructure, rather than concerns with the nature of 
labour.  We argued that under the existing economic model dominating the internet, free 
services are financed by recording user activity and then using the products of this 
commercial surveillance to sell information about people to others.  The paper argued 
the real harm in current online business models is that commercial surveillance is being 
used to commodify private life.  Seeking to define personal data in more precise terms, 
we introduced two new concepts necessary for a detailed discussion of any ethical issues 
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regarding personal data - the digital shadow and the digital persona.  The digital shadow is a 
relatively common concept taken from Alan Westin (Westin 1970).  The digital persona 
is the term we invented to account for personal involvement in one’s online 
communications.  Here we defined a uniquely digital version of a concept known in 
Psychoanalysis as the ‘persona’ (Jung 1977) and in sociology as the ‘mask’ (Goffman 
1990).  We then show how affordances in current online systems are tuned to 
commodification of the user’s personality.  We then explore the nature of online 
surveillance and show how affordances combine with the surveillance economy to 
produce digital alienation. 
The rest of this chapter contains the paper as published.  Minor modifications have been made 
to ensure the writing style matches that of this thesis (such as changing “I conclude” to “we conclude”).  
The citation style has been changed to maintain consistency with the rest of the thesis.  In keeping with 
the need to present the published material in the format of a coherent sequence of chapters, journal meta-
information, such as keywords and categories, have not been reproduced here.  The original publication 
did not number headings.  Numbering has been added to maintain consistency with the rest of the thesis. 
5.2. Digital Alienation as the Foundation of Online Privacy Concerns 
Computers & Society ETHICOMP Special Issue (2015): 109–17. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2874239.2874255. 
Digital alienation is a privacy issue.  Digital alienation occurs when one’s digital 
lifeworld or the digital self is exploited.  The process of exploitation extracts value from 
a person’s digital activity through coercion and manipulation.  We are coerced into 
submission to ubiquitous commercial surveillance11 of our digital activity.  Value is 
extracted from this surveillance process through the conversion of surveilled data into 
economic and political capital.  The entire system represents a reification of one’s digital 
lifeworld and commodification of the digital self.  It also poses a number of problems 
for traditional understandings of concepts related to alienation within marxist theory, 
such as coercion, exploitation, and power dynamics.  Indeed, much of the debate in this 
area over the last few years has been concerned with how to account for alienation 
within a digital context.  We argue solutions to current problems can best be achieved by 
altering the analytic approach. 
                                                 
11 Commercial surveillance involves the recording and analysis of online user behaviour with the aim of predicting and controlling 
their behaviour (Turow 2011). 
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5.2.1. Scope of Concern 
Being connected to the ubiquitous computing environment which is coming to 
surround us is already necessary for full participation in modern Western societies.  A 
review across the range of those emerging ICT’s which will impact society over the next 
decade shows that being connected may become necessary for survival itself (Ikonen et 
al. 2010).  When the internet first emerged, it was predicted that it would “flatten” the 
power structures of traditional society, even lead to the “fading away” of the nation state 
(Negroponte 1996).   Such views were based on technological determinism; they 
envisioned the new distinguishing features of internet technology as passing unmodified 
into society and reshaping it to match the internet’s technical architecture (Curran, 
Fenton, and Freedman 2012). 
In reality, the development of the internet ecosystem has been filtered through 
the structures of pre-existing society and evolved in accordance with its imperatives.  
While it has been disruptive in terms of changing some of the dominant players in media 
markets, destroying some and creating others, it has not fundamentally changed the 
power structures in society.  Authoritarian governments have learned to control and 
censor it, hegemonic corporate capitalism has come to dominate it, and people’s digital 
activities have been cajoled into closed silos controlled by a very few exceptionally large 
corporations (Curran, Fenton, and Freedman 2012).  Once seen as the antidote to 
structural inequality, the internet has actually become a profoundly powerful tool of 
domination based on exploitation and alienation. 
5.2.2. Alienation in Critical IS Studies 
The term ‘digital alienation’ is used in Critical IS research to refer to 
manifestations of alienation online. Stemming from digital labour studies (Krüger and 
Johanssen 2014) the focus soon bridged into social networking.  A good example of this 
bridging can be seen in Fuchs and Sandoval’s Framework for Critically Theorising and 
Analysing Digital Labour (Fuchs and Sandoval 2014).  Initially exploring the dimensions of 
paid digital labour, the authors extend the analysis into the realm of unpaid labour within 
content production in social networks.  P.J. Rey’s paper Alienation, Exploitation and Social 
Media (Rey 2012) explores the mechanisms by which capitalism has come to exploit 
social media.  Rey’s task involves demonstrating how alienation exists within social 
networking as a dynamic of value extraction.  This approach is also used by Christian 
Fuchs (Fuchs 2013; Fuchs and Sandoval 2014) in most of his work.  By contrast, Krüger 
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and Johanssen’s Alienation and Digital Labour—A Depth-Hermeneutic Inquiry (Krüger and 
Johanssen 2014) examines alienation through a survey of prosumer’s comments about 
social network’s themselves.  Here alienation is demonstrated through the effects of the 
social network system’s activities, rather than through the dynamics of labour and 
surplus value extraction.  Of course, if alienation can derive from unpaid digital labour, 
the possibility arises that alienation can be found wherever unpaid digital labour occurs.  
Here we find Marc Andrejevic’s Surveillance and Alienation in the Online Economy 
(Andrejevic 2011b), which extends the analysis of alienation beyond social networking 
into general online activity.  This paper shows a third approach to explaining digital 
alienation by focusing on exploitation, in contrast to the previously mentioned papers, 
which focus on value extraction and coercion.  What all these analyses demonstrate is 
that the nature of alienation online necessarily diverges from the account of alienation in 
earlier, pre-digital, analyses.  These divergences reflect the differences in structures of 
production and value-extraction between analogue and digital socio-technical systems.  
These differences are significant to the degree we may warrantably talk of a distinct 
“digital” form of alienation. 
In Marx, alienation is the result of labour activity coerced into alienated forms 
in order to produce products estranged from the producer (Ollman 2001).  The political 
dynamic is the extraction of value from controlled and structured worker activity.  
Historically, analysis of digital alienation has focused on accounting for the traditional 
mechanisms underpinning alienation within a digital context.  There has been an 
unspoken consensus that an account of digital alienation requires identifying the same 
structures and mechanisms within the digital context as Marx identified within the 
factory.  Here the concern is to understand digital alienation by analysing it as the result 
of conditions considered necessary for alienation - coercion, labour and estrangement 
from product.  With regard to coercion, the difficulty is whether people who freely 
choose to use social networks like Facebook can be described as coerced.  The concern 
with labour is whether people’s unpaid production of content in social networks can be 
described as labour.  Finally, if people seem to be expressing themselves within social 
networks, the question arises as to how can they estranged from the output of their 
activity. 
At one extreme researchers, such as P.J. Rey, have argued that the differences 
between the Victorian factory of Marx’s analysis and modern digital activity are so great 
that alienation is a questionable concept within a digital context (Rey 2012).  Rey argues 
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that the products of digital labour in social networks are not alienated because creation 
of this content is freely chosen and creative.  Referring back to Marx’s categorisation of 
imagination as a distinguishing characteristic between animals and humans, Rey suggests 
that the creative nature of social content production renders the output unalienated.  His 
view is that the creativity involved in social network content creation allows the producer 
to recognise themselves within their output.  In addition, the free choice to engage in 
social networking means this labour is uncoerced.  Rey does accept there is some degree 
of exploitation involved because social networks derive financial value from this output 
without financially compensating those who produced it.  However, he argues this 
exploitation is mild because producers do receive compensation in other forms of 
capital.  Rey argues that social network users are compensated because they retain use of 
their output for their own purposes.  They can therefore use the content they produce to 
generate social and cultural capital.  His position is that the non-economic value derived 
is so great that any exploitation is “relatively minimal” (Rey 2012, 415).  Furthermore, 
any exploitation present is, Rey argues, further diminished by the unalienated nature of 
prosumer output.  Rey acknowledges that social networks also derive value from 
surveillance of user activity, usually without users being aware of it.  However, while he 
sees this as mildly exploitative, he does not consider it alienating.  Rey’s position is that 
digital capitalism can maintain the inequalities and power structures within society 
identified by Marx, but without the need for alienation, or even very much exploitation. 
It is notable that, while recognising that social networks extract value from user 
surveillance, Rey does not extend this recognition to the fact, noted by others, that such 
surveillance is almost universal throughout the internet (Turow 2011; Mayer-
Schönberger 2009).  A 2012 study of the world’s busiest websites revealed that 94% 
themselves engaged in some form of user surveillance, half of whom also allowed 
unidentified third parties to engage in such tracking through their sites.  The same study 
also found that 91% of these sites changed their content to match their understanding of 
the user (Sandoval 2012), something impossible without a pre-existing knowledge of that 
user; knowledge which can only have come from previous surveillance.  User activity in 
other parts of the internet, such as search and reading, does not generate cultural or 
social capital, but is still subject to the same levels of commercial surveillance.  Following 
the logic of Rey’s analysis, this renders such surveillance much more exploitative.  In 
general, Rey’s analysis treats technology as invisible and as permitting users to fully 
express themselves in an unmediated fashion.  While Rey recognises that surveillance 
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occurs, he fails to take into account that much it is used to tune and filter the online 
environment surrounding the user.  Users are presented with “personalised” choices, 
links and content based on the results of covert surveillance as much as on the content 
they produce; something often referred to as the filter bubble (Nagulendra and Vassileva 
2014; Resnick et al. 2013).  People are therefore not able to make free choices or even 
fully express themselves, because the technology available to them is not value-neutral, 
but tuned to commodification (Koh 2011; Erlandsson, Boldt, and Johnson 2012).   
Andrejevic’s analysis of digital alienation is founded on just this consideration.  
All internet users are subject to pervasive universal surveillance by commercial 
enterprises (Omar Tene and Polonetsky 2012; Turow 2011; Sandoval 2012; Deighton 
and Kornfield 2012).  The value of this surveillance far exceeds that derived from social 
network content creation (Deighton and Kornfield 2012; Google Inc. 2014; Facebook 
Inc. 2014; Turow 2011; Mayer-Schönberger 2009; Omar Tene and Polonetsky 2012).  
Initially this information was used only to tune advertising delivery (Deighton and 
Kornfield 2012; Turow 2011).  However, this information is now also used to tune the 
delivery of news on many sites (Turow 2011) and for political manipulation (Abse 2012).  
Users have no choice over whether their activity online is recorded, processed and used, 
nor do they know who by (Sandoval 2012).  This constitutes, for Andrejevic, alienation.  
His argument is that the lack of choice over whether to be surveilled or not constitutes a 
structurally-embedded coercion.  He further argues that the lack of knowledge about this 
surveillance constitutes an epistemological alienation.  Finally he argues that the use of 
this information to alter content in an effort to manipulate the user fits Marx’s definition 
of alienation as an estranged power structure working against the individual (Andrejevic 
2011b, 2012). 
In contrast to Rey’s position that exploitation is mild because the user derives 
non-economic use value from the content they create, Christian Fuchs has argued that 
exploitation is either present or not, and cannot be present in variable degrees (Fuchs 
2013).  One cannot be a little bit exploited.  Fuch’s work tends to focus on the 
mechanisms of value-extraction within a digital context.  Fuch’s position is that any 
activity conducted by someone which can be used to generate economic value is labour.   
He seeks to bring together the competing positions held by Andrejevic and Rey by 
arguing that Rey is focused on subjective feelings of alienation whereas Andrejevic is 
focused on the objective conditions of non-control and non-ownership.  However, 
Fuchs firmly comes down on the side of alienation being objectively present, arguing 
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that the purported social use-value that content creators derive from their work hides the 
true commodity character of social networking (Fuchs 2014).  He identifies two 
dimensions of value within social networks - the value of created content and the value 
of user presence.  Here Fuchs agrees with Andrejevic that the users of social networks 
are themselves treated as commodified products which are then sold. 
Both Fuchs and Andrejevic limit their conception of the use of personal data to 
the realm of advertising delivery.  While the first use of this information was indeed to 
tune content, especially advertisements, to the user profile, this information is now also 
sold for other purposes, including political manipulation (Abse 2012), credit scoring 
(Schmitz 2015; Mierzwinski and Chester 2013), housing and employment (Citron and 
Pasquale 2014) and news delivery (Turow 2011).  It is worth noting that both Facebook 
and the international trade body for online advertising, the Internet Advertising Bureau, 
agree with this assessment of where the real value lies in commercial online surveillance 
(Facebook Inc. 2014; Deighton and Kornfield 2012).  In comparison with this vast and 
pervasive surveillance industry, user-generated content within social networks is a trivial 
consideration.  Under this analysis, alienation is a pervasive and unavoidable adjunct to 
almost all digital activity.  
Rey, Andrejevic and Fuchs all approach alienation within a digital environment 
by focusing on Marx’s mechanisms for its production and explaining how and where 
these mechanisms can be found online.   While general commercial surveillance is 
mentioned, it is not really the central focus of their analysis, nor does it alter their 
approach.  Our position is that we can better account for digital alienation if we can 
liberate ourselves from the form of Marx’s account.  Marx provided an analysis of how 
alienation occurred within a particular historical and technological context.  As we have 
seen from the above, we encounter problems if we assume that this is the only 
mechanism by which alienation can occur or that all of these traditional mechanisms are 
necessary.  The argument herein is that the features of digital alienation are so different 
from traditional alienation that a new account is necessary. 
5.2.3. How alienation occurs online 
In defining alienation, Marx considered two factors, the nature of alienation 
and the means by which it is produced.  The nature of alienation is that the individual is 
disconnected from the products of their labour by property ownership rights; they are 
alienated from ownership of both the product and the means of producing it.  This 
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constitutes the material base of alienation and is the product of power relations 
governing the production process.  Marx’s account involved material coercion by 
controlling access to the means of survival so as to force people into alienating labour.  
Analysis of exploitation on the internet has been distracted by the apparent lack of 
coercion motivating online activity and by the appearance of self-expression in social 
networks.  However, our analysis becomes less complicated if treat social networking 
within the broader context of pervasive digital surveillance.  Here we recognise that, 
while content production in social networks is voluntary and can be self-expressive, it is 
just one type of action within the wider class of voluntary and self-serving digital activity 
which includes search, shopping, email, use of maps, health trackers, life loggers and 
other digital services, not to mention general web surfing.  This is important because the 
range of digital activities will continue to spread until it permeates most of our 
environment (Rader et al. 2010).  Because of this it is essential to treat the current state 
of affairs as an intermediate process moving towards more ubiquitous computing.  Our 
analysis must recognise that the political and economic structures which affect us within 
the current digital domain are on a trajectory to dominate our entire existence, offline as 
well as online.  It is important, therefore, to recognise that the frame of analysis cannot 
limit itself to voluntary activity knowingly making use of digital services.  The 
infrastructure being created now will one day support smart cities, the internet of things, 
and digital devices implanted within our bodies.  Our entire existence will become 
mediated through digital services within a few decades (Rader et al. 2010). 
Thus the place of labour as seen in a traditional account of alienation becomes 
problematic when value is being extracted from broad-spectrum use of digital services 
for life in general.  Assuming that labour is a necessary precondition for alienation 
requires explaining how all activity using digital services constitutes labour despite the 
fact it generates no obvious income and may not even be anything more than a 
traditional activity, like walking or driving, which has been supplemented with a digital 
component.  Certainly the argument of remuneration in the form of social or cultural 
capital is inapplicable with reference to activities which do not involve any form of 
communication, such as using search engines or passively reading a website, yet value is 
extracted from these activities by others via commercial surveillance (Andrejevic 2012; 
Brooks 2005; Deighton and Kornfield 2012; Rubinstein 2013; Schneier 2015; Turow 
2011; Palmås 2011).  If we redefine ‘labour’ as referring to any activity from which value 
may be drawn by any party, as Fuchs does (Fuchs 2013, 2014), then almost all activity 
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becomes labour and the term ceases to provide any real distinction from other mode of 
activity.  We think it is better to abandon the issue of whether online activity is labour or 
not.  There is nothing within Marx’s description of alienation which requires that it must, 
of necessity, derive from labour.  ‘Alienation’ in Marx is not a single concept, but a 
translation of two terms, Entfremdung and Entäusserung, which can also be translated as 
‘estrangement’ and ‘externalization’ respectively (Ollman 2001).  These terms are applied 
to a variety of phenomena, including internal mental states, property relations and 
societal structures.  It is true that Marx attempts to provide a systematic analysis of 
political economy based on the concept of alienated labour in his early work, but that 
attempt is incomplete (Wood 2006).  In his later works, alienation becomes a descriptive 
term which is applied to multiple phenomena.  There is nothing in his usage which locks 
alienation to labour except as a historically contingent feature of nineteenth century 
capitalism (Wood 2006).  All that is required by Marx’s account is that there be human 
activity and that this occur within certain types of unequal power structure within the 
field of economic competition. 
On this basis, we propose to focus on digital alienation as a product of property 
relations regarding data.  Surveillance is a process of data acquisition; some generated as 
the output of online surveillance monitoring systems and some data taken from 
elsewhere, such as the passenger name records used for international travel, geo-location 
data and credit scores (Abse 2012).  The common element all these data elements have is 
that they are held to pertain to the same individual12.  The dataset created is termed a 
personal profile, as opposed to group profiles (Hildebrandt 2008; Kennedy 2008).  The 
personal profile is a digital representation of an individual.  It is the central commodity 
of the surveillance economy.  Each organisation which holds a personal profile subjects 
it to algorithmic analysis and manipulation in order to extract value from it.  The term 
used in the industry is to “monetize” it.  It is this profile which is used to tune content 
and for purposes of manipulation.  All actions using personal data draw that data from 
the personal profile.  Such use constitutes Marx’s concept of an environment which 
reflects back on the producer estranged output (Andrejevic 2012).  In that surveillance 
technology produces the personal profile as a commodity, it is a type of production 
process.  The raw material for this production process is the activity of individuals (van 
der Hof and Prins 2008), which is used to produce personal profiles.  This production 
                                                 
12 This belief may be mistaken, it is not always possible to distinguish between a person and a device; and cases of mistaken identity 
also occur. 
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process is not owned by those who generate the activity which feeds it.  This is the basis 
for alienation from ownership of the means of production.  The surveillance process is 
hidden and unwelcome (Culnan 1993; van der Hof and Prins 2008) and therefore 
represents an unequal, coercive and exploitative power structure (Andrejevic 2012). We 
may view the personal profile as a field of contention between commercial surveillance 
companies and those who use their products on one hand opposed by individuals and 
privacy advocates on the other.   
The essential starting point to all forms of alienation is individual activity.  We 
therefore believe digital alienation may be best understood by examining the mechanisms 
by which an individual’s digital activity is alienated.  Here we must focus on the nature of 
personal action within a digital context, the mechanisms by which the personal profile is 
generated, and the use to which it is put.  As mentioned above, the first task is to 
dispense with the need for a concept of labour.  In Marx’s analysis labour was the term 
used to distinguish activity which supported alienation from activity which did not.  
Labour supported alienation because it was activity which occurred within, and was 
shaped by, exploitative power structures.  However, no such distinction between labour 
and non-labour exists online because all activity is surveilled and exploited (Schneier 
2015; Turow 2011). Not only does discarding the need for labour ease our analysis, it 
helps to direct our attention to the ubiquity of digital surveillance.  Instead we will define 
human activity within a digital context in terms of people’s intentions and expectations.  
To do this we will distinguish the two targets of surveillance; communicative activity and 
everything else.  We will refer to these as the digital persona and the data shadow, 
respectively. 
‘Digital persona’ is our term for the body of digital material created by an 
individual in acts of online communication.  The digital persona includes blogs, 
comments, product reviews, tweets and other social network postings, together with any 
other conscious communication by an individual within a digital context.  Thus the 
digital persona is created by the individual to express and communicate.  The digital 
persona is not a direct or unmediated reflection of the personality, but a creation 
through which the individual seeks to represent of an aspect of themselves.  The 
disconnect between the offline and digital world permits people to exaggerate or repress 
particular aspects of their personality (Suler 2004).  For example, introverts may use the 
digital persona to compensate for difficulties they have in face-to-face interactions 
(Amichai-Hamburger, Wainapel, and Fox 2002) while extroverts often use it to confirm 
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pre-existing characteristics (Wang 2013).  In other cases, people develop new personal 
characteristics online so that they can incorporate them into their offline personality 
(Mehdizadeh 2010).  In all cases, what is revealed or portrayed is further influenced by 
previous experiences online, especially concerns over privacy and security (Yao and Linz 
2008; Krasnova et al. 2009).   We derive the term ‘persona’ from C. G. Jung’s concept of 
the persona as a creation of the ego designed to represent a subset of that ego within 
specific social circumstances (Jung 1977).  The same idea is used within a sociological 
perspective in Goffman’s The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life under the term ‘masks’ 
(Goffman 1990), which outlines his Dramaturgical Theory, a sub-set of Symbolic 
Interactionism (Ritzer 2011). 
The term ‘data shadow’ was first used by Alan Westin in Privacy and Freedom 
(Westin 1970), but has entered into general use both in computing and privacy 
discussions.  It refers to the information generated by someone as a side-effect of their 
use of digital technology.  These days this includes log files, access records, search 
histories, movements between and within web sites, mobile phone location records and 
all financial activities not involving cash (Koh 2011; Hildebrandt 2008; Brooks 2005).  
Thus the term ‘data shadow’ refers to all digital information pertaining to an individual 
which they did not consciously and intentionally create for communicative purposes.  
This information may have been generated by the user for other purposes, such as their 
click-stream history, which is a record of their mouse click activity within a website (van der 
Hof and Prins 2008), or their search history, a record of all the searches they have made in 
a given search engine.  Elements of the data shadow can also be generated through the 
monitoring and recording of user activity by other systems.  For example, web server log 
files, containing records of every file request, constitute data generated by the system 
about the user.  The term ‘data shadow’ includes the material used to commodify users 
within social networks, but also applies outside social networking.  Data shadows may be 
created through any and all use of digital technology.  
Data shadows are created by a network of commercial surveillance agencies 
whose tracking technologies permeate digital services (Mayer-Schönberger 2009; Turow 
2011; Deighton and Kornfield 2012; Brooks 2005; Lazarus 2015).  Very few of these 
agencies are known to the public (Brooks 2005; Schneier 2015).  Some, like Google and 
Facebook, are well known because of their public profile as digital service providers, 
though their activity as commercial surveillance agents is less well known, even though it 
drives their profits (Google Inc. 2014; Facebook Inc. 2014).  Others, such as 
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DoubleClick, Acxiom, Experian and BlueKai, are known to industry analysts and privacy 
advocates as a result of their scale and reach.  However, the majority, such as ClickTale, 
Optimzly, Kiss Metrics, Info Group, Ace Metrics, Crazy Egg, Site Meter, Moz, Adgistics, 
People Metrics, Data Dog, Data Mentors, Extrawatch, Inspectlet, eDataSource, 
Prognoz, and literally hundreds of others, are unknown outside the specialist profiling 
industry.  No one knows how many of these agencies there are, or what they do, but it is 
known they combine the data they gather with information from other sources to create 
detailed profiles on literally hundreds of millions, if not billions, of people (Brooks 2005; 
Federal Trade Commission 2014; Wayne 2012).  The commercial surveillance industry is 
much larger in terms of economic value and user-base than any other online industry 
(Deighton and Kornfield 2012; Schneier 2015; Turow 2011). 
This universal commercial surveillance means there is no way to use most 
digital services without being surveilled (Turow 2011; Wayne 2012; Schneier 2015; 
Federal Trade Commission 2014; van der Hof and Prins 2008).  For most digital services 
there is no alternative provider who does not practice surveillance (or permit others to 
do so) within the service stream (Turow 2011; Stole 2014).  However, lack of choice 
most strongly stems from lack of knowledge.  We are simply unaware of when we are 
being surveilled, who by and for what purpose (van der Hof and Prins 2008; Omar Tene 
and Polonetsky 2012).  Obviously, one cannot exercise choice over things one is 
unaware of.  As we have seen, this lack of choice has been held to constitute coercion by 
Andrejevic and Fuchs, but not by Rey.  Lack of choice as coercion has a long history of 
support in philosophy.  For example,  Aquinas argues that coercion occurs when actions 
by one person mean someone cannot act otherwise (Aquinas 1920).  However, this 
position was challenged in the twentieth century by the position that coercion requires 
communication between the coercer and their target, usually in the form of conditional 
threats (Airaksinen 1988).  Under this view coercion is a communicative act, not a 
contextualising situation.  This is the position currently supported in much legal practice, 
especially in the USA (S. Anderson 2010).  However, since the 1980’s arguments have re-
emerged in support of structural coercion; the creation of situations in which one is 
prevented from selecting alternative courses of action (Rijt 2012).  Here the focus is 
shifted to the coercer’s intentions to remove choice from another (S. Anderson 2008).  
This accords with much of Marx’s analysis, in which he focuses on the general 
circumstances of capitalist society as coercive in the sense of removing freedom (Wood 
2006).  Clearly, hiding surveillance so that people cannot avoid it constitutes removal of 
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choice and diminution of freedom.  Thus it is possible to argue from this perspective 
that the lack of choice to avoid surveillance constitutes coercion. However, we must 
recognise that this position is not in accord with how many, especially in jurisprudence, 
understand the term.   
Lack of choice, even coercion, does not automatically mean that the output of a 
productive process is alienated.  We wish therefore to explore the mechanism by which 
digital activity becomes alienated.  Since we have two forms of digital data, the digital 
persona and the data shadow, two accounts are necessary.  We shall commence with the 
alienation of the digital persona.  
5.2.4. Ego, Affordances and the Digital Persona 
People use Web 2.0 technologies to create their digital persona.  The process by 
which they do this and the persona they create are alienated.  We therefore need an 
account of the mechanism by which people do this and how alienation occurs.   Central 
to our account of how the digital persona is alienated is the view of technology as a 
socio-technical system (Ikonen et al. 2010).  A technology may be composed of multiple 
artefacts and may be “read” or understood in different ways (Hutchby 2001; Heidegger 
1977).  The nature of the “reading” depends on the person, their social environment, 
past experiences and other factors, all of which are constrained by the functional 
capabilities of the artefacts in question (Norman 2002).  We therefore need a conceptual 
framework which holds all the dynamics which are at play in a person’s understanding 
and use of a technical system.  We will use the concept of affordance to explain the 
interaction between people and the technical artefacts.   
The concept of affordances originates with James Gibson’s account of how 
animals perceive and understand their environment in The Ecological Approach to Visual 
Perception (Gibson 1986) 
“The affordances of the environment are what it offers the 
animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill… It implies the 
complementarity of the animal and the environment… [affordances] have 
to be measured relative to the animal. They are unique for that animal. 
They are not just abstract physical properties.” (Gibson 1986, 127) 
 Gibson was arguing against a reductionist understanding of perception and for 
a perceptive process within all animals in which perception itself is not merely a process 
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of physical activity onto which understanding is overlaid post hoc.  Instead, he argued that 
the perceptive process itself incorporates cognitive elements such as motivation, 
environmental context and past experience into the act of seeing. 
The concept was applied to ICT analysis by Ian Hutchby in Technologies, Texts 
and Affordances (Hutchby 2001), in which he describes technologies as 
“texts which are written in certain ways by their developers, 
producers and marketers, and have to be read by their users or consumers. 
The writers of these technology texts may seek to impose particular 
meanings on the artefact, and to constrain the range of possible 
interpretations open to users. Users, by contrast, may seek to produce 
readings of the technology texts which best suit the purposes they have in 
mind for the artefact… Neither the writing nor reading of technology texts 
is determinate: both are open, negotiated processes. Although there may be 
ways that technology texts have preferred readings built into them, it is 
always open to the user to find a way around this attempt at interpretive 
closure." (Hutchby 2001, 445) 
We may thus see affordances as a field of competition in which the owners of a 
technology compete with the users of that technology for domination of the affordances 
which dictate how that technology is understood and used.  Donald Norman explores 
this competition over technological affordances in The Design of Everyday Things (Norman 
2002).  In Norman’s account, we use affordances to build conceptual models of how 
things work.  Any technology involves the interaction of two conceptual models; a 
design model and a user model.  The design model is the conceptual model the designers 
held when they built the technology, and in accord with which they try to construct the 
artefact.  The user’s model is the conceptual model users have of that same technology.  
Norman is concerned with what happens when the two models clash or diverge.  
According to Norman, there is no necessary convergence between the user’s mental 
model and the designer’s.  In fact, in Norman’s view, the two model’s clash most of the 
time.  Using Norman’s framework, we suggest that the user model conceptualises the 
Web 2.0 services people use to express their digital personas as private, unmediated and 
natural.  The user model fails to recognise the degree of surveillance and the degree to 
which their activities are mediated through a technology designed for data gathering and 
commodification.   Users also fail to recognise the degree to which surveillance is used to 
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filter and control the content they see in social networking and news sites and in 
advertising.  Instead, users see the content presented to them within social networks as 
somehow neutral, unmediated and unsurveilled (dos Santos Brito et al. 2013).  In 
contrast, service providers, such as Google and Facebook, show evidence of believing 
that users have the same conceptual model as designers.  They have countered concerns 
over online privacy by stating users have no expectation of privacy and accept that the 
material they create will be processed for purposes of commodification (Fogel 2014). 
There are numerous studies which demonstrate that users manipulate their self-
expression online in order to convey specific characteristics and control the image others 
have of them (Krämer and Winter 2008; Mehdizadeh 2010; Wang 2013; Martin and 
Nicovich 2013).   In our terminology we may say people use Web 2.0 technologies to 
construct their digital personas.  Their understanding of what can be expressed, the 
values determining what should be expressed and how this is to be done are determined 
by the affordances users perceive in these technologies (Sherman 2001; Zhao, 
Grasmuck, and Martin 2008).  These affordances constitute what Goffman describes as 
the “props and tasks” (Goffman 1990, 143) which dictate what persona13 is appropriate 
and the “expressive resources” (H. Miller and Arnold 2001, 74) available from which to 
construct it.   
Unfortunately for users, Facebook and similar Web 2.0 systems are not 
designed for people to portray themselves in any manner they may choose.  Instead, 
Facebook and similar systems divide personal characteristics into a set of discrete data 
points, such as preferred objects of consumption, marketable skills, and approvable 
attitudes (Hull, Lipford, and Latulipe 2011).  Furthermore, qualitative characteristics, 
such as friendship, are reduced to quantitative values, such as the number of likes or 
followers.  Facebook’s affordances, in particular, suggest to users that their digital 
persona is a true reflection of their identity, yet is at the same time something to be 
constructed, managed and enhanced (Gershon 2011).  Facebook openly expresses the 
neo-liberal concept of a “personal brand,” in which a person creates a commodified 
public image as the repository of their social capital (Lair 2005).  The affordances of 
Facebook present the individual as composed of consumption patterns (such as 
preferred movies, books and music) and patterns of association (as shown through one’s 
likes, friends and photos).  These are dimensions of analysis more suited to processing 
                                                 
13 Goffman’s term is ‘performance’ (Goffman 1990). 
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for advertising than developing an understanding of the whole person.  There is good 
empirical evidence that this model conflicts with the affordances the user brings to 
Facebook.  In many cases users seek to express themselves in ways restricted by the 
affordances Facebook imposes, resulting in dissatisfaction, resistance and disuse 
(Gershon 2011; Sherman 2001; Martin and Nicovich 2013; Krasnova et al. 2009). 
In using affordances tuned to atomising, quantifying and commodifying the 
depiction of people, social media systems like Facebook alienate the digital persona.  
Rather than a free expression of the self, users are forced to display only those 
characteristics which are commodifiable.  These characteristics are then embedded in a 
manipulated content environment which reinforces and promotes ongoing 
commodification, and therefore embeds the alienated digital persona within an alienated 
social environment. 
5.2.5. Alienation and the Data Shadow 
The mechanisms by which the data shadow is alienated are straightforward 
compared to the digital persona and commence with unavoidable, hidden, ubiquitous 
commercial surveillance (Schneier 2015; Turow 2011; Sandoval 2012).  In that the digital 
world is permeated with unknown entities gathering unknown information to use for 
unknown purposes (Federal Trade Commission 2014; Wayne 2012), the digital 
environment is self-evidently epistemologically alienated from the user.  The material 
base of the commercial surveillance system supports a superstructure devoted to exerting 
power over the individual by influencing their behaviour directly, or by influencing 
decisions made about them by other people (Brooks 2005; Schmitz 2015; Omer Tene 
and Polonetsky 2013).  This is achieved through personalization of content (Nagulendra 
and Vassileva 2014), such as the advertising (Sweeney 2013) and news (Turow 2011) to 
which people are exposed. 
The unavoidability of commercial surveillance is made possible by the lack of 
ownership or control users have over digital services.  It is known that, in general, people 
do not like commercial surveillance or content personalization (van Doorn and Hoekstra 
2013; Culnan 1993).  Commercial surveillance therefore constitutes the exercise of 
power over individuals and a diminution of their freedom, another manifestation of 
alienation (Andrejevic 2011a).  Furthermore, the knowledge that unknown surveillance is 
occurring, in combination with lack of knowledge about how that information is used, 
has a chilling effect on people’s online activities (Solove 2004; van der Hof and Prins 
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2008; Marthews and Tucker 2014).  In effect, people are alienated from their own 
actions online before they perform them.  In that this chilling effect also applies to how 
people communicate online, ubiquitous commercial surveillance further alienates people 
from each other. 
5.2.6. Digital Alienation – the complete picture 
We are now in a position to provide an account of how the four dimensions of 
alienation occur.  First, users are alienated from their productive activity through 
restricted affordances within expressive Web 2.0 technologies which promote a 
commodity fetishism of personal characteristics and interpersonal relationships.  This is 
made possible by an alienated power structure which is designed around treating users as 
commodities (Andrejevic 2012; Fuchs 2013).  Users are alienated from non-expressive 
activity by the presence of ubiquitous hidden surveillance systems.  Thus users are 
alienated from all forms of digital activity.  Second, users are alienated from the products 
of their digital activity by property relations.  These grant service owners the right to 
reuse user-produced content for their own purposes and to process both the digital 
persona and the data shadow in order to construct personal profiles.  Users are further 
alienated from the products of their own activity since the personal profile is used 
against them, either to manipulate their behaviour or to influence how others treat them.  
In addition, the abandonment of the open standards which created the web means that 
the products of user activity are imprisoned within data silos owned by service providers 
(Dyhouse 2010).  Thus, you may close your Facebook account, but you can’t move it to 
another social network.  Third, users are alienated from each other by the necessary 
mediation of fetishizing social networks and by the chilling effect of ubiquitous 
surveillance.  Finally, users are alienated from themselves and their own human potential 
in three ways; through the imposition of fetishizing affordances promoting the concept 
of the personal brand, through their limited control over their own digital persona, and 
through the use of personalization technologies which confine the user’s ability to 
discover the unexpected, the unusual, and the uncommodified. 
5.2.7. Solutions 
No solution exists today which can resist these patterns and structures of digital 
alienation.  However, a number of technologies exist which can form part of a solution, 
while the design principles to complete the solution are understood.  Two related 
characteristics support the existence of digital alienation, lack of choice and lack of 
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power.  The solution is therefore to provide restore choice and empower the user.  In 
our view solutions that look to regulation, such as data protection and privacy laws, 
merely perpetuate a hierarchical structure which keeps people in a powerless position.  
Instead of companies deciding what to surveil, we merely pass the decision to legislators.  
Given the history of government digital surveillance (Angwin 2014) there is nothing to 
suggest this improves matters.  In addition, the impossibility of a single legislative 
framework for the entire internet (Zekos 2006; Wilske and Schiller 1997; Reidenberg 
2005; Dainow 2013) means surveillance companies can simply move to more conducive 
regimes.  Furthermore, centralised storage of personal data is frequently subject to leaks 
(Liu et al. 2011; Madejski, Johnson, and Bellovin 2012; Koops and Leenes 2014), so we 
are opposed to centralised storage of any fashion, never mind under what rules.  
The first task in combating alienation must be to remove coercion from the 
situation by giving users the choice over whether to be surveilled and for what purpose.  
A number of technologies exist which can offer elements of this solution.  Anonymizing 
systems such as such as TOR (McCoy et al. 2008) and TextSecure (Oppliger 2014) 
enable users to avoid being tracked while using the existing internet.  These need to be 
extended and built into a comprehensive set of easy-to-use systems which can wrap 
browsers and other applications in a protective and intelligent layer which negotiates and 
controls what data is accessed by what services.  Protocols like the W3C’s Platform for 
Privacy Preferences (PPP) (Cranor et al. 2002) can form the basis for such 
communications.  Design of data gathering systems should follow principles of privacy 
preservation, such as those developed by Marc Langheinrich (Langheinrich 2001), one of 
the authors of PPP.  Such technology would enable users to control how much 
information is gathered about them and thus how much personalization is possible.  This 
de-alienates the productive technology by putting control in the hands of the user and 
de-alienates their digital environment by permitting them to control or prevent 
personalization. 
While these solutions restore choice to the user, they only partially redress the 
balance in an existing system which is structurally inequitable.  The long-term solution 
must therefore be to move personal data storage, and therefore ownership, into the 
hands of the users.  Here the solution is to reverse the cloud architecture.  Currently, 
centralised systems run analyses of locally held data.  We would reverse this, so that 
personal data is held by the person in their own devices.  Effectively each person, or 
home, would operate their own data store.  Following Langheinrich’s privacy-preserving 
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design principles (Langheinrich 2001), devices would, wherever feasible, store their own 
data.  A personal server or gateway would provide the interface between digital service 
providers and the user’s personal data.  This gateway would be able to negotiate access 
for services and prepare personal data for access.  This pre-processing would anonymise 
the data to the degree selected by the user for that type of service.  We envision this 
system working in a manner similar to hierarchical protection domains (or “security 
rings”) within chipsets.  These create a series of layers within which particular software 
operations can be confined so as to shield the system from inappropriate operations 
(Karger and Herbert 1984).  Corporate digital services could still be centrally managed 
and owned, but their computations would have to call on the individual’s own data store 
rather than house it on corporate servers. 
This is, however, merely a collection of artefacts.  As a socially-embedded 
system, technology needs more than just hardware if it is to be adopted.  The additional 
component required is therefore societal structures promoting and maintaining such a 
system.  A network of local technicians would be required to maintain and develop such 
systems, provide advice and training, lobby regulators for support and so forth.  Here we 
think the basis lies in recognising the value of personal data.  For example, the value of a 
Facebook user is between $US40 and $US300 (OECD 2013b).  If personal data has 
value for service providers, let them pay for it.  A system of micropayments for access to 
personal data would create a data economy enabling individuals to earn money through 
the gathering and storing of their own data.  Support agencies, such as technical staff and 
software vendors, can then be remunerated through a share of this income.  Such a 
system would permit the development of an intermediate layer of data vendors who can 
store and provide personal data on the user’s behalf, according to guidelines provided by 
those users, or remotely maintain data held in the home.   Such a system permits of 
multiple organisational models.   Community groups could operate such services.  For 
example, people who share the same set of data access protocols could form 
cooperatives to manage storage and access to their member’s data.  As yet, such 
technology does not exist.  However, the hardware is already in place.  Personal cloud 
storage devices have been available for several years.  These permit users to store their 
data in their home while still being able to access it remotely.  The missing components 
are therefore the micropayment and data negotiation systems.  Protocols exist which can 
handle both, they merely need to be implemented as working products. 
 110 
 
We need to bear in mind that the digital service infrastructure we see today is 
merely a step towards a digital environment of ubiquitous devices; embedded within our 
bodies, throughout our homes, offices, cars and public spaces.  A critical evaluation of 
current data practices must consider this long-term future and seek emancipatory paths 
within it.  As we have seen, digital alienation is the product primarily of inequitable 
power structures which intentionally deny users control, or even knowledge, of what is 
being done to them.  The motive power of these structures is the economic value of 
personal data.  If digital services are to align with individual needs, we cannot avoid 
personal data being processed.  The solution is therefore to develop systems which pass 
some of that value back to the user.  Doing so gives the user power and makes them a 
viable partner for other organisations who can earn a living by controlling access to 
personal data on behalf of the user.  Giving the individual control over their personal 
data emancipates them from subjection to hegemonic digital capitalism by permitting 
them to negotiate the terms of the relationship they have with their digital service 
providers. 
- end of published paper – 
5.3. Next Steps 
Having developed a social account of ICT’s, the next step in the research 
project was to use this to consider the way each of ETICA’s eleven technology groups 
could restrict human autonomy.  However, as detailed in the next chapter, autonomy is a 
complex and contested concept.  We identified six different classes of account regarding 
what constitutes autonomy in the philosophical literature, but no recognition of the 
variability of the concept in legal or political discourse.  In general, the philosophical 
approach is concerned with the internal (mental) states one must enact in order to be 
autonomous, while legal and political accounts are focused on external aspects, such as 
lifestyle, intersubjectivity and rights, without reference to internal activity.  The result in 
practical terms is that one may legitimately claim to be living autonomously while living 
in a manner another would not consider autonomous.  Indeed, some definitions of 
autonomy, such as coherentist accounts, would regard this as inevitable and appropriate, 
as would most legal and political accounts.  It is not, therefore, appropriate for our 
research to select a particular account of autonomy as the only correct one and restrict 
analysis to only that form.  Indeed, we consider it to be one of our most significant 
contributions that we introduce into ICT ethics and computer science an understanding 
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that different, yet legitimate, accounts of autonomy exist and are impacted in different 
ways by different species of ICT.  This was published in 2017 as “Threats to Autonomy 
from Emerging ICTs” in Australasian Journal of Information Systems (21).   
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6. Autonomy under Emerging ICT’s 
The paper contained in this chapter answered the main research question: 
“What are the possible threats to human autonomy generated by 
emerging ICT’s?” 
The paper also answers the following secondary research questions: 
“What are the emerging ICT’s?” 
“What is human autonomy?” 
Emerging ICT’s cover a wide range of technologies, yet human autonomy is 
potentially threatened by all of them in some way.  However, as indicated above, because 
there is no single agreed definition of autonomy, this paper considered the ways in which 
different accounts of what constitutes human autonomy are impacted by each of 
ETICA’s ICT groups.  From this range of threats we derived properties which any ICT 
must exhibit in order to threaten human autonomy.  Finally, the paper demonstrates 
how the range of definitions of autonomy creates problems for customary approaches to 
value-sensitive design, indicating a need for greater flexibility when attempting to 
improve the ethical status of emerging ICT’s. 
The rest of this chapter contains the paper as published.  Minor modifications have been made 
to ensure the writing style matches that of this thesis (such as changing “I conclude” to “we conclude”).  
The citation style has been changed to maintain consistency with the rest of the thesis.  In keeping with 
the need to present the published material in the format of a coherent sequence of chapters, journal meta-
information, such as keywords and categories, have not been reproduced here.  The original publication 
did not number headings.  Numbering has been added to maintain consistency with the rest of the thesis. 
6.1. Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICTs. 
Australasian Journal of Information Systems 21, no. 0 (2017). 
https://doi.org/10.3127/ajis.v21i0.1438 
6.1.1. Introduction 
This paper examines ways in which human autonomy can be threatened by 
emerging ICT’s.  Emerging ICT’s embrace a wide range of technologies, including 
autonomous systems, intelligent environments, bio-electronic implants, robotics, and 
artificial intelligence.  We will explore the different ways in which each ICT threatens 
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autonomy to show that the nature of the threat, if any, depends on the version of 
autonomy being used.  From this survey of threats we will derive some properties which 
any ICT must exhibit if it threatens human autonomy, no matter how it is defined.  
Finally, we will argue the range of definitions of autonomy demonstrates the need for 
greater flexibility when attempting to improve the ethical status of emerging ICT’s. 
In order to discuss the complete range of emerging ICT’s it is necessary to have 
a system by which to conceptualise and organise them.  We shall use for these purposes 
the output of the ETICA project (Stahl 2011b), which attempted an examination of the 
complete range of emerging ICT’s, developed an ordered taxonomy (Ikonen et al. 2010), 
and researched the ethical concerns associated with each (Heersmink, van den Hoven, 
and Timmermans 2010).   
6.1.2. Methodologies for evaluation of emergent technology 
To count as “emerging” (as opposed to “possible”) an ICT must be sufficiently 
developed that we can understand its general features, but which has not yet achieved 
maturity in all aspects.  Since the 1960’s the predominant model for such analysis has 
thus been to treat technologies as “socio-technical systems” (Trist 1981; Lamb and Kling 
2003).  This position contrasts with the other major treatment of technology, 
technological determinism, which treats technology as affecting society, but as 
developing independent of social, cultural, political and other “intangible” causes (M. R. 
Smith and Marx 1994).  An emerging ICT will have little market penetration (it may still 
be in prototype), such that its final place and role in the market is yet to become evident; 
its full and final set of features are unlikely to be completely determined; the business 
models under which it will function are likely to be nascent; users may still be working 
out patterns of usage; and the regulatory framework is most probably undeveloped.   
Autonomous cars provide a simple example of an emerging ICT which 
illustrate these uncertainties.  Google’s autonomous cars are still in prototype (Solveforx 
2016), while Tesla vehicles are just beginning to penetrate the market (Statistica 2016).  
In both cases, the systems are still in development such that the final set of functions is 
indeterminate (Statistica 2016; Musk 2016).  The regulatory framework for autonomous 
vehicles has seen some development in a few places, such as California, but most 
countries haven’t even begun to think about the technology.  In the USA, for example, 
as of March 2017, only eleven states had any regulations regarding this technology, while 
the majority of attempts to introduce legislation in the USA since 2012 have failed 
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(National Conference of State Legislatures 2017).  Business models for the sale and use 
of this technology are still undetermined.  For example, Tesla recently proposed models 
in which people would be able to send their Tesla car out as an automated taxi when 
they’re not using it (Musk 2016).  In the meantime, users are still learning how to use the 
systems, often in conflict with how the designers intend them to be used.  The most 
dramatic example of this disparity between designer’s intent and user behaviour is the 
frequent driving of Tesla vehicles without human supervision, despite the Tesla’s 
frequent statements that the user should pay attention and keep their hands on the 
steering wheel at all times (Consumer Reports 2016).  Any attempt to understand the 
ethical impact of autonomous cars must therefore commence with a vision of the state 
of affairs when the technology has matured – with standardised features, customary 
patterns of usage, stable regulatory regimes and (reasonably) settled business models.  
Any attempt to assess the ethical implications of autonomous cars thus becomes an 
exercise in anticipating what the future will look like.  This brings us into the remit of 
foresight studies.   
6.1.3. Introducing foresight studies 
‘Foresight studies’ is one of the terms used to describe the discipline of 
considering the future in a methodical manner.  Foresight studies can be used in any 
discipline and so the objectives in such research vary widely (Glenn 2009b; Godet 2009; 
Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009).  This presence within many disciplines has led to a 
variety of terms being used to describe the activity.  Common alternative terms for 
foresight studies are “future studies” (most commonly used in the USA), “futures 
research” (Europe), “futurology” (Australasia), “prospective studies” (France), “futures 
field” (Europe) and “prognostics” (Russia) (Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009).  A wide 
variety of foresight methodologies have evolved and most foresight research projects 
combine several methodologies. 
The different methodologies used within foresight studies can be divided 
between quantitative and qualitative in technique and between normative and 
exploratory in purpose, though some methodologies bridge these divides (Veikko, 
Kanerva, and Kouri 2009; Haegeman et al. 2013; Gordon and Glenn 2004).  
Quantitative methods are used mainly in predictive forecasting and seek to produce 
probabilities (Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009; Haegeman et al. 2013).  Quantitative 
methods are also used in complex modelling, for example, climate modelling.  Such 
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methods are based on the assumption that future development is a continuation of past 
trends.  While they provide a continuity from past to future, they cannot allow for 
disruptive technologies or unexpected developments.  Some argue for the need to 
support quantitative methods with qualitative ones (Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009; 
Haegeman et al. 2013) as they are better suited for the anticipation of abrupt or 
unexpected changes (Ogilvy 2002; Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009).  Foresight 
research also distinguishes between methodologies on the basis of whether they are 
normative or exploratory.  Normative forecasting is concerned with whether a particular 
future is desirable and the ethical status of decisions which would lead to it.  By contrast, 
exploratory forecasting explores what is possible, irrespective of its desirability (Veikko, 
Kanerva, and Kouri 2009).  Ethical assessment of the future is rarely a formal 
component of foresight research project (W. Bell 1996; Poli 2011; Brey 2012; Clarke 
2005; Grunwald 1999; Harris et al. 2010).  Key foresight research figures such as 
Wendell Bell have attempted to determine what ethical values are universally accepted by 
all peoples in all cultures (W. Bell 1996).  However, Bell has since been criticised for 
accepting as objective and universal what are merely western cultural values (Poli 2011; 
Dator 2011; Rubin 2011).  A less controversial approach has been to incorporate ethical 
values as research data.  Here distinct sets of exploratory and normative data are 
gathered.  For example, the functionality of future technologies can be drawn the visions 
of those creating them, after which philosophical sources can be mined for ethical 
treatments of these functions.  This was the approach taken by the ETICA project.   
6.1.4. ETICA 
The most comprehensive foresight research project focused on ethical 
assessment of emerging ICT’s so far has been the EU’s ETICA (Ethical Issues of 
Emerging ICT Applications) project, which ran from 2009 - 2011.  The project’s aims 
were to identify “significant emerging ICT’s” (Stahl 2011, 1), the ethical issues these gave 
rise to, and to make recommendations for EU policy makers.  A key output from the 
ETICA project was a taxonomy of emerging ICT’s.  Here ETICA developed formal 
structures for technological descriptions and scenario construction (Ikonen et al.  2010).  
It then used bibliometric analysis to assess published discourse regarding the ethical 
issues associated with these ICT’s (Heersmink, van den Hoven, and Timmermans 2010).  
The project validated these findings with expert focus groups and surveys (Heersmink et 
al.  2010).  Finally, ETICA developed a series of recommendations (Rainey and Goujon 
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2011), together with supporting philosophical and methodological expositions (Veikko, 
Kanerva, and Kouri 2009; Rader et al.  2010; Rainey and Goujon 2011).   
ETICA identified 107 different technologies as significant and emerging, which 
it aggregated into eleven groups.  It then identified approximately 400 ethical concerns 
associated with these technology groups.  The aim was to collate the ethical concerns, 
not explore them in depth, much as an 18th century naval cartographer might map the 
location and outlines of a chain of islands, but not explore their interior.  It is not our 
intention to review all of these ethical concerns, but to concentrate on issues concerning 
autonomy.  We shall first catalogue how human autonomy can be challenged by each 
technology group, then elucidate the common characteristics shared by all.  However, 
the meaning of the term ‘autonomy’ is much contested, so what one considers a threat to 
autonomy depends on what one means by the term.  It is therefore necessary to briefly 
explore the concept of autonomy.  Our aim is not to produce a definition of the term 
‘autonomy’, but to better understand the different ways it may be used when discussing 
ethical threats. 
6.1.5. Autonomy 
Immanuel Kant was the first to apply the concept of autonomy to human 
beings (Schneewind 2007; Dryden 2015; Paul, Miller, and Paul 2003; Dworkin 1988).  
Before Kant the term ‘autonomy’ was a purely political one.  A state was said to be 
“autonomous” if its laws were drafted within that state, as opposed to being drafted by a 
distant imperial court or some similar extra-national body (Dworkin 2015; Schneewind 
2007).  Kant applied the concept to the individual in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of 
Morals14 (Kant 1785).  His aim was to justify the right of each individual to make their 
own judgements regarding morality.  For the previous 100 years, Enlightenment thinkers 
had been seeking arguments to combat the politically dominant understanding of ethics, 
in which ordinary people were seen as too weak-willed to act morally without threats of 
punishment and promises of reward.  Under this view, society was dependant on the 
guidance of those few exceptional people whom God had enabled to understand and 
teach His moral laws.  The essence of morality for everyone else was to do what they 
were told (Schneewind 2007).  Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals set out to prove that 
each person drafted their own rules for their own conduct, that these rules constituted 
each person’s moral code, and that no education was required for this ability - it was 
                                                 
14 Sometimes titled “Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals” 
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universally present in all humans.  Kant labelled the innate capacity of all humans to 
determine what was morally correct as ‘autonomy.’ He then used this capacity for 
autonomy as the basis for human dignity, which then became the basis for human rights.  
Thus Kant’s concept of autonomy created an interlinking of the concepts of 
individuality, freedom, morality, autonomy, dignity and politics (Schneewind 2007; 
Bittner 2014; Dryden 2015; Paul, Miller, and Paul 2003).   
Since Kant introduced the concept, a number of differing definitions of 
autonomy have arisen.  The range of such accounts, as well as the lack of progress 
towards any consensus, has led to the concept of “regimes” of autonomy (J. Anderson 
2014; Dworkin 2015) – clusters of similar, but not identical, theories, such that “about 
the only features held constant from one author to another are that autonomy is a 
feature of persons and that it is a desirable quality to have.” (Dworkin 2015, 8).  Kant’s 
criteria for autonomy were, by later standards, rigid and limited.  Under Kant’s account, 
people were required to determine what was right or wrong without reference to the 
consequences of their actions.  Furthermore, under Kant, rules of conduct only counted 
as a moral if the person believed everyone should act the same way.  There was no room 
for moral pluralism in Kant, or tolerance of other people acting differently (Kant 1998; 
Guyer 2003; R. Johnson 2014).  This type of definition of autonomy has come to be 
known as a “substantive procedural” account.  A “procedural” account of autonomy 
takes the position that autonomy is a specific form of thinking process (ie: follows a 
specific procedure).  A subset of procedural accounts are substantive, adding the 
requirement that autonomy also involves thinking about certain things.  By contrast, 
“content-neutral” procedural accounts try to define autonomy without reference to any 
particular concern or aim.  Content-neutral accounts of autonomy form the majority of 
modern accounts (Dryden 2015) and are, perhaps, more suited to multi-cultural or 
pluralistic societies in that they allow individuals to determine for themselves what 
sources and values to consider when making ethical decisions. 
The value given to autonomy varies according to the importance given to 
competing claims, most frequently those of paternalism and those forms of 
communitarianism which devalue individual choice in favour of community needs (D. 
Bell 2014).  Kant’s original concept was developed in an effort to remove external 
authority as a source of morality.  Kant specifically identifies autonomy as oppositional 
to outside influence.  However, we are all influenced by external forces, including family, 
cultural and religious influences.  Consequently, outside influence and the point at which 
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it reduces autonomy is a problem which must be dealt with by every definition of 
autonomy.  One response has been to argue that the concept of autonomy as self-
governance isolates the individual from their society and morally devalues family, 
community, culture and tradition (Christman 2014; Stoljar and MacKenzie 2000; 
Donchin 2000; Buss and Zalta 2015).  These positions have given rise to relational and 
social conceptions of autonomy based on the necessity of human sociality. 
It has also been argued autonomy, if conceived of as only certain forms of 
thinking, does not account for the full range of human emotional and physical 
experience, such as trained muscle action (e.g.: playing sport or music) or healthy 
reflexes, which can also express personal autonomy (Meyers 1989b, 2005).  These issues 
collide with particular urgency where ICT’s become concerned with care for the ill or 
aged (Agich 2003; Burmeister 2016; Dworkin 1988), but also wherever ICT’s come to 
mediate what someone considers to be core elements of their life. 
Kant applied autonomy strictly to the moral realm, though it had political 
implications.  Since then Western Philosophy has come to term the capacity to 
determine one’s own moral codes as ‘moral autonomy.’  To moral autonomy have been 
added the concepts of “personal autonomy” (the capacity to determine one’s own 
actions) and “political autonomy” (the capacity to make one’s own political decisions and 
have them heeded) (Dryden 2015; J. Anderson and Christman 2005).  What these three 
definitions share is the concept of “self-governance.” ICT’s threaten human autonomy 
whenever they interfere with this self-governance.  This occurs whenever ICT’s make 
decisions for people, especially when an ICT imposes on the user a way of doing 
something which is antithetical to the manner in which the user would have chosen.  
Some threats to autonomy are universal under all definitions of autonomy, but most 
depend on the particular form of autonomy being used.  Reducing autonomy may be 
justified on other grounds but such a justification, like the threat, will be based on the 
version of autonomy being used.  It will often be the case that a justification works 
under one concept of autonomy, but not under others. 
6.1.6. ETICA’s technology groups and their threats to autonomy 
As described above, the ETICA project identified the following eleven 
technology groups: 
1. Affective computing 
2. Ambient intelligence  
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3. Artificial intelligence 
4. Bioelectronics 
5. Cloud computing 
6. Future internet  
7. Human/machine symbiosis  
8. Neuroelectronics 
9. Quantum computing 
10. Robotics 
11. Virtual/augmented reality 
Not all technology groups were seen by ETICA as generating ethical threats in 
and of themselves.  ETICA assessed quantum computing as unlikely to have any impact 
on society in the next 10 – 20 years, while cloud computing and future internet were 
seen as enablers of other technologies and not as raising unique ethical issues 
themselves.  We shall now briefly examine the remaining technology groups and discuss 
some of the ways in which each has the potential to reduce human autonomy.  Our aim 
is not to explore the details of the individual threats, but simply to see how autonomy 
can be threatened by each technology.  While a few technologies threaten autonomy no 
matter how it is defined, the central point of this survey is to demonstrate that most 
threats only appear under specific definitions of autonomy.   
6.1.6.1. Affective Computing 
Affective computing involves treating human emotion as input and generating 
output which either emulates human signals of emotion or which seeks to manipulate 
human emotions.  Here ethical concerns derive from the importance of human emotion 
in communication and the risks of manipulation and misunderstanding. 
How affective computing threatens autonomy can depend on whether affective 
computing works or not.  Unlike some other technologies, there is no guarantee it will 
ever be possible to build systems which can accurately read human emotions (Barrett, 
Gendron, and Huang 2009; Picard 2003).  The greatest danger with affective computing 
lies in the possibility that it people will think it is working when it is not.  When most 
technologies operate incorrectly it is obvious.  However, there is no simple way of 
checking to see if an affective computing system’s assessment of a person’s emotion is 
accurate.  Incorrect assessment of someone’s emotions threaten their autonomy when 
that data is used to make decisions which affect them.  
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If ICT’s can successfully understand human emotions, affective computing 
threatens privacy through the ability to glean information about people which they do 
not wish revealed.  Wherever such information is used to make decisions affecting the 
person, it may constitute a restriction of their autonomy.  Here it depends on the form 
of autonomy one subscribes to.  Some “second-order” procedural accounts of autonomy 
hold that autonomy is preserved provided one would have agreed with the decision if 
they had been given the chance (Dworkin 1988, 2015).  However, accounts of autonomy 
which do not allow for such “second-order” assessments hold that any decision denied 
the person is a restriction on their autonomy.  If those decisions were made in an effort 
to benefit the person, they may be justifiable on the grounds of form of paternalism.  
Otherwise they simply constitute a form of oppression.   
Affective computing therefore constitutes a threat to autonomy whenever 
affective data is used to make decisions about someone, unless one is using a second-
order procedural definition of autonomy and the person would have agreed with the 
decision if they had been given the chance. 
Emulation of emotion makes possible threats to autonomy in that it offers the 
chance to overwhelm rationality with emotion.  Any manipulation of a person’s 
emotions which prompts them to make a decision they would not have made otherwise 
constitutes a restriction of autonomy, irrespective of how autonomy is conceived.  The 
concern is therefore that introducing affective output changes the power balance 
between system and user.  If the ability to accurately detect emotions is combined with 
the ability to emulate emotional expression, the power of such systems to manipulate 
and persuade becomes greater than any previous human invention.  In this sense, 
affective systems become human manipulation technology.   
6.1.6.2. Ambient Intelligence 
Ambient intelligence refers to IC technology which is embedded into the 
environment.  Its defining characteristic is the invisibility of the devices, often associated 
with automated input (for example, a change in room temperature) and less-than 
obvious responses by the ambient system (for example, changing the air conditioning 
settings).   
Ambient intelligence offers the capability of personalising the environment to 
the individual user.  Where personalisation is under control of the user, it represents an 
extension of their autonomy.  Where personalisation is outside the user’s control, it 
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represents a reduction in autonomy under most, but not all, definitions.  Second-order 
accounts allow for the preservation of autonomy if the user would have agreed to the 
personalisation had they been given the chance.  Only under such accounts is autonomy 
preserved by automated environmental personalisation.  If the personalisation is 
intended to improve the user’s quality of life, reductions in autonomy may be justifiable 
on the grounds of paternalism.  However, that is a problematic debate which cannot be 
resolved in terms of universal principles, but will ride on the specifics of each case; the 
type of personalisation, the individuals involved and their personal values. 
Ambient intelligence shares several ethical issues with affective computing.  
Autonomy is threatened by poor quality personalization services, either as a result of an 
inadequate understanding of human nature, or by the skewing of personalisation 
protocols resulting from commercial interest or developer ignorance (or bias).  Inference 
of user needs from their behaviour is particularly problematic, especially with regard to 
children.   There is the danger that users will be forced to change their behaviour to get 
the best out of ambient systems, and so end up being “trained” by their environment’s 
designers (Soraker and Brey 2007). 
Ambient intelligence creates the risk of the personal environment acquiring 
power over people.  Since ambient intelligence makes the personal environment 
controllable by third parties, the personal environment becomes a contestable zone; 
open to commercial and state interests, both in terms of gathering information and 
seeking control.  Some contestation of the personal environment has always occurred.  
For example, disputes over noise can be traced back to the earliest cities (Goldsmith 
2012).  However, ambient intelligence represents such a significant increase in power 
that contestation for the personal environment becomes a new type of issue – the power 
to (potentially) totally control someone else’s personal space. 
6.1.6.3. Artificial Intelligence 
ETICA examined both “hard” AI (emulation of human thought) and “soft AI” 
(e.g.: expert systems and software agents).  Ethical concerns focused on the use of soft 
AI as an enabler for other emerging technologies, such as ambient intelligence and 
affective computing.  While issues associated with hard AI were considered, ETICA’s 
judged that hard AI was unlikely to do more than appear in earliest prototypes by 2030 
and so was outside the scope of the project.   
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Our discussions of ambient intelligence and affective computing have both 
shown how human autonomy can be threatened by the power of these systems over 
people.  AI significantly enhances this power, and so can be an enabler of threats to 
autonomy wherever it is deployed within ICT systems.  Particularly problematic is the 
possibility that AI may enable systems to learn things about people not anticipated by 
designer or user.  Implementation of informed consent becomes extremely difficult 
when one does not know what information may be acquired.  It has been suggested the 
solution is to build ethical reasoning into AI systems (Dennis et al. 2013).  However, 
ethical systems are abstract principles of value, not problem-solving algorithms (Kraut 
2016; Graham 2004).  Ethical dilemmas only exist where multiple ethical values conflict 
because it is these conflicting values themselves which create the dilemma.  AI 
developers are not, therefore, able to reach for an existing corpus of ethical problem-
solving algorithms as if the matter were a simple sort task.  Any implementation of 
ethical processing will therefore impose someone’s particular ethical values on the 
system.  Should such an ethical value set not accord with the user’s set of ethical values, 
the user’s autonomy will be compromised by the actions of their AI-enabled system.  
The only way to counter such a threat would be to allow users to customise their AI-
enabled systems with their own ethical values and reasoning.   
6.1.6.4. Bioelectronics 
ETICA defined bioelectronics as ICT systems which interact directly with the 
human body.  The primary ethical considerations were focused on use in health care, but 
those who see bioelectronics as a path to artificial human bodies were also considered.  
Here bioelectronics represents the potential for technological modification of the human 
form.  It therefore directly confronts the essence of what it is to be human and impacts 
core human values, such as autonomy, freedom and dignity. 
Bioelectronics can be used to change people’s internal states by delivering 
medicines and intervening in bodily processes and thus has the potential to reduce 
autonomy.  However, this concern is dependent on the concept of autonomy used.  If 
one accepts a second-order procedural concept of autonomy (Dworkin 1988), autonomy 
may be preserved post-hoc by agreeing with the earlier bioelectronic intervention.  
However, conceptions which situate autonomy at the moment of decision must see any 
bioelectronic intervention as a reduction of autonomy.  Whether this loss of autonomy 
can be justified on paternalistic grounds depends on the intent behind the intervention.  
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However, it may be possible to reframe the issue such that autonomy is not threatened.  
Discussions of bioelectronics tend to treat intervention as morally equivalent to an 
intentional act.  Under this perspective, each individual bioelectronic intervention is 
treated as a discrete act to which assent may be given or withheld.  This raises problems 
for the preservation of autonomy because of the requirement for ongoing consent 
(Agich 2003).  However, where this intervention is frequent and automated, such as is 
the case with drug delivery, it may be more productive to think of it as a form of reflex.  
Some definitions of autonomy incorporate reflex into their schema as non-cognitive 
expressions of the self (Meyers 2005, 1989b).  Treating bioelectronic interventions as 
artificial reflexes removes any threat to autonomy under such definitions.  
The nature of bioelectronic intervention means it is difficult to resist.  This 
places a great deal of potential power in the hands of those controlling the devices; 
granting them the ability to control someone to a degree not possible by other means.  
The capability of bioelectronics to change internal bodily states and processes is the 
same as that of drugs.  Accordingly, bioelectronics shares many of the same issues 
pertaining to autonomy as do drugs.  There are today debates about the advisability of 
treating some mental states as illnesses, concerns about inappropriate use of drugs to 
control behaviour in elderly and children, and other issues relating to appropriate 
boundaries to medical intervention (B. Smith 2012).  These same issues apply to 
interventions by bioelectronic devices.   Threats to autonomy apply here in two ways; 
firstly, “authentic” conceptions of autonomy involve the concept of authenticity (that 
there is some given essential nature to each individual), such that autonomy requires 
being in conformance to that essential self (Kühler and Jelinek 2013).  These accounts 
hold that there is something innate about humans which cannot be changed without 
harming their authenticity, such as particular forms of cognition (Frankfurt 1971).  
Theological accounts of autonomy may also depend upon a divinely-ordained authentic 
human nature (E. O. Wilson 1978; Niebuhr 2004).  Meanwhile, “coherentist” accounts 
base autonomy on continuity with personal history, such that changes or decisions which 
radically depart from someone’s previous patterns or tastes are inauthentic, and thus 
reductions in autonomy (Ekstrom 1993; B. L. Miller 1981).  Bioelectronic interventions 
which take a person away from an essential self, however that self is conceived, are 
reductions to these forms of autonomy.  Finally, where bioelectronic interventions are 
unwelcome and forced on the individual, they constitute a clear reduction in autonomy 
under all definitions of autonomy. 
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6.1.6.5. Human-Machine Symbiosis 
ETICA characterised human-machine symbiosis as the pairing of innate human 
capabilities with ICT.  This definition covers an extremely wide range of systems, 
including haptic interfaces, decision-support systems, computer-assisted surgery, 
augmented reality and direct neural interfaces.  There is considerable overlap with other 
technologies, especially bio- and neuroelectronics and artificial intelligence. 
Attempts to enhance human beings through the addition of ICT components 
may constitute reductions in autonomy under the authenticist views just outlined.  
Therapeutic devices, designed to replace lost human capabilities rather than enhance 
them, may be autonomy-preserving, but other accounts can hold that even these 
constitute a loss of autonomy (Bublitz and Merkel 2009).  This is particularly the case 
where those devices require monitoring or control by others.  A device may therefore 
reduce autonomy when it is operated by someone else, but enhance autonomy where it 
is controlled by the user (Sharon 2017).  Such concerns are not limited to devices 
implanted into people’s bodies.  Use of external devices, for example, as aids to memory, 
may constitute reductions to autonomy, especially under accounts based on the concept 
of an “extended self” (Olson 2011; Rachlin and Jones 2010), in which parts of our 
personal identity are embedded in external objects, such as clothing or mobile phones 
(Ahuvia 2005; Belk 1988; Turkle 2011).  For someone who embeds part of their identity 
in their phone, even something as simple as an enforced software update may constitute 
a reduction in their autonomy. 
6.1.6.6. Neuroelectronics 
ETICA defined neuroelectronics as technology interfacing between the human 
nervous system and electronic devices.  While neuroelectronics clearly overlaps with 
bioelectronics, ETICA felt the intimate connection between the person and their brain 
meant neuroelectronics could not be adequately examined within a general treatment of 
bioelectronics. 
As with bioelectronics, autonomy is not threatened when neuroelectronics is 
used to gather data, but only when used to induce changes.  Since changes cannot be 
made without knowledge of internal states, gathering data is, however, a privacy concern 
as an enabler of reductions to autonomy.  Any neuroelectronic system which produces 
changes within the person constitutes a threat under most accounts of autonomy.  While 
this is clearly the case with conceptions of autonomy which involve an authentic nature 
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or coherent life-history, it may also be the case under second-order procedural accounts 
(which allow for autonomy preservation if someone agrees to a change afterwards).  This 
is because a person’s agreement to a previous procedure may be merely the result of the 
changes they have undergone.  Where these devices are installed to deal with cognitive 
impairment, such as dementia, informed consent is impossible and thus autonomy must 
be reduced (though this may be justifiable on paternalistic grounds).  As with 
bioelectronics and human-machine symbiosis, any accounts of autonomy which involve 
a divinely-derived authentic human nature will view all neuroelectronic changes as 
reductions in autonomy. 
6.1.6.7. Robotics 
ETICA defined robots as “machines  with  motor  function  that  are able to 
perceive their environment and operate autonomously” (Ikonen et al. 2010, 114).  
ETICA focused on new developments which increase the mobility and intelligence of 
robotic devices, permitting their deployment into wider areas of society, such as the 
home and healthcare, and focused on robots built for specific roles within these 
contexts.  ETICA did not consider general-purpose, fully mobile devices controlled by 
strong artificial intelligence seeking to make war on humanity. 
The degree to which robotics can threaten autonomy depends on the definition 
of autonomy used and the use made of the robot.  As has been noted earlier, traditional 
procedural accounts of autonomy as self-determination have been criticised for 
unrealistically portraying people as isolated individuals and leaving no space in the 
account for communitarian elements such as the influence of family or culture (Stoljar 
and MacKenzie 2000; Stoljar 2015).  On this basis some have gone so far as to argue 
autonomy is an unattainable ideal (Strawson 1994).  A more common response has been 
to develop a treatment of autonomy which includes space for the influence of others, 
such as the concept of a social self (Meyers 2005, 44).  The central premise in relational 
accounts of autonomy is the necessary role of other people in the development of one’s 
values and the centrality of interpersonal relationships to human existence; that it is not 
possible to function autonomously without the influence of others (Stoljar and 
MacKenzie 2000; Stoljar 2015; Donchin 2000).  Such conceptions of autonomy are 
threatened when robots replace humans in roles which have social externalities, such as 
health care and education.  While robots are able to undertake the central tasks, the loss 
of the human contact constitutes a reduction in relational autonomy.  The consequence 
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of this is that there may be some tasks for which robots are not ethically suitable, for no 
other reason than that they are robots.  If the social externalities of a work role are 
essential for the maintenance of the recipient’s autonomy, then that role must be 
reserved for humans.  Were we to replace nurses or teachers with robots, we could thus 
see people argue they have an inalienable human right to refuse to be served by a robot 
and to demand human service.   
6.1.6.8. Virtual/Augmented Reality 
ETICA’s union of virtual reality with augmented reality into one technology 
group was based on the common feature they share - the imposition of digital output 
onto the human sensory field.  ETICA defined virtual reality as occurring where digital 
output completely replaced sensory data.  Where it did not completely replace external 
sensory data, ETICA used the term ‘augmented reality’  (Heersmink, van den Hoven, 
and Timmermans 2010, 114).  ETICA’s concerns were founded on the fact that such 
systems mediate or replace interaction with the physical environment. 
Autonomy is threatened when virtual or augmented realities depict objects, 
people and places in the real world and thus become involved with the many ethical 
issues associated with depiction,  cultural bias and its influence the development of 
attitudes and taste (Zimbardo and Leippe 1991).  The imposition of foreign cultural 
models in virtual realities would constitute a threat to relational and social conceptions of 
autonomy (Tomlinson 1991), while lack of alternatives and lack of configuration options 
threatens all conceptions of autonomy.  
6.1.7. Summary 
Many of the technologies examined provide personalised services tailored to 
the individual.  These technologies threaten human autonomy when they fail to 
personalise effectively.  This may result from misreading the user, insufficient granularity 
within the personalisation, lack of user control, inadequate modelling of the user or by 
imposing on the user ways of living which are contrary to their values.  A number of the 
technologies change power balances within society, granting for the first time, or greatly 
increasing, the actant power of the environment over the individual.  This power 
threatens autonomy if used to impose on the user or to enable autonomy-limiting 
personalisation.  Some conceptions of autonomy contain elements which can be 
disrupted by some ICT’s.  Conceptions of autonomy which include inter-personal 
relationships are challenged by robotics, while conceptions of autonomy which make 
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reference to authenticity, coherent life-history, or some form of given human nature, are 
challenged by bio- and neuro-electronics and may also be challenged by human-machine 
symbiosis. 
Irrespective of the nature of autonomy used, our survey of ETICA’s research 
suggests there are certain characteristics any ICT is likely to have if it threatens 
autonomy: 
1. Surveillance: Surveillance consists of the obtaining of information 
pertaining to an individual from their behaviour or communication, followed by 
the use of that data for purposes, either unknown to that individual or against 
their wishes (Lyon, Ball, and Haggerty 2012). While it can be used in a 
paternalistic fashion to enhance the individual’s autonomy, our concern is when 
it is used in a manner which limits the individual's autonomy.  The presence of a 
surveillance system is a necessary precondition for the use of personal 
information by others and for personalisation services because it constitutes the 
means by which that information supporting personalisation is gathered.  
Control of the outflowing data by the individual is therefore an effective way in 
which to retain autonomy.  Thus control of privacy is an enabling right to 
autonomy. 
2. Disparity of Control: Disparity of control occurs when a third party has 
a greater control over the use of one’s personal data and the autonomy-limiting 
processes than oneself.  This lack of control can be accomplished through lack 
of knowledge on the part of the individual as to what is occurring, through “take 
it or leave it” terms of use combined with a lack of alternatives, and through the 
lack (or concealment) of user configuration capabilities.  In some cases, such as 
data profiling, not just functions, but entire industries may be concealed (Dainow 
2015a; Federal Trade Commission 2014; Turow 2011).    
3. Insufficient Configurability: Autonomy can be threatened by lack of 
variability in configuration options suitable to reflect the variations in the user’s 
desires, style of operation or range of outcomes. This lack of variation can stem 
from: 
 A lack of recognition by the ICT developers of the need for, or even 
existence of, such variations. 
 Insufficient consideration of need for user variability during the design 
process. 
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 Insufficient granularity of configuration options. 
 Systemic biases within the delivery mechanisms, including business 
models, market competition, regulatory framework or any other factors 
regarding the operational delivery of services.  For example, a system 
might be highly configurable, but delivered to users with a standardised 
configuration which cannot be changed in an effort to reduce support 
costs. 
4. Insufficient variation in operational models:  Many new ICT’s are 
owned and operated by a very limited number of providers (Noam et al. 2003; 
Hillis, Jarrett, and Petit 2013).  Often a single provider dominates the market to 
near-monopoly levels.  This limits choice of service provision and consequently 
the model under which it is provided.  In many cases the business model is 
identical across all providers within an ICT sector, such that change of provider 
does not change the circumstances under which the user accesses the service.  
For example, social networking is only available under a capitalist for-profit 
model in which service provision is exchanged for personal data which is then 
commoditised (or monetised).  Non-profit and privacy-preserving social network 
systems do not exist to the degree that a real choice is available.  In addition, IP 
protection promotes walled gardens and suppresses interoperability, further 
limiting options for choice by users because it is not possible to interoperate 
between social network providers.  
6.1.8. Conclusions 
The common feature to all conceptions of autonomy is self-determination.  
What one self-decides, how, on what basis, according to what procedure, and subject to 
which influences, varies from account to account.  Yet efforts to preserve autonomy are 
central to ICT ethics (Spiekermann 2015).  Efforts to reduce the negative ethical impact 
of ICT’s on people through processes such as value-sensitive design need to be 
cognisant of the various conceptions of autonomy relevant to the intended functionality 
of the system.  This is especially the case with technologies which enter into spheres of 
life which have previously been purely human or which reduce the power people have 
over their personal lifeworld.  Given the wide range of definitions of autonomy, no 
single definition can possibly cover all cases.   
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Because autonomy is frequently central to the ethical status of any technology, 
it is rarely possible to categorise any ICT as threatening or reducing autonomy without 
reference to the form of autonomy used. Methodologies to improve the ethical 
sensitivity of ICT technology, such as value-sensitive design, make frequent reference to 
the need to specify a particular brand of ethics, such as deontology or utilitarianism, 
from which to draw values (Spiekermann 2015; Nissenbaum 2001; Winfield, Blum, and 
Liu 2014), but the application of such values still depends on the concept of autonomy 
being used.  It is generally assumed that there is a single, fixed meaning to autonomy, at 
least in any given context, and that preservation of autonomy simply requires, at most, 
identification of the correct version (Manders-Huits 2011).  Some have noted the 
meaning of autonomy can vary with different contexts (Burmeister 2016), but it is 
possible that it only appears the meaning has changed because the difficulties perceived 
apply to one version of autonomy and not others, thus making the problematic version 
of autonomy obvious.  Our review of ETICA’s survey of threats to autonomy has 
revealed that many versions of autonomy may be applicable within the one context, 
some of which may have problems while others do not.  Thus, attempts to find the 
“correct” version of autonomy for any context may be moot.  On this basis, it seems 
more appropriate to develop ICT functionality which does not depend on a single 
definition of autonomy, but adapts to the user’s own definition.  This implies a loose 
pairing of system behaviour to coding, such that output can be fine-tuned after 
deployment, either by a user, their technical support staff or through the use of soft AI 
components focused on adapting the system to user feedback.   
All significant emerging ICTs can threaten autonomy, but there is no simple 
way of avoiding this.  Efforts such as value-sensitive design stand more chance of 
success if they focus less on incorporating a single set of values and focus instead on 
ways by which users may adapt ICT’s to reflect their own individual values. 
-end of published paper - 
6.2. Next Steps 
The published paper answered the primary research question of how emerging 
ICT’s could restrict autonomy.  In and of itself, it is useful for evaluating specific 
technologies against the different versions of autonomy.  However, while it goes some 
way towards developing general characteristics from which rules and principles can be 
drawn, it does not consider the implications of the fact people do not use only one ICT 
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technology, but many, and that the impact of any one technology may be influenced by 
others.  For example, the impact of robotics cannot be understood without reference to 
artificial intelligence.  This tendency to focus on a single technology, without reference to 
the technological context in which it occurs, is a common characteristic of ICT ethical 
analysis.  We therefore continued our research by looking for existing analysis which did 
consider the impact of combined technologies within the context of emergent ICT’s.   
Our research indicated the best framework by which the future state of these interacting 
ICT’s can be analysed was smart city research.  While there are many conceptions of the 
smart city, it is, by definition, a descriptive conception of a state of affairs produced by 
the interaction of many ICT’s and people and forming a complete environment. 
In order to evaluate the combined effects of all emerging ICT’s on individuals 
we therefore turned to smart city research.  This first focused on the concept itself, 
which is typically considered within Geography, Architecture and related disciplines 
(such as Urban Planning) and then on more detailed discussions within computer science 
regarding specific technologies (such as city dashboards, expert systems in urban 
management, ad hoc networking, autonomous vehicles and IoT devices).  It became 
clear there was a lack of models in computer science which accommodated both the 
complex technical infrastructure and human practice.  In general, computer science 
accounts which did try to create comprehensive models focused on the technology, 
especially its formal and material aspects, while accounts from Geography, Architecture 
and related disciplines tended to focus on the social aspects, primarily in terms of 
teleology.  However, an ethical account within computer science requires both in equal 
measure.  It was therefore determined that a descriptive framework which could 
accommodate both the engineering and the human as equally important elements was 
required which could then serve as the platform for analysis of restrictions to autonomy 
within a generic digital environment (the smart city).  This analysis stretches over the 
final two publications.  The first publication elucidates the descriptive framework we 
developed, while the second explores the manner in which ICT’s may restrict human 
autonomy within this framework.  The descriptive framework was published in 2017 in 
Orbit (1) as “Smart City Transcendent”.  The analysis is found in the book chapter, 
“Binding the Smart City Human-Digital System with Communicative Processes”, to be 
published in Technology and the City (in press). 
Our research at this point focused on the concept of a digital environment.  A 
digital environment is one in which ICT’s and other digital technologies are the 
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dominating defining characteristics, such that significant elements of one’s life are 
unavoidably mediated through digital technologies.  Smart cities are visions of such a 
digital environment, though there may be other ways of envisioning it.  Our interest in 
the smart city is not motivated by a belief that smart cities, as envisioned today, will 
come into being.  Whether today’s predictions come into being is irrelevant.  The reason 
for considering smart cities is that there a rich source of literature available for research 
purposes, covering concepts, scope, disciplines, methodologies, elucidating issues and 
contextualising technology innovation.  Furthermore, this research material is enhanced 
by empirical data regarding current smart city initiatives.  Most importantly, these smart 
city initiatives mean smart cities meet the same criteria for socially significant and 
emergent technologies used by ETICA.  By evaluating digital environments through the 
lens of the smart city, we thus maintain methodological consistency.  The smart city thus 
constitutes a legitimate expression of a situation in which ETICA’s ICT’s operate 
simultaneously, while also allowing for (unspecified) new social practices in their use. 
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7. Understanding the Smart City as a System 
The paper presented in this chapter provides a conception of the digital 
environment by considering what the smart city brings to the world which is new and 
original.  This approach provides a means of dealing with the complex influences 
humans and digital systems will have on each other in the mature smart cities of the 
future.  The paper first reviews traditional accounts of the smart city and derives from 
them the essential characteristics common to these visions.  We then show how these 
characteristics can be best understood through Actor-Network Theory (Latour 2011) 
and construct an account of the smart city as an autopoietic system in which humans and 
devices are co-constituting actants.  Finally the paper develops this into an original 
conception of the smart city as a new type of thing - an Integrated Domain.   
The following section contains the paper as published.  Minor modifications have been made to 
ensure the writing style matches that of this thesis (such as changing “I conclude” to “we conclude”).  The 
original published paper used the term ‘communicative triad.’  However, this term was changed to 
‘integrated node’ in later accounts of the theory, and so has been changed here from the original 
‘communicative triad’ to ‘integrated node.’  Headings have been numbered and the citation style has been 
changed to match the rest of this thesis. 
7.1. Smart City Transcendent - Understanding the Smart City by 
Transcending Ontology 
Orbit 1 (2017). https://www.orbit-rri.org/volume-one/smart-city-
transcendent/ 
7.1.1. Accounts of Smart Cities 
There is no single definition of what constitutes a smart city.  Accounts divide 
into three schools regarding definitions of the smart city.  One school defines the smart 
city in terms of what we can do with it.  Here we find topics such as innovation policy 
(Komninos, Schaffers, and Pallot 2011), smart governance (Vinod Kumar 2015), urban 
planning (Zygiaris 2013), improved sustainability (Bowerman et al. 2000) and similar 
large-scale management tasks.  Others define the smart city in terms of its material 
construction.  Here the focus is mainly on devices comprising the Internet of Things and 
their interactions.  Some focus on issues of designing smart sensors and other 
components, such as weight detectors in roads (Hancke, Silva, and Hancke 2013).  
Others focus on the interactions between components, such as sensor networks 
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(Filipponi et al. 2010) and human-sensor interactions (Pettersson et al. 2011).  Others 
attempt to make sense of both usage and components through the development of 
organisational models.  For example, Jin proposes a four-layer model of sensors, 
networks, cloud-based data management and service delivery (Jin et al. 2014).  
Organising smart city components and operation into layers is fairly common.  
Balakrishna’s four-layer model (Balakrishna 2012) is almost identical to Jin’s, while 
others adopt a three-layer (Atzori et al. 2012) or five-layer (Pettersson et al. 2011) model.  
In contrast, some have attempted more conceptual organisational models.  For example, 
Filipponi (Filipponi et al. 2010) suggests a vertical model based on our understanding of 
the space in which activity occurs, such as car, home, office and civic space. 
Attempting to make sense of this range, Smart Cities: Definitions, Dimensions, 
Performance, and Initiatives (Albino, Berardi, and Dangelico 2015) examined twenty-two 
accounts and cross-referenced these with urban developments which labelled themselves 
as smart cities.  Their conclusion was that a single definition was impossible because of 
wide variations in the meaning of common terms.  Attempts to include everything 
inevitably cover too much or too little.  At one extreme we have very broad statements, 
such as a smart city is that which uses “social, mobile and sensor-based technologies … 
to create more productive alignments between (growing) demand and (constrained) 
resources.” (Hartswood et al. 2014, 3).  At the other extreme, Getting Smarter About Smart 
Cities defines a smart city as:  
“using networked, digital technologies and urban big data to tackle 
a range of issues, such as improving governance and service delivery, 
creating more resilient critical infrastructure, growing the local economy, 
becoming more sustainable, producing better mobility, gaining 
transparency and accountability, enhancing quality of life, and increasing 
safety and security.” (Kitchin 2016, 9). 
Deployment of smart city technology is more likely to be accomplished by 
industry than by academic researchers.  It is therefore worth considering the vision of 
the smart city which industry offers.  Cobham Plc is a major player in the smart city 
sector, with annual turnover of $US3 billion (Cobham Plc 2011).  Their Tactical 
Communications and Surveillance division provides a range of smart city technologies.  
Their smart city sales brochure (‘Safe Cities’ 2014) offers a 5-layer model, ranging from 
an “IP mesh” which allows any type of sensor to communicate with any other, through 
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several layers of device type, including integration of personal devices as sensors (with 
and without user knowledge), through to management systems. 
Certain characteristics are held in common throughout all these accounts.  They 
agree that smart cities require a ubiquitous heterogeneous sensor network which 
provides information about the inhabitants, their environment and service delivery.  This 
has been referred to as an “IP mesh” (Cobham Plc 2011, 3) and as an “underlying sensor 
fabric” (Balakrishna 2012, 224).  These sensors must report their data to other devices.  
Some of these communication patterns can be predesigned, while others must be created 
on an ad hoc basis in response to the movement of the inhabitants and machines such as 
drones, robots and cars (Guo et al. 2013; Pettersson et al. 2011).  There is general 
agreement these devices will be embedded in the civic environment, the home and other 
personal spaces (such as the car), worn on the person and implanted within the body.  
While many accounts assume that all data processing will occur in the cloud, this is not 
inevitable.  A contrasting view can be seen in the concepts of fog computing (Bonomi et 
al. 2012; Petrolo, Loscrì, and Mitton 2015) and user-controlled personal data stores 
(Service Systems Group 2015b).  Under these views significant data processing can be 
done locally, either within sensor devices themselves or through locally situated data 
processing units (Service Systems Group 2015a).  Indeed, such local processing is likely 
to be more secure and efficient (Dainow 2015b; Langheinrich 2001). 
The aim of this paper to provide a comprehensive definition of the smart city 
which can serve as the foundation for ethical analysis by reconceptualising the smart city.  
Current ethical concerns for the smart city tend to be limited to specific issues associated 
with specific technologies within the smart city, such as cars (Jaisingh, El-Khatib, and 
Akalu 2016) or location detection (Martínez-Ballesté, Pérez-Martínez, and Solanas 2013).  
Our aim is to provide a comprehensive framework for analysis of any ethical issue, 
especially issues which are emergent from the interaction of multiple systems and which 
therefore cannot be predicted from any one sub-system.  This requires developing a new 
vision of the smart city which is able to account for the complex nature of interactions 
within it.  
7.1.2. The City of the Future 
We must first place the smart city within a foresight studies framework.  This is 
because the smart city does not yet exist, but is rather at an early stage of development.  
Given that the smart city does not yet exist, current technologies related to smart cities 
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must be regarded as interim steps towards what will be the ultimate deployed solutions 
in mature smart cities of the future.  We must therefore regard current smart city 
technologies as in flux, as unfinished, and their features as mutable and almost certainly 
subject to change.  Furthermore, our current understanding of the path to the mature 
smart city is highly uncertain.  The issue of ad hoc networking illustrates that even the 
direction of innovation is in dispute.  Much concern in smart city development focuses 
on issues of communication between devices.  It is widely recognised that mobile 
devices, autonomous systems and moving people will all necessitate the dynamic 
creation and uncreation of unpredictable network patterns.  Known as “ad hoc 
networking”, some see great advantages in this (Boldrini, Conti, Delmastro, & Passarella, 
2010; Guo, Wang, Zhang, Yu, & Zhou, 2013) seeking only to make it reliable and secure, 
while others (Pettersson et al. 2011) see its chaotic and unpredictable nature as 
something which needs to be controlled.  Clearly, it is difficult to anticipate the ultimate 
role of ad hoc networking in the smart city at a stage when we cannot even agree on 
whether it should be promoted or inhibited.  
Teleological accounts, concerned with urban governance, typically focus on the 
ways in which smart cities can solve today’s problems.  However, it is unlikely that the 
contentious issues of smart city governance are predictable in any detail.  Prior to the 
invention of the world wide web, no one could have anticipated the need for domain 
name registries, nor the political fighting which would emerge around them. We can 
therefore anticipate that at least some important forms of governance of mature smart 
cities are yet to be imagined.  Similarly the most pressing issues confronting mature 
smart cities will include those we cannot yet anticipate because they will derive from the 
unknown nature of currently unpredicted technologies and the currently unpredictable 
patterns of usage which will evolve around them.  Considering that new technologies 
always create negative side-effects (Derry and Williams 1993; Cardwell 1994), it is 
inevitable that the solutions we deploy in creating the smart city will generate problems 
of their own – which we also cannot predict. 
Placing the smart city within a futures perspective therefore means 
understanding that we do not know how it will be made, how it will operate, or how it 
will be managed.  Conceptions of this future unknown smart city must therefore frame 
themselves in terms which are not dependent upon knowledge of the specific details of 
future smart technologies.  Fundamental to the futures approach is an understanding 
that the smart city is not today’s city with some digital tech laid over the top of it, any 
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more than the modern city is just a Victorian one with cars instead of horses.  The 
mature smart city will be a fundamentally different type of environment from any we 
have previously seen.  The key change will be the presence of ubiquitous ICT 
technologies.  Through all of history the human built environment has been a largely 
dumb. It has not had the ability to do things to us except in the most gross fashion and it 
has not had the capability to know us. The capacity of the environment to obtain data 
and to respond to human action represents a fundamentally new type of built 
environment for human living.   
We can therefore understand the characteristics of the smart city best if we 
consider it as a form of built environment.  Accounts of smart cities focused on the 
technical infrastructure typically treat it as consisting of intelligent devices embedded 
within dumb materials.  However, the number, ubiquity, heterogeneity and invisibility of 
most devices will cause humans to understand and act towards the object in which the 
devices are embedded rather than the devices themselves, and in many cases deal with 
aggregations of devices rather than individual ones.  Attempting to account for this 
interaction between human and device in terms of component types and processes is 
impossible on two grounds.  Firstly, we cannot know the nature of these future devices 
or what patterns of usage humans will develop towards them.  Secondly, the number and 
heterogeneity of these devices and variability of human relations with them across 
differing contexts renders attempts to understand on the basis of technical type 
impossibly complex.  We must therefore cease to talk in terms of technical components 
and instead identify the functional characteristics which can unite the various 
heterogeneous technical forms.   
The following will identify the essential functional characteristics of the smart 
city.  Thereafter we will use these to synthesise a conception of the smart city as a new 
type of being. 
7.1.3. Ambient Intelligence 
Ambient intelligence is defined as technology which embeds input, processing or 
response ubiquitously through the environment (Ikonen et al. 2010).  With its ubiquitous 
sensor mesh the smart city is the ideal type for ambient intelligence.  As a lived 
experience, people will know the smart city not as individual components and discrete 
processes isolated within atomised sections of their lives.  Instead the smart city will be 
experienced as a seamless experience as one moves from house to car to work, from one 
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context to another.  People will not think of themselves as moving from one discrete 
situation to another, they will simply experience themselves as going about their daily 
life, an unbroken stream of changing contexts seamlessly merging from one to the other.  
The following quotes from the auto industry illustrate current steps in this direction: 
Matt Jones, Director of Future Technology at Jaguar Land Rover: 
“We very quickly discovered that customer expectations really 
aren't based on our Jaguar Land Rover competition - they're based on the 
smartphone. They're based on the tablet. They're based on the home 
entertainment experience….  Consumers expect to be able to download an 
app, get into the car and discover a seamless integration between the device 
and the automobile.” (Bedigian 2016, 7) 
John Schnoes, Programme Director of Vehicle Information Technology at 
Nissan: 
“It all comes down to smart device connectivity. People are really 
looking to have that sort of seamless experience when they've been 
working on their phone and then they walk into their car and they expect 
the platform to know what they've been doing.” (Bedigian 2016, 8)  
Emergent in-car systems reveal that cars will communicate with their 
environment in a deep fashion.  Usage-Based Insurance systems analyse driver 
behaviour, including time of day, acceleration rates, cornering and locations travelled in 
order to dynamically set insurance premiums.  Emerging collision-detection systems can 
automatically contact emergency services with essential details, including the identities of 
the occupants and which seatbelts were fastened.  Car maintenance systems will access 
user calendars to determine the best time for maintenance appointments.  Already today, 
the Ford SyNC systems can accesses the driver’s medical data to remind them when to 
take their medicine (Jaisingh, El-Khatib, and Akalu 2016).  
We can see similar cross-context connectivity trends at the urban management 
level.  For example, Restore NV provides demand management systems, such as those 
controlling electrical grids, including five of Europe’s largest grid operators (Restore NV 
2016). Their newly announced smart city electricity management system, FlexPond, 
monitors individual home appliances to predict electrical load within individual homes 
(Restore NV 2017).  This information can be cross-referenced with local weather 
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patterns and the number and type of household occupants to greatly improve demand 
prediction (Hancke, Silva, and Hancke 2013). 
Other smart city systems treat personal digital devices as mobile components of 
the smart city infrastructure.  This is not limited to using such devices merely as sensors 
or as personal identifiers.  Patterns and content of social interaction between people can 
be analysed to anticipate movement patterns, shared use of resources, and even as a way 
of determining appropriate security levels to create between devices (Atzori et al. 2012).  
Others have tested analysis of social networking to guide structuring of ad hoc networks 
(Boldrini et al. 2010).  China plans to take this further, creating a “social credit system” 
by monitoring many aspects of personal conduct, including honesty and conformance to 
socialist behaviour.  A key aim is to reduce social diversity.  This system will offer 
rewards and punishments through differential access to smart city services (State Council 
of People’s Republic of China 2014).  Some smart city services will even penetrate the 
physical body.  Already being tested, body sensor networks embedded into the 
environment communicate with implanted medical devices, such as heart monitors, to 
anticipate and react to medical emergencies (Lo et al. 2005). Such health sensor networks 
can also monitor some vital signs externally, such as skin temperature, respiration, sleep 
patterns and diet (Hancke, Silva, and Hancke 2013; Y. Kim, Kim, and Lee 2008).   
The picture which emerges is one in which smart city services must take data 
from a ubiquitous digital ecosystem, in which digital devices are embedded throughout 
the fabric of the built environment - “transforming everyday objects into information 
appliances,” (Botta et al. 2016, 691) but also including devices carried by people and 
embedded within their bodies (Filipponi et al. 2010; Balakrishna 2012; Botta et al. 2016; 
Jin et al. 2014; Pettersson et al. 2011). This data will be integrated across contexts, 
technology forms and purposes so as to create an integrated sensing and response 
environment (Psyllidis 2015).  Such an “intelligent information infrastructure” (ITU-T 
2008, 2) is clearly an ideal type for ambient intelligence. 
7.1.4. Artificial Intelligence 
Central to the vision of the smart city is algorithmic intelligence, or “soft AI” 
(e.g.: expert systems and software agents) (Komninos 2006; Ikonen et al. 2010).  It has 
been estimated that a typical smart city will contain around 1 trillion nanoscale devices 
(Balakrishna 2012).  A central paradigm implied within the concept of the smart city is 
that the smart city will generate new data and novel possibilities for action as a result of 
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the integration of data from disparate domains (Picon 2015).  There is a general 
acceptance that this will require machine learning and other forms of soft AI 
(Balakrishna 2012; Nam and Pardo 2011).  In addition to common expectations that soft 
AI will provide core functionality through cloud computing and big data, it has been 
suggested soft AI will need to be embedded at local level to support ad hoc networking 
and to facilitate more rapid system responses due to the sheer scale of data (Komninos, 
Schaffers, and Pallot 2011). 
7.1.5. Robotics 
Robotics refers to ICT devices possessing the ability to move autonomously 
(Ikonen et al. 2010).  Self-driving cars (and possibly drones) are expected to exist within 
smart cities (Jaisingh, El-Khatib, and Akalu 2016; Balakrishna 2012; Petrolo, Loscrì, and 
Mitton 2015).  The home will see robotic devices such as vacuum cleaners and similar 
devices, sometimes known as mobile IoT (Gubbi et al. 2013).  The specific details of 
which robotic devices will exist within the smart city need not concern us for the 
purposes of this analysis.  The important point is that the smart city environment will 
involve both humans and machines moving within the same spaces.  Just as the 
introduction of the car eventually led to the rise of pedestrian crossings, so an 
environment of moving machines will require adjustments in human behaviour to take 
them into account. 
7.1.6. The Smart City as a Socio-Technical System 
The vision which has emerged of the smart city places technical artefacts and 
humans as equally powerful actants.  Digital devices will communicate amongst 
themselves and engage in negotiations (Atzori et al. 2012; State Council of People’s 
Republic of China 2014) as they create ad hoc networks, including event-driven 
networks (Filipponi et al. 2010), contextual networks (Boldrini et al. 2010) and social 
networks (Atzori et al. 2012; Boldrini et al. 2010). Thus the network structure of the 
smart city will be created by the devices as well as by the humans.  Device activity will 
respond to human activity.  Humans will respond to these responses.  Furthermore, 
digital devices will have their own needs, which will require consideration by humans.  
Accordingly we can view digital devices as causal agents in a smart city on the same 
causal level as humans.   
Systems theory has dominated urban planning since the 1960’s (Taylor 2005) 
and permeates approaches to the smart city (Söderström, Paasche, and Klauser 2014), 
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which is seen as a complex system, or system of systems (Albino, Berardi, and Dangelico 
2015; Chourabi et al. 2012).  Actor-Network Theory (ANT) (Latour 2005) provides a 
theoretical framework for incorporating the smart city’s digital agents and their needs 
into an interactive relationship with humans.  By treating both devices and humans as 
co-existing within the same structure, ANT provides a framework by which we can 
attribute to artefacts causative properties within the human dimension and vice versa 
(Tabak 2015).  A further advantage of ANT is the lack of need to specify the details of 
each node within the network (Law 1992).  This suits a both a heterogeneous device mix 
and a futures approach which accepts that we cannot know what final forms smart city 
technology will take.  In addition, ANT has been used to account for pathways in ICT 
innovation (R. Kim and Kaplan 2005; Lamb and Kling 2003) and so applying it to smart 
cities can be linked to that research.  This offers the potential for an explanatory 
framework which can account for the dynamics of the innovation which will lead to the 
mature smart city. 
The arrival of an intelligent responsive environment, especially one containing 
autonomously mobile agents, requires changes which must affect people.  This will 
inevitably bring the needs of the digital agent into conflict with the needs of the 
individual or society, just as cars require roads and regulations which gives them effective 
rights over people in some circumstances.  Ambient intelligence systems may also 
require changes in human behaviour, raising the possibility that our environment will 
train us to suit its needs (Soraker and Brey 2007).  In other cases, we can anticipate that 
personalisation of shared spaces will result in differences between people regarding how 
much any particular personalisation suits them.  This may range from the trivial, such as 
ambient temperature, to the existential, such as access to sensor networks required for 
medical implants.  As the Chinese social credit system shows, some people will be forced 
to make compromises in order to accommodate aspects of personalisation preferred by 
others within the shared space.  It is not inevitable that spaces will be personalised to suit 
the majority, or that minority needs will be accommodated.  It is possible that 
environmental personalisation will become a zone of contention and power dynamics.  
Given the potential impact alteration of spaces can have on the individual, control of 
personalisation of shared spaces could easily become a path to domination of others.  
Hence control of the digital actants within the smart city’s actor-network can be 
expected to grant influence and power over the human actants. 
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The fact digital actants have their own needs which require changes by humans 
raises the issue of secondary rights.  Digital objects, while requiring humans change, do 
not, in and of themselves, originate that need. They are operational units whose 
existence is caused by humans and to whom the benefit of their activity is given to 
humans.  They are not self-originating and they are not in receipt of the benefit of their 
activity.  As a result, while it appears that the object is competing with the person, in 
actual fact the object stands in proxy to another individual - the beneficial owner.  While 
the situation may look like competition of rights between the individual and the object, it 
is in fact competition between one individual and another in which the device stands as 
proxy for the second individual.  However, the rise of AI systems may mean that, while 
other humans benefit from the satisfaction of digital needs, they did not originate those 
needs.  Instead we may encounter needs that were generated by the AI system as a result 
of its own development and self-learning.  Given the expected complexity and scale of a 
smart city’s ambient intelligence, there are likely to be many contexts in which we cannot 
distinguish between human-originated and self-determined needs of digital actants.  It is 
likely that some needs will arise via a combination of human-originated and self-
determined needs.  It is likely that many human goals will be accomplished via 
methodologies which were self-determined by autonomous systems.  Where a self-
determined methodology has negative effects on other people, we can expect some form 
of resistance.  Such a situation represents an interactive process between human and 
digital system, in which human decision-making contends with the autonomous 
decisions of a digital actant.  In that ANT considers nodes as “black boxes” (Tabak 
2015, 37) and does not need to specify their internal details, it is not confounded by the 
issue of whether an activity derives from the device or some beneficial owner. 
By treating the human and the digital components of the smart city as equal 
actants within the same environment, ANT also offers a dimension of analysis which is 
essential for a full understanding of the interactions of the human and the digital – the 
perspective of the digital device.  By its very nature, a digital device cannot know the 
physical world.  What a device knows is what its sensors generated as input.  For 
example, a thermostat does not respond to the temperature, but to what the sensors tell 
it the temperature is.  If the sensor malfunctions, or we game it, the thermostat control 
will still respond to what the sensor tells it, not what the material reality is.  Hence digital 
devices do not know the physical world, but inhabit a totally digital environment.  What 
they know of us and how much they know is determined by our representation in digital 
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terms.  Smart city systems will not respond to us; they will respond to our digital 
representations.  If those digital representations are incorrect or incomplete, then the 
analysis of us will be compromised and the delivery of services will suffer.   
Accordingly, ANT offers us a conception of the smart city as a complex 
network of heterogeneous actants.  Under this view we recognise that these actants may 
be a single digital device, an individual person, a group of people, a group of devices, or 
a mixture of both.  We can build on this conception by considering the logic which must 
be inherent within operational smart cities in order for them to exist.  Doing so will 
provide a more detailed understanding of the nature of the smart city system, revealing 
its essential quality of autopoiesis. 
7.1.7. Autopoiesis in the Smart City 
The concept of autopoiesis originates in theoretical biology in the 1970’s 
(Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 1981) and accounts for living things, such as cells and 
bodies, as self-sustaining systems.  The concept was made accessible to the social 
sciences by Luhmann (Luhmann 1986a) in the 1980’s.  Systems theory holds that the 
defining characteristics of a system are not determined by the properties of the 
components but by the patterns of their relationships (Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 
1981).  Autopoietic systems are those which are self-maintaining in the face of changing 
stimuli, either changes inside the system or within the system’s environment.  To be 
autopoietic, systems must also regenerate the essential patterns which characterise that 
system and internally generate the components and processes required to maintain it 
(Maturana 1981).  
The original theories of autopoiesis were designed for biology and seemed 
limited to that field by the necessary characteristic that an autopoietic system generate its 
own components (Maturana 1981; Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 1981), a process known 
as “material self-production” (Di Paolo 2005, 433).  However, this issue is really one of 
the minimum granularity in one’s ontological schema.  Living systems are the ideal type 
for theories of autopoiesis, but they do not create atoms or many of the molecules they 
depend on.  No autopoietic system generates the materials from which the components 
considered necessary for characterisation of that system as autopoietic are created.  All 
autopoietic systems exchange input and output with their environment (Luhmann 
1986a).  Hence autopoietic systems need only self-generate the components which are 
the most proximate cause of their characteristics and self-maintenance. 
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Building on this approach, Luhmann reworked the concept of autopoiesis to 
bring it into the social sciences (Luhmann 1986a).  Under his account social systems are 
autopoietic systems which use communication as their characteristic form of autopoietic 
generation.  The atoms from which social systems are constituted are communications, 
which are recursively produced and reproduced.  Luhmann defines communications as 
being composed of three elements; information, utterance and understanding.  As such, 
a communication is an event.  A social system as autopoietic is a “network of events 
which produces itself … the reproduction of events by events.” (Luhmann 1986a, 175).  
The critical point is that the elements of an autopoietic system which make it autopoietic 
are those which maintain autopoiesis in the face of destabilising forces and which give 
rise to characteristics of autopoiesis which distinguish it from other autopoietic systems.  
The basic unit of social autopoiesis is this integrated node of information, understanding, 
and utterance (Luhmann 1986a).   
This pattern is easily visible within the smart city.  It is the minimum necessary 
capability of digital device interactions which exhibit any of the defining attributes of an 
ambient intelligence.  Within ambient intelligence this communicative pattern is visible as 
the ability to accept input (“information”), process it in some way (“understanding”) and 
consequently produce output (“utterance”).  In order for any device to participate in an 
ambient intelligence it must be able to perform these three processes.  The actant within 
the autopoietic system is thus defined by its ability to accept input, process it and 
respond.  The response becomes input for a connected node and thus the process 
perpetuates.   
However, smart cities will not be constituted by closed communicative systems 
in which digital devices communicate only with each other.  As we have seen, the smart 
city will be characterized by the close integration of digital devices and humans (Bicocchi 
et al. 2013).   Much of the digital device’s input will derive from humans, both as 
intentional commands and as unconscious input (such as movement and reactions to 
digital service delivery).  Hence both devices and humans will react to each other and 
stimulate new responses in turn.   In this way both humans and digital devices will be 
seen to engage in communicative patterns amongst their own kind and across the 
human-digital divide.  Furthermore, once begun, this system becomes self-referential and 
recursive, as each responds to the response of the other, and so the system becomes self-
sustaining and autopoietic. 
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If we accept this integrated node as the atomic unit of a living smart city, there 
exists a temptation to see this as two societies, one human and one digital, 
communicating within themselves and only interacting with the other by means of 
constituting its environment – humans embedded in a digital environment and digital 
devices surrounded by humans.  However, significant portions of human communicative 
action will be mediated by the digital environment, while that digital environment’s 
communicative patterns will respond in myriad ways to every human action.  Under such 
circumstance, few integrated nodes can be said to be purely human or digital; the overall 
patterns of communicative flow will be the result of both human and digital 
components.  Some have highlighted the tight interaction of the ICT and human 
communities in smart cities under the terms ‘collective sensing’, ‘collective awareness’ 
and ‘collective action’ (Bicocchi et al. 2013).  However, such analysis does not 
incorporate the deep fusing of both collectives which must occur.  We are not suggesting 
this fusion constitutes some form of hybrid human-machine society, or that we should 
redefine the term ‘society’ to include digital systems.   Some have used the term ‘smart 
society’ to characterise the society within a smart city (Hartswood et al. 2014), but this 
refers to a human society using smart city services.  This is a useful definition to maintain 
because it refers to real issues and to a clearly definable zone of concern.  We therefore 
believe we need a new term for this new phenomena, one which refers to an autopoietic 
system constituted of integrated nodes which may be digital, human or both.  We 
propose to call this an integrated domain. 
7.1.8. Defining Integrated Domains 
An integrated domain is a socio-technical system in which humans and digital 
devices co-mingle in a manner such that it becomes impossible (or even meaningless) to 
identify the origins of patterns within the system as being either human or digital.  An 
integrated domain is autopoietic.  The autopoiesis of an integrated domain derives from 
a close coupling of nodes such that output from one node cannot avoid generating a 
reaction in another node, combined with the unavoidable structure of the atomic node, 
which is the integrated node event.  An integrated domain consists of two collectives 
integrated into a mutually dependant and co-creative partnership.  One collective 
consists of a human smart society.  This is a form of human society existing within an 
ambient digital environment, such that human perceptions, actions and intersubjectivity 
are unavoidably mediated and influenced by this ambient digital environment.  The other 
(non-human) collective consists of an autopoietic system of digital devices and networks 
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based on the integrated node.  However, neither collective possesses strict boundaries 
against the other, but rather the two intermingle.  We can thus describe each as separate 
for theoretical purposes, but it is not possible to account for characteristics of, or 
phenomena within, either without reference to nodes within the other.  Any discussion 
of the nature and processes within smart society on the human side or the smart city 
digital components must draw on aspects of the other, and so any explanatory discussion 
of either must occur at the higher ontological level of the integrated domain. 
The concept of autopoiesis includes a persistent demand for regeneration 
(Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 1981).  This holds true for integrated domains as well.  
However, whereas in a living organism it is the material constituents which need 
regeneration, in an integrated domain it is the integrated nodes.  Integrated nodes are 
events, not states (Luhmann 1986a).  Patterns of communication thus form an actor-
network in which the nodes are events constituted of integrated nodes, whose material 
base may be a human, a digital device, or a group of either or both.  It is essential that 
groups of people and/or devices can be treated as equal actants within this model 
because groups will interact and communicate with individual devices or people in the 
smart city, and vice versa.  An example of a combined group which would yet constitute 
a single node is a car in motion.  The car is composed of a wide range of interacting 
devices.  Much of the operation of these devices will be influenced by the actions of the 
driver, and vice versa.  However, this complex system may communicate data aggregated 
from many of these systems in combination with the driver’s actions to a single device, 
such as a traffic light.  Similarly, a single device, such as a traffic light, can be expected to 
communicate with dozens, if not hundreds, of similarly complex entities. We thus see 
that the communicative system is integrated not just across differences of materiality, but 
also spans (or ignores) multiple ontological levels. 
7.1.9. Social Machines 
The primary unit of the integrated domain is the integrated node. This is a 
three-stage process consisting of input, processing and output. It constitutes an 
individual node within the network structure of the integrated domain.  This network 
structure is dynamic, variable and self-sustaining.  Under this view the smart city is seen 
as a system possessing autopoiesis.  Each node is not a state, but a process or an event 
and their influence on the system’s patterns is not determined by their material base.  
The material base of each node may be an individual processing unit, such as an single 
 146 
 
digital device or an individual person, or it may be constituted by a grouping of devices, 
people or even a combination of both.  Each node may also be constituted by the 
aggregated activity of a group of sub-nodes.  These sub-nodes may themselves may be 
constituted by another group, an overlapping set of groups or an individual person or 
device.  It is likely that the cascade effect of events and responses, combined with the 
volume and complexity of communication will make it impossible, or even meaningless, 
to ask whether a feature of note is the product of one node or many, human or digital.  
The integrated node therefore constitutes both the atomic unit for, and the essential 
pattern of, interactions within the smart city.  It provides us with a framework for 
handling the way in which smart city processes can transcend normally distinct 
ontological boundaries and frequently renders them meaningless.  This deep 
interconnectedness of materially indeterminate nodes combines with ad hoc networking 
and human response variability to create a highly complex network structure.   
As an autopoietic system, many of the integrated nodes will be concerned with 
internal states of operation within both digital assets and humans.  In the case of digital 
assets, much of the communication can be expected to be concerned with issues such as 
maintenance and management of digital technology. This monitoring represents self-
awareness.  This is not awareness in the human sense, implying sentience.  However, as a 
system, the integrated domain is aware of its internal processes.  Through the 
component of the human, the integrated domain possesses the human level of 
understanding and meaning-giving.  An integrated domain is therefore a self-aware, 
autopoietic system composed of actants who may be digital or human, individual or 
group.  
We are already witnessing early examples of hybrid systems which combine 
human and digital devices under the label of “social machines”.  Social machines are 
defined as “socio-technical systems which involve the participation of human individuals 
and technological components…able to extend the reach of both human and machine 
intelligence [by] supporting capabilities that less integrated systems might find difficult to 
accomplish” (Smart, Simperl, and Shadbolt 2014, 55–56).  Social machines are the early 
fore-runners of the integrated domain which will form the fabric of future smart cities. 
7.1.10. Conclusions 
The close integration of a huge range of devices and systems makes any model 
of the smart city which depends upon material differences impossibly complex and 
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inevitably incomplete.  The deep integration of various ontological levels, from the 
individual nano-sensor to the global cloud, makes it impossible to comprehend causes of 
individual actions within the smart city.  Both of these issues are further magnified by the 
expectation and need of the human lived experience to transcend these technical 
distinctions.  Discussion of smart cities in terms of enablers of human activity, such as 
urban management, do not adequately incorporate into their models the deep fusion of 
digital cognitive processes with human deliberations.  This confronts us with the 
necessity for a model which does away with such distinctions.  Instead we have 
postulated the smart city as an integrated domain.  Under this view the digital and the 
human, the individual and the group, all hold equal status as nodes within a complex, 
dynamic autopoietic system known as a smart city.  The concept of the smart city as an 
integrated domain provides a framework through which it is possible to consider issues 
which transcend traditional IT boundaries, issues deriving from complex interactions of 
multiple agents of multiple types.  It provides a unified model by which to account for 
bidirectional interactions between management-level civic aims and individual device 
functions, between groups and individuals, between digital devices and humans.  It 
further provides us with the ability to anticipate issues within mature smart cities without 
knowing the details of the technologies to come.  Models like this, which seek to 
incorporate the human and the digital into integrated systems, offer our best hope of 
anticipating the future issues of smart cities. 
- end of published paper - 
7.2. Next Steps 
The model presented above provides a framework for analysis necessary to 
answer the main research question, but does not address it directly.  Within the terms of 
the above framework, the research question can be rephrased as “how can a digital 
environment restrict human autonomy?”  The last stages of the above account introduce 
the integrated node as the operational unit within the integrated domain, but do not 
provide any detailed information about it.  As the site of human existence within an 
integrated domain, and as the place where technology and the human interact, threats to 
autonomy will occur within the integrated node.  Exploring the mechanisms by which 
autonomy can be restricted within the integrated node is therefore the next step.  The 
following chapter offers an analysis of the mechanisms by which autonomy can be 
restricted through the integrated node and directly answers the main research question. 
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8. Autonomy within the Integrated Node 
The book chapter presented here offers a second answer to the primary 
research question: 
“What are the possible threats to human autonomy generated by 
emerging ICT’s?” 
The chapter describes the mechanisms by which autonomy can be restricted 
within each of the integrated node’s phases of input, processing and output.  The aim is 
to provide a mechanism for considering ethical issues within future digital environments 
without needing details regarding the technology in question or the type of action being 
undertaken.  The intent in so doing is to avoid predicating concerns on specific 
predictions of future technologies or specific human usages of them.  This necessarily 
requires more detailed analysis of each phase within the integrated node, as well as 
supporting concepts. 
The following section contains the book chapter as accepted for final publication.  Minor 
changes in formatting and citation styles have been made to ensure consistency with the rest of this thesis.   
8.1. Binding the Smart City Human-Digital System with Communicative 
Processes 
In Technology and the City, edited by Michael Nagenborg, in-press. 
This chapter offers a new way of viewing the complex phenomena which is 
humans living in a technologically advanced city.  Using Actor Network Theory (Latour 
2005), the concepts of autopoiesis (Luhmann 1995), symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1986), 
affordances (Hutchby 2001) and fields of contention (Bourdieu 1990), a new framework 
will be developed which provides a way of describing people and technology as a single 
unified system.  We will use this framework to characterise the system’s nodes and 
patterns of connection, identify fields of contention and how they impact technology 
design and derive consequent ethical issues.   
The sophistication of modern technology is what separates modern cities from 
those of the past.  Today’s cities are becoming dependent upon advanced digital systems 
embedded throughout them.   The life of a citizen in such a city is incomprehensible 
without understanding the technology of their built environment.  We may therefore 
regard modern cities as complex socio-technical systems (Taylor 2005).  The future for 
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technology in cities is held in the image of the smart city, in which intelligent digital 
systems and personalised services dominate urban existence.  If we can develop an all-
encompassing framework to describe the smart city, we can use it to understand trends 
in urban technology today.  By anticipating the ethical concerns in future smart city 
technology, we can identify current trends which may not be of concern today, but will 
give rise to issues in the future.  Such knowledge offers the chance to change innovation 
paths now in order to prevent future issues developing in the first place. 
The key characteristic of the smart city is the ubiquity of digital devices and 
systems.  Smart cities are based on the foundation of an omnipresent sensor network 
which provides information about the inhabitants and environment (Balakrishna 2012).  
These sensors will communicate with devices and systems to provide analysis and 
response.  Some of these communication patterns can be predesigned, but some will 
appear and disappear as people move about (ad hoc networking) (Guo et al. 2013).  Digital 
devices will be embedded in the civic environment, the home and other personal spaces 
(such as the car), worn on the person and implanted within the body (Perera et al. 2014).  
While some devices will be embedded in traditional materials, the rise of smart materials 
will often render the distinction between device and material meaningless (Addington 
and Schodek 2005).  Data will be processed locally (fog computing) as well as in the cloud 
(Bonomi et al. 2012).  People will be tracked individually and in aggregate.  The urban 
environment will change in response to the movements and needs of individuals and 
groups.    
Ethical exploration of technologies is usually limited to issues associated with 
specific technologies, such as cars (Jaisingh, El-Khatib, and Akalu 2016) or location 
detection (Martínez-Ballesté, Pérez-Martínez, and Solanas 2013).  However, many ethical 
issues emerge from the interaction of different technologies.   Furthermore, smart cities 
will not be like today’s cities with some digital technology laid over the top, any more 
than the modern city is just a Victorian one with cars instead of horses.  The mature 
smart city will be a fundamentally different type of environment from any we have 
previously seen (Batty et al. 2012).  Through all of history, the human built environment 
has been a largely dumb.  It has not had the ability to initiate action, nor has it had the 
capacity to know us.  The ability of the environment to obtain data and to respond to 
human action represents a fundamentally new type of built environment for human 
living (Picon 2015).  The number, ubiquity, heterogeneity and invisibility of digital 
systems in the urban fabric will force humans to deal with intelligent spaces, rather than 
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individual devices (Rolim et al. 2016).  We must therefore cease to talk in terms of 
technical components and instead develop a vision of the smart city which encapsulates 
all aspects of its operation.  The starting point for analysis is to identify the functional 
characteristics which can unite the various heterogeneous technical forms found in the 
smart city.  These are ambient intelligence, artificial intelligence and robotics. 
Ambient intelligence is technology which embeds input, processing or response 
throughout the environment (Ikonen et al. 2010).  As a lived experience, people will not 
experience the smart city as individual components and discrete processes isolated within 
atomised sections of their lives.  Instead, the smart city will be experienced as a seamless 
experience as one moves from house to car to work, from one context to another 
(Dainow 2017a).  Similarly, smart cities will integrate data about people from multiple 
sources, creating a digital environment, a pervasive digital ecosystem which saturates the 
built environment, interacts with devices carried or worn by people and embedded 
within their bodies (Balakrishna 2012) to create an integrated sensing and response 
environment (Psyllidis 2015), an “intelligent information infrastructure” (ITU-T 2008, 2), 
or ambient intelligence. 
Central to the vision of the smart city is algorithmic intelligence, or soft AI (e.g.: 
expert systems and software agents) (Komninos 2006).  In addition to expectations that 
soft AI will provide core functionality through cloud computing, it has been suggested 
soft AI will need to be embedded at local level to support ad hoc networking (Komninos 
2006), to provide contextual awareness (Augusto, Nakashima, and Aghajan 2010), and 
simply to handle the sheer amount of data (Komninos, Schaffers, and Pallot 2011). As a 
result, the smart city will be filled with many AI systems.  These systems will need to 
interact with each other and the human inhabitants in myriad ways.  These AI’s will 
constitute a complementary, but distinct, form of consciousness to the humans within 
the smart city. 
‘Robotics’ refers to ICT devices possessing the ability to move autonomously 
(Ikonen et al. 2010).  Self-driving cars and drones are expected to exist within smart 
cities (Jaisingh, El-Khatib, and Akalu 2016).  Much building construction will occur 
robotically (Tibbits and Cheung 2012).  The home will see mobile IoT devices, such as 
robot vacuum cleaners (Cirillo, Karlsson, and Saffiotti 2012).  Public spaces, such as a 
hospital ward or shopping mall, will see many different types of robot moving about 
(Mastrogiovanni, Sgorbissa, and Zaccaria 2010).  The specific details of which robotic 
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devices will exist within the smart city need not concern us here.  The important point is 
that the smart city environment will involve both humans and machines moving within 
the same space.  Just as the introduction of the car eventually led to the rise of pedestrian 
crossings, so an environment of moving machines will require adjustments in human 
behaviour to take them into account.  Similarly, just as the car required the development 
of petrol stations, so the needs of the smart city’s robotic inhabitants must inevitably 
require the development of specific urban structures and support systems. 
The arrival of an intelligent, responsive environment containing autonomously 
mobile agents brings changes which must affect people.  In this respect, the smart city 
will be created by its digital systems as much as by its human inhabitants.  Device activity 
will respond to human activity.  Humans will respond to device activity.  Digital devices 
will have their own needs, many of which will require consideration by humans.  This 
will sometimes bring the needs of the digital agent into conflict with the needs of the 
individual, just as cars require roads which gives them effective rights over people in 
some circumstances.   Accordingly we must view digital devices as causal agents in a 
smart city on the same level as humans. If we are to develop a comprehensive view of 
the smart city, we must therefore include humans and digital systems as equals.  Both are 
active agents capable of producing changes in the other. 
 Systems theory, long dominant in urban planning (Taylor 2005), permeates 
approaches to the smart city (Söderström, Paasche, and Klauser 2014), treating it as a 
complex system of systems (Bicocchi, Leonardi, and Zambonelii 2015).  Actor-network 
theory (ANT) (Latour 2005) offers a systems approach which puts the smart city’s digital 
agents into an interactive relationship with humans by regarding both as nodes in the 
same system.  By treating both devices and humans as the same type of node within the 
same system, ANT provides a way of describing the causal effects digital agents have on 
humans and vice versa (Tabak 2015).  A further advantage of ANT is the lack of need to 
specify the details of each node within the network (Law 1992).  Instead, under ANT, 
agents may be a single digital device, an individual person, a group of people, a group of 
devices, or a mixture of these.  However, ANT alone is not sufficient.  The range and 
number of devices, their mobility, the deep interaction with humans, and the dynamic 
patterns of interaction generated as a result, means smart cities cannot be centrally 
managed, but must be self-organising, or autopoietic.  
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The concept of autopoiesis originated in biology to account for living 
organisms as self-sustaining systems (Varela, Maturana, and Uribe 1981).  Systems theory 
holds that the defining characteristics of a system are not determined by the properties 
of the components, but by the patterns of their relationships (Boulding 1956).  
Autopoietic systems are those which can maintain or regenerate these patterns in the 
face of changing circumstances  (Maturana, 1981).  Niklas Luhmann introduced the 
concept of autopoiesis to the social sciences by treating society as a form of autopoietic 
system.  Under Luhmann, the atoms from which social systems are built were 
communicative events between people.  Luhmann defined communicative events as being 
composed of a sequence of information, understanding, and utterance (Luhmann 
1986b).   
This communicative atom is also visible in digital devices and systems.  It is the 
minimum necessary characteristic of any digital device that it be able to accept input 
(“information”), process it (“understanding”) and produce output (“utterance”).  All 
digital systems are formed from groups of digital devices acting in such a fashion.  
However, smart cities will not be constituted by systems in which digital devices 
communicate only with each other.  Humans and digital devices will engage in 
communicative patterns across the human-digital divide, as well as with each other.  
Furthermore, significant portions of human-to-human communicative activity will be 
mediated by the digital environment, while that digital environment’s communicative 
patterns will respond in myriad ways to every human action.  Under such circumstances, 
few nodes can be said to be purely human or digital; the overall patterns of 
communicative flow will be the result of both human and digital actants - an integrated 
domain. 
  It is important to bear in mind ANT is not explanatory.  ANT is more method 
than theory, and the appellation of ‘theory’ has been declared misleading (Latour 2005).  
The concept of the integrated domain is not intended to explain relationships or trace 
cause and effect.  ANT provides a system of describing phenomena which cannot be 
attributed to exclusively digital or human causes, but does not seek to explain why or 
how.  The descriptive framework offered here is intended to provide a language for such 
explanations. 
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8.1.1. Integrated domains 
An integrated domain is an autopoietic socio-technical system comprised of 
two collectives integrated into a mutually dependant partnership.  One collective consists 
of a human smart society.  A smart society is a human society which exists within an 
ambient digital environment, such that human intersubjectivity is mediated by digital 
technology (Hartswood et al. 2014).  The other (non-human) collective is a system of 
digital devices and networks.   Operationally, neither collective possesses strict 
boundaries against the other.  Instead, they intermingle to such a degree it is impossible 
to account for phenomena within the integrated domain without reference to both.  An 
example is the search engine manipulation effect, which has shown that the order in 
which a search engine lists items strongly influences the chance of these items being read 
and being believed (Epstein and Robertson 2015).  Search engines are significant 
cognitive tools for many people, which analyse people’s behaviour in order to produce 
search results personalised to them (Dillahunt, Brooks, and Gulati 2015).  Thus, the 
user’s knowledge of the world is mediated by logic created by their behaviour in 
combination with the search engine’s algorithms.  The user’s knowledge of the world no 
longer derives from their own efforts, but from the inseparable fusion of human and 
digital.  When the human and the digital are inseparable, we have entered the integrated 
domain. 
The node which binds the integrated domain as a system is the integrated node, a 
unit of operation consisting of input, processing and output.  In ANT terminology, an 
integrated node is a mediator, a node in a system which transforms what flows through it 
(Latour 2005).  A integrated node may be a person, a single device, a group of devices, a 
group of people, or any combination thereof.  A integrated node is not defined by what 
it is made of, but by its mode of operation. 
As the digital develops more cognitive capabilities through AI, so its impact on 
the human becomes more varied and more complex.  The internal nature and logic of 
these digital systems, their logos, therefore becomes more important in understanding 
their outcomes.  As a consequence, it becomes imperative that we consider the digital 
perspective - how the world looks and is understood by digital systems  (Picon 2015).  
The terms ‘looks’ and ‘understood’ do not indicate anthropomorphism.  Digital 
cognition is not the same as human cognition.  However, if cognition is accepted as “the 
action or faculty of knowing taken in its widest sense” (‘Cognition, n.’ 2018), then it is 
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clear that digital systems do possess a form of cognition.  The most important aspects of 
the digital perspective are time, design, logic, epistemology and energy. 
Descriptions of digital systems are inherently time-bound.  Digital systems only 
“exist” to the degree that data flows through them.  Without data on which to operate, a 
digital device is inert, no more able to cause effects in the world than a rock.  
Accordingly, a digital system is not best considered as a state but as a process (Dodge 
and Kitchin 2005).  For example, a service commences with anticipation of user 
requirements, organises processes to deliver the service to the user, is processed by the 
user (possibly mediated by other devices) and terminates in a stream of output data 
comprised of user activity and the recording thereof.  Integrated nodes are regions 
through which data and activity flow, defined by the manner in which they change what 
flows through them.  Digital systems cannot be understood as actants by considering 
their material composition, only through understanding how they operate over time. 
Digital constructionism is the view that there is nothing natural, and little 
inevitable, in the manner any digital system accomplishes its task. For example, it is often 
assumed that improving online security must require reducing online privacy, but these 
two values are not in competition.  Enhancing privacy can actually make systems more 
secure (Langheinrich 2001).   The assumption that security and privacy are oppositional 
reflects current practice, not the necessary characteristics which must adhere in any and 
all digital systems (Dainow 2015b).  Any system which improves one by reducing the 
other is a result of decisions made by developers, who chose to code in such a manner.  
The algorithms, interfaces and other implementations of digital design are therefore to 
be understood as artificial and engineered social constructions, and always open to 
alternatives (Dong 2004). 
All digital systems stem from the place of tool making in the human.  It is the 
primary defining characteristic of the digital that digital systems are created by humans 
for specific purposes.  We do not create any digital systems simply so that they can exist, 
returning nothing to us.  All digital systems are therefore inherently teleological systems.  
Any attempt to understand them must consider the purpose for which they exist.  We 
can only arrive at a complete understanding of other goals, processes and values within a 
digital system by considering them in reference to the ultimate purpose for which that 
system was built.  We must therefore consider digital systems in terms of who their 
primary beneficiaries are and the benefits they derive.  Processes within digital systems 
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are driven by their digital logos, the heuristics, values and other elements which govern the 
design of digital cognitive processes and thus determine their outcomes.  The nature of 
the digital logos is therefore important to those who desire control.  Consequently, 
contention and power dynamics are concentrated around the digital logos in the form of 
competition for dominating values and heuristics (Albrechtslund 2007).  The overarching 
function of the digital logos is to serve the system’s ultimate purpose.  The ultimate 
purpose may be different from the obvious purpose.  The obvious purpose is the reason 
why users make use of the system.  For example, a commercial navigation system’s 
obvious purpose is to guide a user to their destination.  However, as a commercial 
system, its ultimate purpose is to generate profit.  During design, elements of the system 
will therefore be evaluated against their profit-making capacity as well as their capacity to 
aid navigation.  Potential elements which help the user but compromise profit generation 
will be unwelcome, and may not be included (Bogliacino and Pianta 2013).  The user 
may not get the best solution if such a solution would reduce profitability.  All systems, 
especially those operated for profit, must therefore be regarded as, at least potentially, 
compromising the user in favour of some other goal.  We can never assume that the user 
is always the primary beneficiary of any digital service. 
By its very nature a digital device cannot know the physical world.  What a 
device knows is only what its sensors generate as input.  For example, an air conditioning 
control system does not respond to actual room temperature, but to what the sensors tell 
it the temperature is.  If the sensor gives a false reading, the air conditioning will still 
respond to what the sensor tells it, not what the reality is.  Hence digital devices do not 
know the physical world, but inhabit a totally digital environment.  What they know of 
us is determined by our representation in digital data.  Smart city systems will not 
respond to us; they will respond to our digital representations.  If those digital 
representations are incorrect or incomplete, then the analysis of us and our needs will be 
compromised (Mittelstadt et al. 2016).  Digital scepticism is the epistemological position 
that digital systems can only detect that limited set of reality which they are designed to 
receive as input.  If a system is not designed to process a certain input, then the 
corresponding aspect of the world does not exist for the digital system.  Should this 
aspect of the world represent an important goal to the user, their attempts to achieve 
that goal will be frustrated.  When combined with digital constructionism and the politics 
of the digital logos, the digital system’s knowledge of the world becomes a product of 
stakeholder interests, not some “objective” view of reality. 
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Every process uses energy.  This means we can validly apply many concepts 
related to energy to both digital processes and human interactions with digital systems.  
We can talk in terms of capacity, frequency, resistance and so forth.  We can apply these 
same concepts to the human as well as to the digital because we do not depend upon any 
particular material composition for the concept of energy to be applicable.  
Consequently, we can discuss both digital and human systems and the interactions 
between them in the same terms.  The amount of energy required to utilise a digital 
service is an important factor in its usability.  Energy is expended for a purpose, as a cost 
towards achieving a goal.  Goals have a cost threshold, beyond which the cost is not 
worth the goal.  Increasing ease of use is a way of reducing the energy required for a 
task.  This is a significant factor in the spread of digital technology and an important 
driver of innovation (Fontana and Nesta 2009).  By contrast, nudging is a process of 
gradually leeching energy through micro-thresholds in order to produce a strong 
cumulative effect, either to discourage input, prevent or influence processing, or reduce 
output (E. J. Johnson et al. 2012). 
8.1.2. Contention and affordances 
As creations of human society and as sources of value, digital systems are 
inevitably included in the fields of contention (Bourdieu 1990) which permeate other aspects 
of society (Pursell 2007).  Many of the characteristics of any digital system can be sites of 
contention (Mansell 2017).  Any aspect of a digital system can be designed to increase 
domination more than to serve the user.  Characteristics of digital systems should 
therefore be considered as potential strategies for competition.  Within the Integrated 
Domain digital actants are not passive spaces, but support or inhibit the competitive 
strategies of human actants.  Bourdieu’s theory of multiple forms of capital (Bourdieu 
1986) allows us to understand human-digital interaction as being engaged in generation, 
exchange and transformation of capital.  Digital systems can produce multiple forms of 
capital – economic (OECD 2013b), cultural (Shifman and Nissenbaum 2017), social 
(Jiang and Carroll 2009) and political (Epstein and Robertson 2015).   
Generation of non-economic capital in digital systems occurs through 
affordances, which bring cognitive associations to sensory input.  Any technology may be 
understood in different ways, according to a person’s education, social environment and 
other factors (Hutchby 2001), all of which are constrained by the capabilities of the 
technology in question (Norman 2002).  These dictate a person’s affordances; how they 
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perceive a technology and how they understand what they perceive.  The concept of 
affordances holds that perception does not consist of a physical activity onto which 
understanding is overlaid post hoc.  Instead, the perceptive process itself contains 
cognitive elements, such as motivation and context (Gibson 1986).  We use affordances 
to build conceptual models of how something works (Hutchby 2001).  There are always 
two conceptual models involved; the model the designers held when they constructed 
the artefact and the user’s model when they use it.  These models are never the same and 
user error or difficulty is usually the result.  There is a significant body of analysis which 
argues that the design and operation of digital services today is primarily tuned to the 
exploitation of users to their disadvantage (Vaidhyanathan 2012; Andrejevic 2012).  
Owners use marketing to manipulate values so as to attribute symbolic capital to use of 
their systems (Bernays 1928), such as creating socially aspirational personalities whose 
use of a system makes it desirable to their followers (Lamb and Kling 2003).  Designers 
of digital systems use control of development to determine which forms of capital are 
generated through use of their systems (Dainow 2015a) and which are repressed (Cirucci 
2015).  A common example is making privacy controls hard to locate in order to stop 
people using them (Liu et al. 2011). 
8.1.3. The Integrated Node 
As a system, we do not understand the smart city’s digital environment as being 
composed of states so much as processes.  A integrated node is a node in an Integrated 
Domain which binds the system together through the activities of input, processing and 
output.  This is the model for mediators of any composition within the Integrated 
Domain, whether composed of single or multiple actants, digital or human, or any 
combination thereof.  Integrated nodes are recursive.  They are usually made from 
autopoietic systems of sub-nodes, each of which is an integrated node itself.  Each of 
these will usually be constituted by their own autopoietic system of integrated nodes, and 
so on.  For example, a person may interact with their digital environment through a 
combination of their physical body and carried digital “assistants” such as a smartphone.  
Here the one integrated node is composed of both the human and the digital devices, 
both of which can individually accept input, process it and produce output, and thus are 
nodes in their own right.  However, to be an “integrated” node, the node must be 
composed of both human and digital components.  However, the triphasic pattern of 
input, processing and output is the atomic pattern within all nodes, whether human, 
digital or integrated.  Hence, the integrated node constitutes both the atomic unit and the 
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essential pattern of interactions between these atomic units, transcending normally 
distinct ontological boundaries.   
Many integrated nodes will be concerned with internal states of operation 
within both digital assets and humans.  Much of the communication between digital 
agents concerns management of digital technology. This monitoring represents a form of 
digital self-awareness, though ‘self-awareness’ does not imply sentience.  Meanwhile, the 
human element confers on the Integrated Domain the human level of understanding and 
meaning-giving.  An Integrated Domain is therefore a self-aware system which two 
forms of awareness – human and digital.  We are already witnessing early examples of 
hybrid systems which combine human and digital devices.  Social machines are “socio-
technical systems which involve the participation of human individuals and technological 
components…able to extend the reach of both human and machine intelligence [by] 
supporting capabilities that less integrated systems might find difficult to accomplish” 
(Smart, Simperl, & Shadbolt, 2014, pp. 55–56).  Social machines are early fore-runners of 
the Integrated Domain’s integrated nodes which will bind together the fabric of future 
smart cities. 
The integrated node is both its own field of contention and a site within other 
fields of contention, in which attributions of symbolic capital determine value, some of 
which are convertible into economic capital.  The initial basis for contention is the 
degree to which the user's needs align with the service provider’s or designer’s aims.  
Where the user is paying directly for the service and has a choice of service provider, the 
interest of the service provider is primarily to maintain the satisfaction of the user.  
However, where the service is free to users but paid for by other means, the service 
provider’s concern for the user is merely to keep them using the service while value is 
derived from that usage of the system by other means. 
Each person inhabits a digital environment comprised of a variety of devices 
and systems.  Some of those devices are “personal” in the sense that they are worn, 
carried, or embedded in the body.  In addition to providing direct services to the user, 
these devices mediate between the person and their digital environment.  The smart city 
will not interact with people directly, but with this assemblage of human-with-personal-
devices.  At the level of the Integrated Domain, each individual is thus located within an 
Integrated Personage comprised of themselves plus their personal digital devices.  Should 
one subscribe to theories of the extended self (Belk 2013), an Integrated Personage may 
 159 
 
be regarded as a self which has been extended into the personal digital devices.  
However, the concept of the Integrated Personage is not dependent on the concept of 
an extended self, but on practical necessity - many digital systems are not designed to 
interact with humans, only with other digital technology, and so humans must use digital 
tech to access these systems.  Integrated Devices are those devices used within the 
Integrated Personage.  They have a special relation to the human by virtue of their role 
as critical mediators with the Integrated Domain and within the human smart society.  
They may also have, under some accounts, special relation to the user as extensions of 
the self, especially if they are embedded within the physical body.  As a result they have a 
special ethical status not accorded to other owned objects. 
8.1.4. Ethics and the Three Modes of the Integrated Node 
We need an account of the technological city which does not function at the 
level of the thousands of individual technical systems of which it is made.  Not only is 
such a level of analysis is too complex, it is misleading because technologies do not work 
in isolation but are experienced as a unified digital environment.  Likewise, we need to 
avoid separating the digital from the human because it is often impossible to understand 
the one without reference to the other.  In similar fashion, consideration of individual 
ethical concerns is to be avoided.  Individual ethical concerns are many and frequently 
specific to particular technologies, usages or historical circumstance.  The approach 
taken here is to instead identify a single point of ethical concern which is not dependent 
on specific details.  This single point can be used to identify features of ethical concern 
which could be found in any digital environment.  Autonomy is just such a foundational 
ethical value.  It forms the legal and ethical basis for human rights and provides the 
justification for treating people as we do under international law and democratic politics 
(Dworkin 1988).  All rights given under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
derive from the premise that all humans have the capacity for autonomy (Marshall 2008).  
The capacity for autonomy is what gives humans dignity and the right to be treated as an 
end in themselves, not a means to an end (Kant 1998).  Autonomy is thus the single 
point of ethical interest with the widest range of implications and shall therefore be our 
point of ethical concern. 
However, there are many different definitions of autonomy (Dainow 2017b).  
The term was initially restricted to morality by Kant, who argued that all humans had the 
innate capacity to determine what was morally right and wrong (Kant 1998).  This 
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version of autonomy has become known as ‘moral autonomy.’  Since Kant we have 
added political autonomy (participation in political processes) and individual, or 
personal, autonomy (being the final determinant of one’s actions)  (Christman 2015).  In 
addition to these spheres of application, there are many different accounts of what 
constitutes autonomy in any sphere.  Here the focus lies on the internal processes by 
which one exercises autonomy.  The general concerns are to distinguish the degree of 
external influence which can be allowed before we can say autonomy has been lost and 
what, if any, specific cognitive elements are required in order for self-reflection to count 
as autonomous (Dainow 2017b).  Even the same definition of autonomy can lead to 
people living incompatible lives because they hold different values.  However, it is 
possible to work with a generic understanding of autonomy without getting bogged 
down in these details by allowing that it is for each person to determine how they want 
to define autonomy for themselves.  This means we need to assess digital environments 
in terms of the degree to which they enable or prevent the exercise of all forms of 
autonomy.  At the level of the Integrated Domain, the Integrated Personage occupies the 
point of autonomy for the individual and so our account of the operations of the 
integrated node shall focus on the ways in which autonomy is in play within the input, 
processing and output phases of an Integrated Personage. 
8.1.4.1. Input 
Input may be defined as change at the interface between the integrated node 
and its environment.  It is through design of digital interfaces that the most significant 
efforts at control occur within the Input phase. Interfaces are material elements which 
generate energy for internal processing.  Data is a cognitive form of energy and may be 
analogue or digital.  When meaning is applied to data or use made of it, data becomes 
information (Ackoff 1989).  Different meanings may be applied to the same data, just as 
different uses can be made of it.  The same data is thus capable of giving rise to variable 
amounts of information (Floridi 2008).  Someone’s capacity to control their input is both 
empowered and constrained by the nature of the interfaces which exist between the 
human user and the digital environment.  Control of interface design and operation is 
therefore fundamental to domination and commodification (or “monetisation”) of the 
digital environment.   
One cannot process something which has not entered the system.  Input 
therefore determines the constraints of processing.  Control of input is a fundamental 
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determinant of the exercise of autonomy.  No matter how one defines it, autonomy is 
always dependant on one's knowledge of the external world because it is with this 
knowledge that one makes deliberations.  One important way in which input is restricted 
is through epistemic control.  Epistemic control is the strategy of restricting the delivery of 
data or designing its delivery so as to hide information.  A common example is the 
creation of privacy policies which are lengthy and difficult to understand.  By doing so, 
the privacy policy becomes too large or too complex to be accepted as input by the user 
(McDonald and Cranor 2008).  Because the policy cannot be input, the website’s privacy 
practices cannot be processed, and so the user cannot generate a response (output) 
which the service provider wishes to avoid (such as not using the service) (Acar et al. 
2015).  Epistemic control is also exercised by simply hiding what is being done.  For 
example, digital systems may make use of hidden technologies, such as Flash Long 
Storage Objects, which bypass privacy systems (Soltani et al. 2010).  User systems which 
attempt to preserve privacy by blocking cookies are an example of epistemic contention, in 
which two parties attempt to gain epistemic control of each other.  In effect, the user’s 
cookie-blocking technology is an attempt by the user to limit the tracking organisation’s 
input, and so prevent the tracking organisation processing information about them, 
while the tracking organisation’s attempt to hide their tracking is an attempt to prevent 
information about their practices becoming input to the user.  This exposes an on-going 
conflict between service provider and user, in which each seeks epistemic control over 
the input of the other as a means of influencing their respective processing.  A more 
subtle strategy for epistemic control lies through association and design, as we have seen 
with the search engine effect (Epstein and Robertson 2015), whereby the mode of 
presentation of data at the interface can influence the affordances through which it is 
input to the human.  More complex factors emerge in concerns as systems become more 
sophisticated.  Factors such as cultural bias may mean the input systems for ambient 
intelligence, affective systems (which seek to detect emotion) and voice recognition, 
force people into behaviours which are foreign to their culture in order to use the system 
(Soraker and Brey 2007).  Epistemic control can also be achieved through preventing 
restriction of input, effectively “force feeding” data into the integrated node.  
Advertising technology which bypasses ad blocking is an example of such force feeding, 
as is subliminal messaging (Verwijmeren et al. 2011).  The actions of data brokers in 
seeking to keep their very existence hidden (Federal Trade Commission 2014) are an 
extreme example of epistemic control. 
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The designer of a digital system may restrict input intentionally or through 
ignorance.  Where this is intentional, it may be done either to help the user, make life 
easier for the developer, or exploit the user.  Where it is done to exploit the user, it 
constitutes an intentional attack upon their autonomy.  Many theories of autonomy hold 
that autonomy is preserved if the person would have consented had they been given the 
opportunity to do so at the time (Dainow 2017b), so hidden factors do not necessarily 
constitute a restriction on autonomy.  However, preventing choice post hoc does 
constitute a restriction of the user’s autonomy no matter what the action.  Where this 
prevents someone taking actions they would have chosen if they had possessed full 
information, it also constitutes a restriction on their freedom.  Where input is restricted 
to suit the service provider it constitutes a secondary, but still intentional, attack on the 
user’s autonomy, in that the user is not being considered as an end in themselves, but as 
a means to the service provider’s end.  Where input is restricted to help the user, it can 
be described as an accidental restriction on autonomy and should be weighed against the 
benefit derived.  This happens fairly frequently.  For example, it is often easier for users 
to restrict input by forcing people to choose from pre-set options, rather than allowing 
them to type freely.  A free choice opens the possibility of unprocessable input, and so 
requires checking which may force the user to retry.  As a result, restricting users to pre-
set choices is the preferred strategy in design. 
8.1.4.2. Processing 
Processing is the bridge between input and output.  Processing therefore 
heavily influences which connections are made at output, although output is also 
constrained by material limitations.  Input is what is processed.  We use the term ‘energy’ 
for that which is input, including both data and physical activity (such as hearing aids and 
traffic lights).  Because affordances append attributions of meaning and implied use, 
processing is strongly influenced by the affordances with which the input was received.   
Processing may be described as the reorganisation of input energy patterns 
through manipulation.  The heuristics of this manipulation are driven teleologically by 
the goals for which they are deployed.  How input is transformed is also determined by 
the material composition of the integrated node and its internal processing structure.  
The processing structure may be divided into a material component and a cognitive 
component.  Examples of the material component include biology and chip design. The 
material component has a determining effect on many aspects of the data, such as 
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granularity, processing speed, computational complexity and so forth.  The factors 
affecting processing are always defined so that they can be applied to a device, human, 
individual or group, no matter whether digital, organic or both.  Since it is attributions of 
value which determine the heuristics of processing, contention occurs for attributions of 
value in an attempt to influence the processing.  For example, placing values on using 
digital devices in certain ways (Zhao, Grasmuck, and Martin 2008) is an attempt to 
influence the way a person processes information using these devices.  In an Integrated 
Personage processing is also instantiated in communication patterns between the 
Integrated Devices, and between these devices and the human.  For example, a GPS 
device communicates location information to a mapping device which then 
communicates instructions to a bluetooth headphone which then communicates sound 
to the human, who then changes direction and thereby communicates new location data 
to the GPS device.  It is not only the data processed and transmitted which constitutes 
the processing, but the devices themselves as Triphasic Nodes within the autopoietic 
system which is the Integrated Personage. 
Many of our existing issues with regard to ICT ethics today are focused on 
processing; issues of algorithmic justice, the moral status of autonomous systems, and 
use of personal data, are all examples of concerns over processing.  One of the most 
important ethical issues here is the role of previous experience.  It is indubitable that 
individuals bring their previous experience to their processing.  Physical practice to 
develop muscle memory and trained reflex, central to music and sports, are a way of 
encoding previous experience as processing structures in the physical body.  Education is 
a way of producing previous experience which can be used in cognitive processing.  
Previous experience is held to be a critical factor in processing by designers of 
personalisation systems, which analyse our history in order to predict and influence our 
future actions (Schneier 2015).  The internet economy today is based on knowledge of 
previous experience (OECD 2013b), as are all personalisation services of the future. 
Because ANT is not an explanatory theory, it brackets how processing works.  
Being silent as to the internal details of processing, the exact mechanism by which 
human processing occurs may be described according to one’s theories regarding the 
nature of the human mind.  All that is required here is an acceptance that people have 
internal states of some form, determine their own actions in some way, and respond to 
changes in their environment.  For our purposes, it is sufficient to say that processing 
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involves the production of information and determination of action, and that input 
comes with a use value (Hartson 2003), which implies how it is to be processed.  
It is important to bear in mind that each human exists within the Integrated 
Domain at the level of the Integrated Personage, an autopoietic system composed of 
human + digital.  The Integrated Personage is therefore the point of autonomy within 
the Integrated Domain, not the individual.  Since autonomy involves self-governance 
(Kant 1998), the ability to have control over processing within the Integrated Personage 
is necessary for autonomy in an Integrated Domain.  The individual must be able to 
control processing to the degree that they are able to generate output intended to 
produce the states of affairs that the individual desires.  It is not required that they are 
actually able to produce their desired states of affairs.  Autonomy is not threatened 
simply because the world does not give in to whatever you wish.  But the individual must 
be able to try (Christman 2004). 
A person may be unable to exercise autonomy in processing due to constraints 
created by designers.  Internal contention is contention for the manner in which the 
Integrated Personage processes information.  External contention is competition as to 
whether processing occurs within the Integrated Personage or is done by an external 
integrated node.  Internal contention occurs through attempts to influence how the 
Integrated Personage conducts its processing.  Simple examples include blocking 
interoperability with a device from a competing manufacturer, controlling what apps can 
be installed on a device, or restricting devices from accessing certain files or formats.  A 
common technique in many systems is to discourage processing by increasing the energy 
required, for example the use of obscure legal terms in privacy policies.  One has no 
difficulty physically inputting the words into one's mind.  However, where the terms are 
not understood, the affordances providing semantic understanding at input are absent.  
In order to process these terms, one must look them up in a dictionary first.  This raises 
the energy required to process the term significantly, and may reach a level which 
exceeds user’s willingness to continue (McDonald and Cranor 2008).  It has been argued 
that is exactly the purpose behind using such terms (Schneier 2015).  Such design 
elements are examples of the way in which people can be nudged into changing the 
manner of their processing through design (Acquisti 2009).  When an operating system 
provider embeds their web browser into the interface in a manner which makes it hard 
to avoid using, as Microsoft once did (Fisher 2001), they are similarly seeking to take 
control of an element of the processing within one’s Integrated Personage. 
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External contention is contention over whether processing will occur within the 
Integrated Personage or within an external integrated node, such as a cloud service.  
Systems which upload data to the cloud for processing are transferring cognitive load 
from the Integrated Personage to the service provider’s integrated node.  Systems of 
rentier capitalism for Integrated Devices, such as software-as-a-service, represent an 
attempt to own portions of the individual’s Integrated Personage.  If books and similar 
digital services represent offloading of personal cognitive capabilities into digital devices, 
then statements of ownership over content, such as we see with Kindle (Amazon 2017), 
constitute claims of ownership over the individual’s cognitive capabilities.  The argument 
from tradition that digital devices are optional tools is contrary to modern circumstances.  
The right to hack and to repair one’s own devices contends with intellectual property 
initiatives and rentier capitalism for control of how individuals process within their own 
Integrated Personage.  A digital service or device which is so commonly used that not 
having access to it impacts one's ability to participate in society constitutes a component 
of the smart society.  Lack of access means one cannot fully participate in the smart 
society.  As technology spreads deeper into the built environment, so it comes to assume 
certain minimum technological capabilities on the part of the inhabitants (Dodge and 
Kitchin 2005).  Increasingly, the city’s digital environment has expectations that the 
Integrated Personage possesses certain capabilities - certain input and output channels 
and certain processing capabilities.  Where an important aspect of the Integrated 
Domain becomes dependent on such capability, that capability becomes necessary for a 
full life and full participation in the smart society.  At that point one acquires, as a 
citizen, a right to that capability.  To the degree that this capability is necessary for the 
living of a full life, it becomes a human right.  
8.1.4.3. Output 
Output connects an integrated node with other integrated nodes.  One 
integrated node’s output is the next integrated node’s input.  We can therefore talk in 
terms of an Output-Input channel (or O-I).  For the purposes of this discussion, output 
may be defined as energy released from an integrated node in the form of physical 
movement or data.  Some output is intentional, though cases of hidden surveillance 
show that output need not be originated by the user, or even known to them (Sandoval 
2012; Federal Trade Commission 2014).  Output also occurs as a by-product of existence 
because all digital processes leave a data shadow (Westin 1970) in the form of temporary 
files and logs.   
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Because the function of output within the Integrated Domain is to connect 
with other integrated nodes, output must be coherent with its environment.  Here 
‘coherence’ means compliance with shared standards, such as languages, protocols and 
data formats.  The requirement for coherence grants power to those who can control it.  
A significant portion of the contention within digital technology is for control over 
standards because it confers domination over systems dependent on those standards 
(Cusumano 2010).   Control of connectivity accords one the status of a gatekeeper, able 
to control who uses an O-I channel and what they can send through it.  The gatekeeper 
role in connectivity is one of the major points of financial return in digital services.  
Websites act as gatekeepers for connecting advertisers to users and extract value 
therefrom, charging an entrance fee for a presence in the user's input stream (Deighton 
and Kornfield 2012).  Telecoms companies generate income from connecting other 
digital systems to users (Huston 1999).  Debates over net neutrality show that many 
believe service providers can use this position as gatekeepers to extract economic capital 
(Pil Choi and Kim 2010). 
As techniques such as object-oriented programming (Rumbaugh et al. 1991) 
and Digital Object Architecture (York 2016) demonstrate, internal processing need not 
use the same formats as are required for output.  As a result, output often requires a 
translation layer to convert internal information into formats which can be accepted as 
input by external integrated nodes.  For output to humans, this may mean displaying 
information in a readable format, with consequent constraints on minimum text size, 
display time, using a particular human language, and conforming to graphical 
conventions in digital design (McKay et al. 1997).  Coherence means providing digital 
devices with data in a format they can accept, hence the need to create keyboards for 
human output intended for digital systems.  The Graphical User Interface (GUI) and 
similar systems, such as HTML, provide formats for both data and affordances (Galitz 
2007).  API’s, networking protocols and similar systems provide shared output formats 
which can bind digital devices into communicative systems.  Physical output is seen in 
the activation of motors and switches, and the movement of muscles and limbs.  Much 
of the intelligent functionality of the smart city is location-dependent (Picon 2015), such 
as controlling traffic flow or delivering location-based services to inhabitants.  The 
movement of the Integrated Personage within the digital environment will be 
accompanied by a constant flow of output based around movement through an urban 
space whose digital characteristics change as fast as its physical characteristics (Dodge 
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and Kitchin 2005).  The Integrated Personage will manifest within the digital perspective 
as a moving cloud of output. 
Output currently constitutes the primary point of value extraction for digital 
service providers where the recording of user behaviour is monetised through data 
mining (O’Neil 2017).  As a result, commercial surveillance is one of the foremost ethical 
concerns regarding output.  The ethical status accorded to human beings on the basis of 
their possession of autonomy (Marshall 2008) confers special ethical status on data 
output by the Integrated Personage.  This concern is greater where usage of output 
results in restrictions on autonomy or derivative rights.  Autonomy is limited when 
people’s digital systems do not allow them to emit the particular form of output they 
wish.  For practical purposes, we cannot consider something a limitation on autonomy 
which is physically impossible.  If it is not technically possible to instantiate my 
preferences, then my autonomy is not reduced.  Nonetheless, in many cases, systems are 
designed to make outputting particular desires or in particular ways difficult or 
impossible - nudging or forcing people into using approximate variations which can be 
commoditised (Dainow 2015a; Cirucci 2015). 
It is in the user's interest that their output is tuned to optimal delivery of the 
services they desire, in the manner they desire, under the conditions they desire.  It is in 
the interest of a commercial service provider that they offer the services in the manner 
which generates the greatest income.  These two interests are not necessarily aligned.   
Where they are not aligned the risk arises of reductions to autonomy through the use of 
that service.  Where the service is non-essential we may say that autonomy is not 
threatened because one has the option of simply not taking the service.  However, where 
the service is essential, or has achieved the status of a public utility (such that 
participation in society becomes difficult without it), then conditions under which one is 
forced to accept that service risk threatening autonomy.  It is possible therefore, to treat 
certain aspects of service delivery as public utilities and impose limitations on allowable 
terms of service.  It seems most in accord with the capitalist model to promote 
competition by requiring alternative service providers offering alternative terms of 
service.  The construction of a smart city in which the citizen has access to alternative 
providers for each and every service at each and every location is feasible but would 
require an open technical infrastructure, similar to that offered by TCP/IP and HTML.  
Such open platforms enable any designer to create new systems in confidence their 
output will be coherent with the digital environment.  No participant in the TCP/IP or 
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HTML ecosystems can prevent a competitor arising (no one can become a gatekeeper to 
the web).  Achieving this situation in the smart city would require standardisation of 
many protocols, but we can have done this before with many other standards (Mattli 
2001), and indeed it may be argued from history of utilities that it is almost inevitable 
that we will do so in the future (Clifton, Lanthier, and Schröter 2011). 
8.1.5. Summary and Conclusions 
We have passed the point where technology can be treated as a dumb hammer, 
whose use and impact on others is totally dependent upon the human who wields it.  
Society, now and into the future, can only be understood by considering the human and 
the technological in combination.  This combination results in systems giving rise to 
emergent features not predictable from the components.  We therefore need a 
theoretical framework, a language, specifically designed to handle that fusion as a thing-
in-itself, not as an analogue of traditional concepts.  Actor Network Theory, combined 
with the concept of autopoiesis, offers the vision of an Integrated Domain in which the 
mediating nodes which provide the motive power and logic to the autopoiesis of the 
system are created of the interactions of humans with digital systems.  The human and 
the built environment of the city do not directly encounter each other but interact 
through the medium of digital systems.  The nature of their interaction is such that it 
cannot be split into independent components of the digital and the human, but 
combines them to the degree that they are indistinguishable.  In terms of effects, they 
become one cause.  They also give rise to emergent properties not predictable from their 
individual characteristics and not present without both.   
As a dynamic system, the Integrated Domain consists of the transmission of 
energy in various forms through integrated nodes, which are mediators constituted by a 
three-phase process of input, processing and output.  These nodes are therefore, in 
terms of their operational characteristics, events and processes more than they are 
objects and states.  The ontological priority of process derives from the fact that 
integrated nodes cannot be understood, and do not exist, unless they utilise processes 
over time.  It is true that digital devices will have a material composition, just as humans 
do.  However, the material constituents are separable and understandable without 
reference to the other.  By definition, the Integrated Domain is the ontological level at 
which the digital and the human are fused.  That fusing occurs only as a process.  
Therefore, by definition, material composition and static states are not part of the 
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Integrated Domain.  It is only when nodes produce output and pass it as input to other 
nodes that the Integrated Domain comes into existence.  Consequently, it is always 
through process and connection that we see the Integrated Domain.   
Analysis of ethical issues and contention within the Integrated Domain must 
therefore focus on connectivity and processing, seeking to find mechanisms by which 
competing stakeholders pursue strategies for control and value extraction.  We 
understand what is being transmitted through the system as energy, using the term 
‘energy’ generically so as to allow for both material and cognitive (or symbolic or mental) 
transmission and activity.  In empirical terms observed phenomena are almost always a 
combination of the two, just as they are a combination of the digital and the human 
From an ethical point of view, and to the individual, the most important 
integrated node is their Integrated Personage.  The Integrated Personage is the active 
field within the digital environment constituted by the human in an inseparable fusion 
with their personal digital devices, such that the aggregated output from the Integrated 
Personage is a unified product of both human and digital, including not just the 
individual operations and functions of the component devices, but also the patterns and 
content of their interaction.  The Integrated Personage, like any other integrated node, is 
an element of the Integrated Domain and therefore a combined entity in which the 
human and the digital cannot be treated as distinct. 
Input overlaps with output.  The output from one integrated node is the input 
for the next one.  This output-input (O/I) connection constitutes the systemic 
relationships between the nodes maintaining autopoiesis within the Integrated Domain.  
Output must be coherent with the digital environment in order to connect with it.  This 
means that control over what constitutes coherence dictates control over how, and 
possibly what, can be output, and to whom.  Examples include network protocols, 
programming languages and data formats.  In the absence of contrary forces, we can 
expect contention over standards to continue as the smart city develops.  Given the wide 
range of functions, spaces, contexts, volume and variety of digital devices and systems 
within the smart city, we can anticipate many more opportunities for such competition.  
On the basis of the history of digital innovation, we expect that multiple stakeholders 
will participate in this contention, few of whom can be assumed to have the user’s best 
interests as their primary goal.  In the absence of countervailing forces, we can therefore 
anticipate that the individual user of the service is unlikely to receive the best solution to 
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the problem.  Rather they are more likely to receive something just good enough to 
tolerate, while their use of the service is exploited, both in terms of the service delivery 
and the design of the systems.  As the Integrated Domain rises to become more 
sophisticated and more the dominating feature of modern urban society, so the potential 
for domination by those who do not have the user at heart becomes more likely and 
potentially more damaging.  We do not know what the future will be like, but by 
anticipating the flows within future urban socio-technical, we can identify where human 
autonomy will be threatened and how. 
- end of published chapter – 
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9. Conclusions 
9.1. Summary of findings 
Each publication offers some mechanism by which ICT’s can restrict autonomy.  This section 
brings all these factors together. 
9.1.1. Computer science mentality 
Many who are happy with those problematic elements which restrict human 
autonomy do not believe alternatives are possible.  For example, many believe that 
delivery of personalised services requires reductions in personal privacy.  However, we 
have demonstrated how Langheinrich’s Principle’s for Privacy Aware Ubiquitous 
Computing and emerging alternative architectures offer many ways to deliver 
personalised services while also maintaining privacy.   Others believe that the creator of 
an autonomous system has no ethical responsibility for the actions or effects of that 
system.  Under this view, once an autonomous system is activated, human responsibility 
terminates.  However, this position is based on a highly restricted and unusual 
understanding of the manner in which ethical responsibility transfers between causative 
agents.  The position requires that services be treated as independent of any human 
cause in terms of design, environment, purpose, how they are used and who benefits.  In 
fact, once autonomous services are understood as existing within a field of human 
practice, the ethical responsibility of the designers becomes self-evident.  Those who 
design and deploy ICT systems therefore need to accept that they bear the ultimate 
ethical responsibility for the effects they generate.  To put it bluntly, you cannot regard 
yourself as a good person if you build evil software.  Finally, the client-server service 
architecture has been accepted reflexively by developers and users, despite evidence of 
more effective alternatives in many cases, and has been supportive of autonomy-
reducing organisational and economic models.  Alternatives are possible which do not 
enable problematic organisational or economic models to arise with such ease. The 
solution to these issues is to educate programmers and leaders that there are viable 
alternatives to customary practice and that they have the power, and a moral 
responsibility, to explore them. 
9.1.2. Treating users as captured resources 
The ability to express and act freely in digital environments is restricted by 
power structures designed around extracting money from user activities by spying on 
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them and by designing systems which facilitate only those activities which support this 
surveillance and monetisation.  In other words, users are not treated as the beneficiaries 
of the systems, but as commodities within a larger system, most of which is intentionally 
and vigorously concealed.  User autonomy is further restricted when the data gathered 
about someone is used against them, either to manipulate their behaviour or to influence 
how others treat them.  This system combines interface design, system architecture, 
business model and legal framework to alienate users from the products of their own 
digital activity.  Steps are put in place to prevent user resistance by abandonment of the 
open standards which created the web, so that user activity is imprisoned within data 
silos owned by the service provider.  These factors combine to alienate people from each 
other because they are forced to communicate through these exploitative social networks 
and by the chilling effect of ubiquitous surveillance.  Finally, users are alienated from 
themselves and their own potential through the imposition of fetishizing affordances, 
such as the concept of the personal brand, through their limited control over their own 
digital data and through the use of personalization technologies which trap the user in a 
“filter bubble,” restricting their ability to discover the unexpected, the unusual and the 
uncommodified.  On this basis, users are being treated as a means to an end, not as an 
end in themselves.  Such treatment is the very definition of a violation of human dignity 
and therefore a violation of user’s human rights. 
9.1.3. Surveillance 
The presence of a surveillance system is a necessary precondition for the use of 
personal information by others and for personalisation services.  Control of this data by 
the individual is therefore an effective way to retain autonomy.  Thus control of privacy 
is an enabling right to autonomy.  Autonomy-restricting systems depend on hidden, 
uncontrollable or unavoidable surveillance. 
9.1.4. Insufficient user control 
Restricting user control is a necessary precondition to restricting autonomy.  
Lack of control can be accomplished through lack of knowledge on the part of the 
individual as to what is occurring, through “take it or leave it” terms of use combined 
with a lack of alternatives and through the lack of suitable user configuration capabilities, 
or the concealment thereof.  In some cases, not just functions, but entire industries are 
concealed.   
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9.1.5. Insufficient user configurability 
Autonomy can be threatened by lack of variability in configuration options, 
such that the user’s desires, style of operation or range of outcomes cannot be enabled. 
This lack of variation can stem from ignorance by the ICT developers, insufficient 
understanding of the user population, insufficient granularity of configuration options or 
systemic biases within the delivery mechanisms, including business models, market 
competition, regulatory framework or other factors affecting the operational delivery of 
services.  
9.1.6. Insufficient variation in operational models 
Many ICT services are owned and operated by a limited number of providers, 
often to near-monopoly levels.  This limits choice of service provision and consequently 
user choice of the business model under which a service is provided.  In many cases the 
business model is identical across all providers within an ICT sector, such that change of 
provider does not change the circumstances under which the user accesses the service.  
In many instances autonomy-preserving systems do not exist to the degree that a real 
alternative is available.  In addition, intellectual property regulations and exploitative 
business models promote walled gardens and suppresses interoperability, further limiting 
user choice it is not possible to interoperate between providers. 
9.1.7. Epistemic control 
Epistemic control is the strategy of preventing user control of data flows at the 
interface.  This is most commonly done to restrict the delivery of data or designing its 
delivery so as to hide information.  A common example is the creation of privacy 
policies which are intentionally difficult to understand.  Epistemic control can also be 
exercised by simply hiding what is being done, as we saw with elements of commercial 
user surveillance.  Epistemic control can also be accomplished through interface design, 
whereby the presentation of data at the interface can influence the affordances through 
which it is understood by the user.  More complex modes of epistemic control will 
become possible as systems become more sophisticated.  For example, cultural bias in 
voice control systems can force people into modes of speech which are unwelcome to 
them.  Epistemic control can also be achieved by “force feeding” data into the interface 
against the user’s wishes. 
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9.1.8. Control of data processing 
User autonomy can be restricted by constraints in data processing.  Examples 
include blocking interoperability with a device from a competing manufacturer, 
controlling what apps can be installed on a device, or restricting devices from accessing 
certain files or formats.  People can also be nudged into certain modes of data 
processing through design.  For example, a device provider may embed systems into the 
device in a manner which makes it hard to avoid using them.  Architectural and business 
models, most importantly cloud services and rentier capitalism (such as software-as-a-
service) represent an attempt to own portions of the user’s data processing and thus 
restrict their autonomy. 
9.1.9. Control of standards 
Control of standards is control of inter-operability.  As we have seen, inter-
operability frequently a necessary precondition of user choice.  Restriction of user choice 
is one of the most common vectors for restrictions in autonomy.  On this basis, 
commercial organisations desirous of, or in possession of, monopolies for provision of a 
service, must be regarded as antithetical to human autonomy, harmful to the 
development of best standards and should not be permitted a voice in the development 
of standards within computer science.  The development of standards must be regarded 
as a fundamental foundation of future societies and subject to the same scrutiny and 
modes of development as are more traditional regulatory regimes, such as criminal law. 
9.1.10. Summary – the problem is people, not systems 
There is no necessity why any ICT should restrict human autonomy.  
Autonomy-preserving alternatives are always possible.  Yet the current trends in ICT 
innovation are towards restrictions in autonomy, not liberation.  This is the result of 
choices made by people, not the unavoidable by-product of functionality.  These choices 
stem from ignorance, lack of thought, a desire to exploit people, a lack of respect for 
fundamental human rights and exploitative business models.  Avoiding unpleasant 
futures requires changing how members of the computer science discipline think, 
disempowering restrictive regulatory regimes and promoting alternatives so that people 
have genuine choice in ICT services. 
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9.2. Answering the research questions 
This section is a formal statement regarding how each research question was answered. 
The primary research question was  
“What are the possible threats to human autonomy generated by 
emerging ICT’s?” 
This was answered in Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICTs (Dainow 2017b) 
(see Chapter 6. Autonomy under Emerging ICT’s, p.112) and Binding the Smart City Human-
Digital System with Communicative Processes (Dainow in-press) (see Chapter 8. Autonomy within 
the Integrated Node, p. 148). 
Secondary questions were: 
1. “What are the emerging ICT’s?” 
This was answered in Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICTs (Dainow 2017b) 
(see Chapter 6. Autonomy under Emerging ICT’s, p.112). 
2. “What is human autonomy?” 
This was answered in Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICTs (Dainow 2017b) 
(see Chapter 6. Autonomy under Emerging ICT’s, p.112). 
3. “By what mechanism can an aspect of an emerging ICT have a restrictive 
effect on human autonomy?” 
This was answered in Key Dialectics in Cloud Services (Dainow 2015b) (see Chapter 
4. The Current State of Affairs – Poles of the Debate, p.73) and Digital Alienation as the 
Foundation of Online Privacy Concerns (Dainow 2015a) (see Chapter 5. Digital Alienation - ICT’s 
as Socio-Technical Systems, p. 91)  
9.3. Project Summary 
This research project commenced by accepting the premise that technology is 
best defined as a socio-technical system.  This definition combines three terms; ‘social’, 
‘technical’ and ‘system.’  Each of these needs to be fully represented in any account of 
the interactions between ICT’s and humans.  We understand ‘social’ to require an 
account of the manner in which social factors influence, and are influenced by, the 
material and operational conditions of engineered artefacts and their functions.  We 
understand the term ‘technical’ as referring to these engineered artefacts.  Finally, we 
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understand ‘system’ as requiring reference to principles of General Systems Theory as a 
meta-theory, and as requiring some reference to relevant domain-specific systems 
theories.  In this case, the domain-specific theories must be relevant to the interactions 
between the social and the technical.  The combination of these three terms means we 
must understand this relationship between the social and the technical as a system, not as 
a chain of linear causality.  An account of each term was a necessary preliminary step 
before examining how emerging ICT’s may impact human autonomy.  In addition, it was 
necessary to define autonomy itself before it was possible to examine how it can be 
affected by emergent ICT’s.  
The following sections summarise how each issue was addressed. 
9.3.1. ICT’s as technical 
Our research commenced with ETICA’s findings, which also accepted the 
definition of technology as a socio-technical system.  Here we encountered a detailed 
and reliable taxonomy of emerging ICT’s defined by their technical characteristics.  Our 
analysis of the ETICA project has not been published, nor has the methodology we 
developed by which to undertake this analysis.  However, it is contained within this 
thesis (see 3. Evaluation of ETICA’s Technology Analysis, p.33).  Our chief finding was that 
ETICA produced a sufficiently robust and detailed account of the technical aspects of 
emerging ICT’s for use within our research project.    
9.3.2. ICT’s as social 
Our analysis of the ETICA project found the work focused almost exclusively 
on the functional aspects of technology, with little analysis of social causation and 
inconsistent analysis of social impact.  Furthermore, ETICA lacked a coherent, explicit 
or detailed social account, and no reference to ICT’s as systems.  While this did not 
undermine ETICA’s own objectives, it rendered ETICA’s technology identification 
insufficient for our research goals.  We therefore developed an account of the social 
within the socio-technical.  The aim here was not to develop a social account of 
technology in general, but merely one which could support an account of the impact on 
human autonomy in the future.  We termed the generic state of having one’s autonomy 
restricted by ICT’s ‘digital alienation.’  Our account of the mechanisms by which digital 
alienation occurred was constructed through an analysis of marxist efforts to understand 
how current online systems generate ethically negative consequences for their users.  
Here we found marxist analysis mired in traditional structural elements of social analysis 
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which rendered attempts to account for current circumstance unsatisfactory.  Our 
position was that this failure derived from maintaining traditional terminology and 
theoretical forms in the face of a radically different environment from that under which 
Marx developed his theories.  In the face of changed empirical circumstance, the only 
way to maintain terminology and the form of any theory is to redefine the terms.  The 
central problem confronting marxist analysis of the internet is the rise of mechanisms by 
which value can be extracted from voluntary activity instead of paid labour.  As a 
consequence, maintenance of form and terminology requires redefinition of ‘labour’ to 
include voluntary activity.  With this redefinition, ‘labour’ comes to refer to almost any 
human activity and we lose the ability to distinguish between activities for pay and other 
human activities.  Our approach was instead to maintain terminology but update the 
theoretical form to reflect the changed circumstances.  We demonstrated that value is 
extracted from all forms of internet activity, so all that was required for value extraction 
was that one “exist” online.  Replacing the term ‘labour’ with ‘existence’ was sufficient to 
account for modern circumstance while also maintaining the theoretical form.  Our 
change therefore maintained coherence with the rest of the mechanisms within the 
marxist account and preserved its explanatory status. 
Published as Digital Alienation (see 5. Digital Alienation - ICT’s as Socio-Technical 
Systems, p. 91), this account paired with its sister paper, Key Dialectics (see 4. The Current 
State of Affairs – Poles of the Debate, p. 73), to add a critique of those dominant social and 
technical factors present in current circumstance which threaten human autonomy.  
Social factors covered included privacy violations, privacy regulation and business 
models.  Technical factors included data structures (such as the digital shadow), inter-
operability (or lack thereof), conformance to standards, algorithmic justice and interface 
design.  In our view, an important aspect of these two papers is that both marxist and 
capitalist analyses reach the same conclusions regarding ethical impact and both agree on 
the causes.  Key Dialectics also demonstrated a number of premises critical to our future 
research - that ICT’s could create ethical problems, that personal data and 
personalisation could be vectors for ethical violations and that such circumstances were 
avoidable. 
9.3.3. Defining the term ‘autonomy’ 
While autonomy is understood as an enabling condition for most human rights, 
this understanding is not nuanced by the different accounts of what constitutes 
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autonomy within modern philosophy.  The general position outside philosophy is that 
humans have the capacity for autonomy, without reference to what that means beyond 
“self-governance.”  We took the position that any of the major accounts of autonomy 
could be legitimate if an individual chose to self-govern in accord with that account.  We 
did not take a position that any one account was better or “more accurate” than any 
other.  Consequently, we did not feel it appropriate to settle on any one definition of 
autonomy and restrict our analysis to it.  Our position was that ICT’s which prevented 
enaction of any version of autonomy restricted the autonomy of people who wished to 
live by that version.   
By cross-referencing ETICA’s technology groups against the different versions 
of autonomy, we demonstrated whether an ICT threatens autonomy usually depends on 
the version of autonomy someone is living by (see 6. Autonomy under Emerging ICT’s, 
p.112).  We believe this is an important finding.  It means that it can be the case that the 
same technological function can be both liberating and restrictive.  It means that the 
impact on autonomy cannot be determined as a factor of the technology, but only by 
reference to specific individual modes of self-governance.  In keeping with technology as 
socio-technical, technology’s impact on autonomy can be understood only by 
considering the interaction of the social with the technical.  This finding indicates the 
potential for future legal or ethical objections to technologies or operations which many 
people find unremarkable.  For example, under versions of autonomy which emphasis 
relationships over self-sufficiency, it is possible to argue that the delivery of services by 
robots in medicine or education violates human rights.   Combined with our analysis of 
the processes of digital alienation, what is revealed is that restrictions of human 
autonomy need not be the result of intentional efforts, but can derive from treating the 
user as a means to an end, from reification of only one form of autonomy in design, 
through business practices which restrict user choice or through pervasive behavioural 
nudging.  The threat to human autonomy is thus insidious in that it is pervasive, hard to 
detect, and often requires complex explanation, understanding of which is dependent on 
specialist knowledge.  Preventing it cannot be achieved through simplistic regulations or 
by reference to specific contexts or practices, but only through nuanced responses. 
9.3.4. ICT’s as systems 
However, these conclusions do not explicitly address technology as a system.  
When considered as a system, ICT’s cannot be divided into discrete groups because 
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relevant processes span multiple technologies.  Moreover, the impact on society derives 
more from the combined effects of ICT’s than from any single one.  In addition, the 
relationship between the social and the technical can only be understood in terms of 
systemic properties such as feedback and equifinality.  It is thus possible to address the 
issue of the impact of emerging ICT’s on autonomy from two perspectives.  One is to 
address the impact each technology has on each version of autonomy.  The other is to 
identify processes by which all IC technologies, viewed as a single socio-technical system, 
have the potential to restrict human autonomy.  This second approach requires an 
account of a system which contains both social and technical elements.  Processes by 
which autonomy is restricted must then be developed within the terms and structures of 
this system.  Our account of the environment encapsulating the combination of all ICT’s 
was drawn from existing work on the smart city.  We applied two systems theories from 
sociology to develop a theoretical model of a truly socio-technical system, in which 
technical artefacts and humans hold equal causative status for each other and for the 
dynamics of the system (see 7. Understanding the Smart City as a System, p.132).  We were 
then able to describe mechanisms of autonomy restriction in terms of flows of energy 
and data through the system’s nodes (see 8. Autonomy within the Integrated Node, p.148). 
9.3.5. Results - two complementary answers to the primary 
research question 
We believe these two approaches to the research question are complementary.  
Our first answer15 provides relatively detailed understanding of the manner in which 
specific ICT’s impact specific versions of autonomy.  Our second answer16 identifies 
mechanisms of concern which can apply to any ICT or combination thereof, without 
variable import under different accounts of autonomy.  We hold the latter account to be 
more in accord with the central interpretive principle of foresight studies – that the 
future cannot be predicted in any detail.  It is therefore important that any foresight 
studies account focus on principles and processes which are not dependent on specific 
details about the future.  While we find the ETICA findings compelling and valuable, 
they essentially depend on extrapolation of current trends into the future.  This does not 
allow for unexpected or disruptive innovations, or for unanticipated changes in praxis.  
                                                 
15 ‘Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICTs’. Australasian Journal of Information Systems 21, no. 0 (2017). 
https://doi.org/10.3127/ajis.v21i0.1438. 
16 ‘Binding the Smart City Human-Digital System with Communicative Processes’. In Technology and the City, edited by Michael 
Nagenborg, in-press. 
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The first analysis is valuable for providing a detailed account of the technologies 
currently emergent.  However, the second account can be applied to other technologies 
which have yet to be invented.  More importantly, it provides axioms by which potential 
systems can be evaluated during their initial design phase.  We believe these two 
accounts provide a comprehensive understanding of the manner in which emerging 
ICT’s can threaten human autonomy in the future. 
9.4. Summary of Contributions to Knowledge 
This research offers a number of contributions.  These were detailed above (see 
1.5 Contributions, p.14), and are summarised here: 
9.4.1. Resolving difficulties in marxist analysis of the digital 
economy 
The digital economy does not generate value in the same way as manufacturing 
did when Marx developed his theories because of its extraction of value from voluntary 
and unpaid activity.  As a result, traditional marxism cannot account for digital alienation.  
By the simple step of replacing labour with existence, together with empirical evidence 
supporting this move, we resolve marxism’s inability to account for the digital economy. 
9.4.2. Development of a formal, generic, methodology for evaluation 
of large foresight research projects which combine multiple 
methodologies.   
Significant foresight research projects commonly combine multiple 
methodologies and can arise in many disciplines.  Evaluation of such projects is 
therefore problematic.  This is a widely recognised issue in foresight studies.  Our 
adaptation of medicine’s CASP provides a formal and detailed methodology for analysis 
of such foresight research.  We do not believe a methodology of equivalent rigor or 
depth exists within the field.  We therefore believe that this evaluation method can have 
widespread value. 
9.4.3. A catalogue of potential threats to human autonomy across 
the range of emergent technologies.   
Threats to Autonomy from Emerging ICT’s (Dainow 2017b) is the first time any 
analysis of autonomy under ICT’s has considered the different versions of autonomy.  
Any ethical analysis of ICT’s which is concerned with human rights or other values 
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which derive from autonomy must consider the different versions of autonomy or stand 
a good chance of neglecting those who live according to values different from the 
version of autonomy used in the analysis.  This is particularly important when drafting 
legislation and in any other efforts to maintain human autonomy into the future. 
9.4.4. Development of Integrated Domain Theory 
Integrated Domain Theory introduces important concepts to ethical analysis of 
digitally-driven environments.  It provides a means of discussing complex situations, 
composed of multiple systems and people, in depth, but without becoming overwhelmed 
by detail.  It provides a means of identifying common ethical issues which can occur in 
multiple contexts, especially those deriving from system architecture. The approach 
which gave rise to Integrated Domain Theory is General Systems Theory and 
derivatives.  Applications of systems theory have already demonstrated value in other 
fields, especially sociology, biology and geography.  Our contribution has been bring it 
into ICT ethics by adding features unique to the discipline. 
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10. Limitations, Recommendations and Future Work 
10.1. Limitations 
10.1.1. Arguments against a “correct” version of autonomy 
Philosophers who hold there is only one legitimate version of autonomy and all 
others are wrong will argue that failing to select one account of what constitutes human 
autonomy is a serious limitation to the study.  From that perspective, seeking to analyse 
how technologies affect different versions of autonomy would not be an appropriate 
approach.  The most significant limitation to this work is that we have not published a 
formal argument in favour of the legitimacy of multiple versions of autonomy.  The lack 
of such a formal argument leaves us defenceless against arguments that a particular form 
of autonomy is the only correct one.  However, while many have proposed their own 
accounts of what constitutes autonomy, often rejecting competing versions, our research 
has not revealed any formal arguments supporting the position that there must be a 
single correct account of what constitutes autonomy.  Instead, this seems to be an 
assumption. 
However, this does not undermine the analyses we have published.  Threats to 
Autonomy from Emerging ICT’s cross-references technologies with all major accounts of 
autonomy.  Whether one agrees or not with a particular definition does not affect how 
that definition interacts with a particular technology.  Binding the Smart City intentionally 
considers autonomy in a generic fashion, such that its analysis is not changed by using 
any particular account of what autonomy is. 
10.1.2. English language 
One limitation to this research is that it is drawn purely from English-language 
sources.  Some of the most important sources used, such as Latour, Kant and Luhmann, 
were written in French or German, but in all cases we have drawn on English 
translations.  We have been sensitive to issues of translation, particularly the danger that 
critical terms may not have an exact equivalent in English.  This has not been a frequent 
issue, but where it has occurred we have attempted to cross-reference multiple 
translations as well as appropriate dictionaries.  We do not think this has compromised 
our own work, though specialists may disagree with our understanding of minor nuances 
of some theories. 
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10.1.3. Western thinking 
We are aware that our perspective and approach is particularly Western and 
bound in certain ways of thinking which are not reflected in other philosophical cultures.  
For example, Daoist philosophical approaches in China and the native Quechuan 
philosophies of Latin America do not treat dialectical opposites as being in conflict, as 
they are treated in the West.  This affects our thinking about binary choices and directly 
opposing values in that it promotes an approach of seeking to choose between them or 
fuse them into a new synthesis.  In contrast, the Daoist or Quechuan approach would 
promote viewing the tension between them as the important dynamic to be analysed and 
used, not something to be resolved.  While we recognise that our work is bounded by 
the limits of Western and Enlightenment approaches, we do not think this has 
compromised the analysis.  We have remained consistent within the framework of 
Western philosophical analysis and so our conclusions remain coherent with the 
premises and the mode of analysis.  It is possible approaches from other philosophical 
cultures could expand our understanding, but the internal coherence of our analysis 
means including other perspectives would not undermine it. 
10.1.4. Prioritising autonomy 
We are aware that in thinking about the preservation of autonomy, we did not 
contrast it with other values.  Given that autonomy is the subject of our research we 
must prioritise it within our analysis, but this may not reflect its relative priority against 
other values, such as communitarianism and paternalism.  Furthermore, no attempt was 
made to contrast restrictions on autonomy with compensating ethical benefits, such as 
increased social harmony.  Many cultures give greater priority to the group over the 
individual than is common in the West, which means different cultural approaches will 
regard the import of our findings differently.  However, this does not undermine our 
analysis of how autonomy can be restricted.  It merely means we have not sought to 
counter-balance any restriction of autonomy with any potential benefit.  This was an 
intentional element of the research design.  The research question was intentionally 
focused purely on how autonomy could be restricted, not the import or context of such 
restrictions, which would have considerably complicated the research process.  In 
addition, compensatory benefits in the future are even more speculative and difficult to 
predict.  Attempting to do so would have gone beyond what can be reasonably 
undertaken under the principles of future studies.  Furthermore, the degree to which any 
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benefit compensates for loss of autonomy depends on the version of autonomy in 
question and the relative value of other ethical virtues.  We believe our research has 
wider accessibility because it does not pre-suppose either and is therefore accessible to 
proponents of any version of autonomy and any compensatory values. 
10.2. Recommendations 
10.2.1. Regulations should remain vague about autonomy 
The most important recommendation derives from competing versions of 
autonomy, all of which we hold to be legitimate.  We cannot therefore base rules and 
regulations, especially those regarding consent, on any specific version of autonomy.  To 
do so is necessarily to reduce the autonomy of those who choose to live by different 
rules.  Though we have not formal arguments in support of our position, we hold that to 
argue one version of autonomy is legitimate and all others are not is inappropriate 
because autonomy is a created concept and there is therefore no empirical test of that to 
which the term refers17.  Furthermore, we cannot refer back to the original conception 
developed by Kant because he is strictly limited his definition to specific procedures in 
moral reasoning.  This offers little for our understanding of political or personal 
autonomy.  Laws cannot therefore be based on a particular version of autonomy.  This 
does not seem to be a significant concern so far because, while laws and regulations 
make reference to autonomy, they generally do so in such a diffuse fashion which allows 
for most accounts of autonomy.  It is essential that this pattern continue and that 
regulation regarding ICT’s not pin itself to specific aspects of a single conception of 
autonomy. 
10.2.2. Computer science needs to develop ethical awareness 
Once a science starts to produce effects of ethical significance in people's lives 
it must develop an ethical aspect, both in terms of practical methodology and in terms of 
moral virtues.  The mind-set of the computer scientist involved in the development of 
ethically significant technologies has been, and continues to be, ethically ignorant.  This 
will change.  Society will not tolerate the development of socially harmful technologies 
forever.  Sooner or later it will enforce an ethical awareness upon computer science, just 
                                                 
17 Our position is that the appropriate issue for philosophy is not “what is the nature of autonomy?” but rather the following 
questions - “what justifies an individual’s claim to be acting autonomously and how must they be treated as a consequence by 
others?”  and “by what warrant may an individual state that another is not acting autonomously when they claim they are so doing?” 
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as it did with Biology and Medicine.  It would be preferable, more productive and better 
for all, if the field of computer science voluntarily embraced ethical education and ethical 
awareness as virtues to the same degree that the field embraces other scientific virtues, 
such as intellectual honesty and methodological consistency.  This requires the inclusion 
of ethical education throughout computer science education.  It further requires 
encouragement of ethical awareness and ethical aspiration within the graduate 
profession, both in universities and in industry.  In that a significant number of ICT 
innovations are developed by people who did not complete their first degree, it is 
probably best that ethical education commence in computer science on the first day of 
class.  At this time we do not have canonical methodologies for teaching ethics within 
computer science.  A very limited number of textbooks have been attempted and a very 
limited amount of research has been conducted.  These constitute starting points, but we 
cannot expect to roll out a fully developed educational component for ethics within 
computer science immediately.  Research needs to be conducted to determine the best 
methods by which to develop ethical awareness in computer science.  Such research 
should commence with an examination of how ethics has been introduced into other 
sciences, most notably medicine, and practical experimentation in the classroom. 
10.2.3. Computer science education should include the 
humanities 
ICT systems which interact with human beings will suit people better, and are 
less likely to be ethically problematic, if they are based upon a more sophisticated 
understanding of human beings and society.  If computer scientists are going to build 
systems which become part of people's personal world, they need to understand those 
people and their personal world in order to achieve the best fit between what they create 
and what people need.  We cannot assume, as we do now, that this will happen magically 
through some form of osmosis by students during an education which contains no such 
subject matter.  At best we are leaving it to chance, relying on individuals to do their own 
reading and personal development.  The repeated ethical debates which arise regarding 
ICT systems indicate students will not independently develop such an awareness to the 
degree that it will affect the paths of future innovation.  It would therefore seem 
appropriate to demand computer science students take some training in the humanities.  
Computer Scientists need to have an understanding of the culture within which they are 
building the systems as well as the people.  This will become increasingly important as 
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computer science systems spread into civic management and planning systems and so 
begins to have a greater effect on social processes. 
10.2.4. Maximise user-level configuration of digital systems 
In order to permit people to live in an intimate and personalised relationship 
with their digital environment, while also being able to exercise a variety of ways of living 
autonomously, the systems in which people are embedded must be configurable to that 
individual’s style of autonomy.  This demands that a loose conception of autonomy be 
embedded in digital systems by the designers so as to avoid imposing restrictions on user 
autonomy.  Instead, systems should permit the user to configure the systems they use 
with the widest possible variation of operational characteristics, so that the individual’s 
digital environment supports a style of life chosen by the user.  Such user configuration 
must include all the elements we have identified in this research as capable of threatening 
autonomy.  Unless personalised digital environments are configurable to the user’s 
satisfaction, such that they permit the user to exercise autonomy as they see fit, those 
systems will necessarily limit the autonomy of some, if not all. 
This demands that digital systems offer the following: 
1. Variations in business model and terms of service. 
2. Inter-operability between competing services, such that a user may move 
between providers without loss of functionality. 
3. Limitations to, and user control of, the degree and content of digital 
surveillance and the use thereof. 
4. Where viable, user-selectable alternatives in system architecture.  For 
example, no one should be forced to use cloud-based services if local 
processing is a viable alternative.  In fact, we would advocate the legal 
mandating of use of Langheinrich’s Principles for Privacy-Aware 
Ubiquitous Systems throughout ICT innovation, only using cloud-based 
services when no other architecture is possible. 
5. Increased restrictions in current intellectual property law and other 
regulations which support software-as-a-service and rentier capitalism. 
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10.2.5. Special legal and ethical status for personal digital 
devices 
The chapter on the integrated node made brief reference to integrated devices 
as having special status because of their intimate connection with their user’s personal 
lifeworld (see 8.1.3 The Integrated Node, p.157).   We need a new legal status for such 
personal digital devices because their relationship to the individual is significantly 
different from other property.  The same special status should also be accorded to any 
other devices through which we interact with our digital environment on a personal 
level, or which are essential for maintenance of normal life.  Because of their essential 
nature they are necessary for the maintenance of the user’s human dignity.  People 
therefore have a human right to own and operate these devices in a manner which does 
not undermine their autonomy.  The degree to which the device is personalised to the 
user is proportional to the degree to which these devices are deserving of a special ethical 
and legal status.  In particular, devices which are embedded within the body or essential 
for continued existence must be the unique and special property of the person within 
whom they reside in any and all respects.  Restricting ownership or use of such devices 
has the same impact as limiting a person’s use of their own body.  We therefore 
recommend commencing determination of the details of such special status by viewing 
such personal devices as analogous to the human body, rather than to human 
possessions, as has been the case until now.  
10.3. Further work 
10.3.1. Maintenance of ETICA 
The technological taxonomy developed by the ETICA project remains a unique 
and valuable resource.  It should be more widely disseminated through a dedicated 
public website.  The taxonomy should be updated as soon as feasible and a long-term 
project put in place to keep it updated on a regular basis, probably every five years.  It is 
not necessary to recover ETICA’s lost data or use identical methodologies as were used 
before.  In particular, we would not recommend the use of the same tools for 
bibliometric analysis.  More sophisticated tools exist today and the methodologies need 
to adapt as new technologies develop.  An ETICA website and taxonomy should form 
the spine of a repository of discussions around these technologies. 
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10.3.2. Enhancing our understanding of autonomy 
Much further work needs to be done with regard to the various versions of 
autonomy and their interaction with ICT's, especially with regard to personalisation and 
interface design.  In particular, research needs to be done to provide a much more 
detailed taxonomy of autonomy, perhaps similar in format and approach to ETICA's 
analysis of technologies.  Furthermore, it is likely that similar examination of other 
fundamental ethical values such as freedom will reveal multiple, competing versions, 
each of which need to be cross-referenced with ETICA’s technology groups. 
10.3.3. Development of Integrated Domain Theory 
We have found Integrated Domain Theory to be a productive application of 
systems theory to smart city analysis and the analysis of any complex digital 
environment.  Much further work remains available, such as the development of basic 
metrics for the calculation of energy flow between nodes.  Concepts suited to the 
development of formal metrics include thresholds and resistance, transduction between 
informational and physical input and output, configurability and variations in flow 
patterns.  For example, that digital environments will accept as input and produce as 
output both informational and physical energy suggests the possibility for the 
development of metrics and calculations for the interaction between physical and 
informational energetic structures. 
Under Integrated Domain Theory, digital systems are considered equally 
important causative agents to humans.  With the increase in artificial intelligence and 
autonomous decision-making, we see the development of a “digital perspective.”  
Integrated Domain Theory provides a means of exploring the nature of this perspective 
and its impact on human life.  Much of the initial work can be done through logical 
deduction of axioms.  For example, in order for a system to deliver a personalised 
service, it must have access to information about the person.  There must, therefore, be a 
body of data about each person who receives personalised services.  The accuracy and 
granularity of that data will significantly influence the degree to which service delivery 
suits user need.  It is our intention to continue development of Integrated Domain 
Theory and we have already identified twelve axioms similar to this example which 
define the digital perspective. 
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11. Final Reflections 
This section contain informal reflections in which I seek to contextualise the research within 
the bigger frames of human history and theology. 
My understanding of this research project positions it in a profound change 
occurring today, sometimes known as the “fourth industrial revolution” (Schwab 2016). 
We are moving into a stage of history where our external environment will be intelligent 
and autonomous, determining for itself how it responds to us.  There is nothing 
inevitable about this direction or its endpoint; it will be the product of human choices.  
As a society we are not making those choices.  They are being made for us by 
corporations in pursuit of their own aims.  There is no reason to assume they will create 
a digital environment for us which is tuned to our needs to the best possible degree.  
Current trends give us every reason to expect this environment will be tuned to using us 
as a resource.  This is not inevitable and can be changed with relative ease through 
appropriate carrots and sticks.  The most important is the prevention of monopolies; 
whether that monopoly be of a service, a particular sphere of activity or a geographic 
space.  There is no technical reason why we cannot mandate a variety of technical 
architectures and business models for every place and purpose in our digital 
environment.  Whether considered from a marxist or capitalist perspective, this would be 
a better environment for society and the individual. 
The emerging digital environment is coming to interpenetrate the human body.  
Conversely, the human self, through cognitive offloading, prosthetics and embodied 
devices, is spreading into the built environment.  Therefore we cannot formulate our 
policies or ethics through a model based on property as being physical objects which 
exist outside the body.  We are thus entering a new of being characterised by the 
inseparable fusion of the digital and the human.  This new way of being does not fit into 
pre-existing conceptions of what is inside and what is outside.  There now exist external 
objects which we treat as part of ourselves, which the individual sees as cognitive 
extensions of themselves, and there are elements of the external world within our bodies, 
deeply embedded within our private personal lives.  This new zone of overlap between 
the person and their environment requires recognition, definition and analysis.  It 
requires a new way of understanding our relationship with our technology - in which we 
do not dominate tools, but neither do they dominate us.  Instead both are subparts of 
something which can only be understood as a fused being - human and digital – which I 
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have termed the Integrated Personage.  The human is not dominant in this being, but 
rather is dominated by something new, the unification of the two.   This Integrated 
Personage, being a fusion of two different perspectives, is incomprehensible to the 
human.  We may imagine, describe and organise our vision of the digital perspective, but 
we cannot know it.  Accordingly, that aspect of the experience of the Integrated 
Personage is beyond human comprehension.  It is greater than us.  We are each 
becoming part of something bigger than ourselves. 
From a historical point of view we are moving into an age where it is possible 
to have control of the individual and the environment to a degree never seen before in 
human history.  This represents a quantum leap in the power to control people.  We do 
not have the legal or organisational checks in place to deal with such a unprecedented 
situation.  Furthermore, most leaders are ignorant of the potential dangers.  Indeed, the 
potential power is so great it challenges anyone’s imagination.  Yet none of the dangers 
are unpredictable and, in most cases, they are merely magnified examples of situations 
we have seen in the past history of technology.  We know how to deal with these 
dangers.  In this age all that is required is that we look and act.  Autonomy cannot be 
restricted by ICT's unless those ICT's, as sociotechnical systems, exhibit certain 
properties.  These properties have been detailed throughout this thesis.  They include 
walled silos, monopoly service provision, privacy violations, insufficient user 
configurability, poor design and absurdly naive understanding of human beings and 
society.  What is required is education of users and developers, appropriate regulatory 
mechanisms to prevent certain structural features emerging in the marketplace and 
service provision, and the development of theological, ethical and legal responses to the 
rise of the Integrated Domain, integrated devices and the Integrated Personage.   
I believe it is inevitable that this will happen, as it always has in the past.  
However, the historical pattern is usually that we have to have disasters before we will 
recognise the danger and respond.  In the broad sweep of history those disasters have 
not been limited to relatively short timescales, but have also been constituted of 
significant declines in the quality of life and the freedom of the individual for hundreds 
of years.  There is nothing inevitable about the continuing rise of human liberty and 
fulfilment, nothing in the nature of society or the human which can prevent declines that 
last for ages.  Amongst the other dangers facing the human race at this time there now 
exists the possibility that monopoly service providers could, through extension of 
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current legal regimes and directions in innovation, turn us all into digital slaves, partially 
or fully owned by them, with little or no freedom. 
A particular concern is the Chinese social credit system.  If this system fulfils its 
aims it will serve as a template for any dictatorship which wishes total control of the 
population.  The Chinese social credit system may be so successful as to prevent 
resistance and the rise of freedom in China for hundreds of years.  If that is the case, 
over the course of time, it will inevitably spread.  As each nation goes through those dark 
times which are almost inevitable in its history, and is taken over by dictatorship, the use 
of a successful totalitarian control system like the Chinese social credit system could 
preserve dictatorial governments until one day most, if not all, human beings live under 
such control.  Is such a state likely?  We simply do not know.   
Most readers will have an immediate emotional reaction that this is 
inconceivable, that something will always happen to prevent it.  However, that is merely 
an emotional reaction and is not based on any empirical knowledge.  We are therefore 
not in a position to gauge the danger we are in as a society.  What we are in a position to 
do is undertake steps which we know will not only reduce the risk, but also create better 
systems - which work better and serve people and society more effectively, more 
efficiently and more healthily.  Not to see this as preferable, as an aim appropriate to 
computer science, as a desire to produce the best systems with the closest fit to the 
design goal, not to see this as the ultimate objective of the application of computer 
science is to be a poor computer scientist.  It must be reasonable for any well-adjusted 
human being to seek that their work, at least to do no harm, if not make the world a 
better place.   
There is nothing incompatible about an ethical concern for the products of 
one’s science and the rigorous pursuit of that science to the best of one’s ability.  To 
position ethics as external to computer science is either a failure to understand what is 
meant by scientific objectivity or simply amoral.  Scientific objectivity does not call for a 
lack of ethics.  Scientific objectivity calls for truthful adherence to results.  The 
framework within which research is done is ethically significant and does not inhibit 
good science.  It is time for computer science to understand that the applications of the 
discipline are now central to everyday human life and the future of society.  Computer 
science cannot be regarded as a purely theoretical or abstract field disconnected from 
ethics.  Even the most theoretical and abstract research today will result in real-world 
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products which affect people's lives at some stage in the future.  It is time for computer 
scientists to decide whether they wish to ignore this issue until society forces regulation 
upon them or whether they wish to develop their own ethical awareness before being 
forced. 
I hope that my research has given computer science tools and concepts with 
which to adapt the direction of ICT innovation (and the supporting science behind it) in 
a positive fashion and avoid the disasters which my research shows could occur. 
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Processes” is still in press, no published version exists, so it is not included in this 
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Abstract 
This paper examines threats to autonomy created by significant emerging ICT’s. Emerging 
ICT’s cover a wide range of technologies, from intelligent environments to neuroelectronics, 
yet human autonomy is potentially threatened by all of them in some way. However, there is 
no single agreed definition of autonomy. This paper therefore considers the ways in which 
different versions of autonomy are impacted by different systems. From this range of threats 
we will derive some properties which any ICT must exhibit in order to threaten human 
autonomy. Finally, we will show how the range of definitions of autonomy creates problems 
for customary approaches to vale-sensitive design, and indicates a need for greater flexibility 
when attempting to improve the ethical status of emerging ICT’s. 
Keywords: ICT; ethics; autonomy; foresight studies; futures research; ETICA; value-sensitive 
design 
1 Introduction 
This paper examines ways in which human autonomy can be threatened by emerging ICT’s. 
Emerging ICT’s embrace a wide range of technologies, including autonomous systems, 
intelligent environments, bio-electronic implants, robotics, and artificial intelligence. We will 
explore the different ways in which each ICT threatens autonomy to show that the nature of 
the threat, if any, depends on the version of autonomy being used. From this survey of threats 
we will derive some properties which any ICT must exhibit if it threatens human autonomy, no 
matter how it is defined. Finally, we will argue the range of definitions of autonomy 
demonstrates the need for greater flexibility when attempting to improve the ethical status of 
emerging ICT’s. 
In order to discuss the complete range of emerging ICT’s it is necessary to have a system by 
which to conceptualise and organise them. We shall use for these purposes the output of the 
ETICA project (Stahl 2011), which attempted an examination of the complete range of 
emerging ICT’s, developed an ordered taxonomy (Ikonen et al. 2010), and researched the 
ethical concerns associated with each (Heersmink, van den Hoven, and Timmermans 2010).  
2 Methodologies for evaluation of emergent technology 
To count as “emerging” (as opposed to “possible”) an ICT must be sufficiently developed that 
we can understand its general features, but which has not yet achieved maturity in all aspects. 
Since the 1960’s the predominant model for such analysis has thus been to treat technologies 
as “socio-technical systems” (Trist 1981; Lamb and Kling 2003). This position contrasts with 
the other major treatment of technology, technological determinism, which treats technology 
as affecting society, but as developing independent of social, cultural, political and other 
“intangible” causes (Smith and Marx 1994). An emerging ICT will have little market 
penetration (it may still be in prototype), such that its final place and role in the market is yet 
to become evident; its full and final set of features are unlikely to be completely determined; 
the business models under which it will function are likely to be nascent; users may still be 
working out patterns of usage; and the regulatory framework is most probably undeveloped.  
Autonomous cars provide a simple example of an emerging ICT which illustrate these 
uncertainties. Google’s autonomous cars are still in prototype (Solveforx 2016), while Tesla 
vehicles are just beginning to penetrate the market (Statistica 2016). In both cases, the systems 
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are still in development such that the final set of functions is indeterminate (Solveforx 2016; 
Musk 2016). The regulatory framework for autonomous vehicles has seen some development 
in a few places, such as California, but most countries haven’t even begun to think about the 
technology. In the USA, for example, as of March 2017, only eleven states had any regulations 
regarding this technology, while the majority of attempts to introduce legislation in the USA 
since 2012 have failed (National Conference of State Legislatures 2017). Business models for 
the sale and use of this technology are still undetermined. For example, Tesla recently 
proposed models in which people would be able to send their Tesla car out as an automated 
taxi when they’re not using it (Musk 2016). In the meantime, users are still learning how to use 
the systems, often in conflict with how the designers intend them to be used. The most 
dramatic example of this disparity between designer’s intent and user behaviour is the frequent 
driving of Tesla vehicles without human supervision, despite the Tesla’s frequent statements 
that the user should pay attention and keep their hands on the steering wheel at all times 
(Consumer Reports 2016). Any attempt to understand the ethical impact of autonomous cars 
must therefore commence with a vision of the state of affairs when the technology has matured 
– with standardised features, customary patterns of usage, stable regulatory regimes and 
(reasonably) settled business models. Any attempt to assess the ethical implications of 
autonomous cars thus becomes an exercise in anticipating what the future will look like. This 
brings us into the remit of foresight studies. 
2.1 Introducing Foresight Studies 
‘Foresight studies’ is one of the terms used to describe the discipline of considering the future 
in a methodical manner. Foresight studies can be used in any discipline and so the objectives 
in such research vary widely (Glenn 2009; Godet 2009; Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009). 
This presence within many disciplines has led to a variety of terms being used to describe the 
activity. Common alternative terms for foresight studies are “future studies” (most commonly 
used in the USA), “futures research” (Europe), “futurology” (Australasia), “prospective studies” 
(France), “futures field” (Europe) and “prognostics” (Russia) (Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 
2009). A wide variety of foresight methodologies have evolved and most foresight research 
projects combine several methodologies. 
The different methodologies used within foresight studies can be divided between quantitative 
and qualitative in technique and between normative and exploratory in purpose, though some 
methodologies bridge these divides (Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009; Haegeman et al. 2013; 
Gordon and Glenn 2004). Quantitative methods are used mainly in predictive forecasting and 
seek to produce probabilities (Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009; Haegeman et al. 2013). 
Quantitative methods are also used in complex modelling, for example, climate modelling. 
Such methods are based on the assumption that future development is a continuation of past 
trends. While they provide a continuity from past to future, they cannot allow for disruptive 
technologies or unexpected developments. Some argue for the need to support quantitative 
methods with qualitative ones (Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009; Haegeman et al. 2013) as 
they are better suited for the anticipation of abrupt or unexpected changes (Ogilvy 2002; 
Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009). Foresight research also distinguishes between 
methodologies on the basis of whether they are normative or exploratory. Normative 
forecasting is concerned with whether a particular future is desirable and the ethical status of 
decisions which would lead to it. By contrast, exploratory forecasting explores what is possible, 
irrespective of its desirability (Veikko, Kanerva, and Kouri 2009). Ethical assessment of the 
future is rarely a formal component of foresight research project (Bell 1996; Poli 2011; Brey 
2012; Clarke 2005; Grunwald 1999; Harris et al. 2010). Key foresight research figures such as 
Wendell Bell have attempted to determine what ethical values are universally accepted by all 
peoples in all cultures (Bell 1996). However, Bell has since been criticised for accepting as 
objective and universal what are merely western cultural values (Poli 2011; Dator 2011; Rubin 
2011). A less controversial approach has been to incorporate ethical values as research data. 
Here distinct sets of exploratory and normative data are gathered. For example, the 
functionality of future technologies can be drawn the visions of those creating them, after 
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which philosophical sources can be mined for ethical treatments of these functions. This was 
the approach taken by the ETICA project.  
2.2 ETICA 
The most comprehensive foresight research project focused on ethical assessment of emerging 
ICT’s so far has been the EU’s ETICA (Ethical Issues of Emerging ICT Applications) project, 
which ran from 2009 - 2011. The project’s aims were to identify “significant emerging ICT’s” 
(Stahl 2011, 1), the ethical issues these gave rise to, and to make recommendations for EU 
policy makers. A key output from the ETICA project was a taxonomy of emerging ICT’s. Here 
ETICA developed formal structures for technological descriptions and scenario construction 
(Ikonen et al. 2010). It then used bibliometric analysis to assess published discourse regarding 
the ethical issues associated with these ICT’s (Heersmink, van den Hoven, and Timmermans 
2010). The project validated these findings with expert focus groups and surveys (Heersmink 
et al. 2010). Finally, ETICA developed a series of recommendations (Rainey and Goujon 2011), 
together with supporting philosophical and methodological expositions (Veikko, Kanerva, and 
Kouri 2009; Rader et al. 2010; Rainey and Goujon 2011).  
ETICA identified 107 different technologies as significant and emerging, which it aggregated 
into eleven groups. It then identified approximately 400 ethical concerns associated with these 
technology groups. The aim was to collate the ethical concerns, not explore them in depth, 
much as an 18th century naval cartographer might map the location and outlines of a chain of 
islands, but not explore their interior. It is not our intention to review all of these ethical 
concerns, but to concentrate on issues concerning autonomy. We shall first catalogue how 
human autonomy can be challenged by each technology group, then elucidate the common 
characteristics shared by all. However, the meaning of the term ‘autonomy’ is much contested, 
so what one considers a threat to autonomy depends on what one means by the term. It is 
therefore necessary to briefly explore the concept of autonomy. Our aim is not to produce a 
definition of the term ‘autonomy’, but to better understand the different ways it may be used 
when discussing ethical threats. 
3 Autonomy 
Emmanuel Kant was the first to apply the concept of autonomy to human beings (Schneewind 
2007; Dryden 2015; Paul, Miller, and Paul 2003; Dworkin 1988). Before Kant the term 
‘autonomy’ was a purely political one. A state was said to be “autonomous” if its laws were 
drafted within that state, as opposed to being drafted by a distant imperial court or some 
similar extra-national body (Dworkin 2015; Schneewind 2007). Kant applied the concept to 
the individual in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Kant 1785). His aim was to justify 
the right of each individual to make their own judgements regarding morality. For the previous 
100 years, Enlightenment thinkers had been seeking arguments to combat the politically 
dominant understanding of ethics, in which ordinary people were seen as too weak-willed to 
act morally without threats of punishment and promises of reward. Under this view, society 
was dependant on the guidance of those few exceptional people whom God had enabled to 
understand and teach His moral laws. The essence of morality for everyone else was to do what 
they were told (Schneewind 2007). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals set out to prove 
that each person drafted their own rules for their own conduct, that these rules constituted 
each person’s moral code, and that no education was required for this ability - it was universally 
present in all humans. Kant’s labelled the innate capacity of all humans to determine what was 
morally correct as ‘autonomy.’ He then used this capacity for autonomy as the basis for human 
dignity, which then became the basis for human rights. Thus Kant’s concept of autonomy 
created an interlinking of the concepts of individuality, freedom, morality, autonomy, dignity 
and politics (Schneewind 2007; Bittner 2014; Dryden 2015; Paul, Miller, and Paul 2003).  
Since Kant introduced the concept, a number of differing definitions of autonomy have arisen. 
The range of such accounts, as well as the lack of progress towards any consensus, has led to 
the concept of “regimes” of autonomy (Anderson 2014; Dworkin 2015) – clusters of similar, 
but not identical, theories, such that “about the only features held constant from one author to 
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another are that autonomy is a feature of persons and that it is a desirable quality to have.” 
(Dworkin 2015, 8). Kant’s criteria for autonomy were, by later standards, rigid and limited. 
Under Kant’s account, people were required to determine what was right or wrong without 
reference to the consequences of their actions. Furthermore, under Kant, rules of conduct only 
counted as a moral if the person believed everyone should act the same way. There was no 
room for moral pluralism in Kant, or tolerance of other people acting differently (Kant 1998; 
Guyer 2003; Johnson 2014). This type of definition of autonomy has come to be known as a 
“substantive procedural” account. A “procedural” account of autonomy takes the position that 
autonomy is a specific form of thinking process (ie: follows a specific procedure). A subset of 
procedural accounts are substantive, adding the requirement that autonomy also involves 
thinking about certain things. By contrast, “content-neutral” procedural accounts try to define 
autonomy without reference to any particular concern or aim. Content-neutral accounts of 
autonomy form the majority of modern accounts (Dryden 2015) and are, perhaps, more suited 
to multi-cultural or pluralistic societies in that they allow individuals to determine for 
themselves what sources and values to consider when making ethical decisions. 
The value given to autonomy varies according to the importance given to competing claims, 
most frequently those of paternalism and those forms of communitarianism which devalue 
individual choice in favour of community needs (Bell 2014). Kant’s original concept was 
developed in an effort to remove external authority as a source of morality. Kant specifically 
identifies autonomy as oppositional to outside influence. However, we are all influenced by 
external forces, including family, cultural and religious influences. Consequently, outside 
influence and the point at which it reduces autonomy is a problem which must be dealt with 
by every definition of autonomy. One response has been to argue that the concept of autonomy 
as self-governance isolates the individual from their society and morally devalues family, 
community, culture and tradition (Christman 2014; Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Donchin 
2000; Buss and Zalta 2015). These positions have given rise to relational and social 
conceptions of autonomy based on the necessity of human sociality. 
It has also been argued autonomy, if conceived of as only certain forms of thinking, does not 
account for the full range of human emotional and physical experience, such as trained muscle 
action (e.g.: playing sport or music) or healthy reflexes, which can also express personal 
autonomy (Meyers 2005, 1989). These issues collide with particular urgency where ICT’s 
become concerned with care for the ill or aged (Agich 2003; Burmeister 2016; Dworkin 1988), 
but also wherever ICT’s come to mediate what someone considers to be core elements of their 
life.  
Kant applied autonomy strictly to the moral realm, though it had political implications. Since 
then Western Philosophy has come to term the capacity to determine one’s own moral codes 
as ‘moral autonomy.’ To moral autonomy have been added the concepts of “personal 
autonomy” (the capacity to determine one’s own actions) and “political autonomy” (the 
capacity to make one’s own political decisions and have them heeded) (Dryden 2015; Anderson 
and Christman 2005). What these three definitions share is the concept of “self-governance.” 
ICT’s threaten human autonomy whenever they interfere with this self-governance. This 
occurs whenever ICT’s make decisions for people, especially when an ICT imposes on the user 
a way of doing something which is antithetical to the manner in which the user would have 
chosen. Some threats to autonomy are universal under all definitions of autonomy, but most 
depend on the particular form of autonomy being used. Reducing autonomy may be justified 
on other grounds but such a justification, like the threat, will be based on the version of 
autonomy being used. It will often be the case that a justification works under one concept of 
autonomy, but not under others. 
4 ETICA’s technology groups and their threats to autonomy 
Identification of ethical issues of significant emerging ICT’s is dependent upon first having 
identified the ICT’s which are both significant and emerging. ETICA defined “significant” 
technologies as those which were likely to have an important influence on society and 
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conceptions of the self. It defined “emerging” technologies as those on a stable development 
path and likely to be in common use by 2030 (Stahl 2011). 107 technologies meeting these 
criteria were identified, including 3-D printing, sensor networks, augmented reality, location-
based services, lab-on-a-chip, molecular electronics, nanobots, mobile payment systems, 
robotics, social network analysis, speech recognition, internet of things, and wireless power. 
These were then organised into eleven groups on the basis of shared characteristics, such as 
type of user, operational context, functionality, and relation to other technologies. For 
example, both wireless sensor networks and wearable computing were placed into the category 
of Ambient Intelligence.  
The project identified the following eleven technology groups: 
1. Affective computing 
2. Ambient intelligence  
3. Artificial intelligence 
4. Bioelectronics 
5. Cloud computing 
6. Future internet  
7. Human/machine symbiosis  
8. Neuroelectronics 
9. Quantum computing 
10. Robotics 
11. Virtual and augmented reality 
(Ikonen et al. 2010, 42; Stahl 2011, 5) 
Not all technology groups were seen by ETICA as generating ethical threats in and of 
themselves. ETICA assessed quantum computing as unlikely to have any impact on society in 
the next 10-20 years, while cloud computing and future internet were seen as enablers of other 
technologies and not as raising unique ethical issues themselves. We shall now briefly examine 
the remaining technology groups and discuss some of the ways in which each has the potential 
to reduce human autonomy. Our aim is not to explore the details of the individual threats, but 
simply to see how autonomy can be threatened by each technology. While a few technologies 
threaten autonomy no matter how it is defined, the central point of this survey is to 
demonstrate that most threats only appear under specific definitions of autonomy.  
4.1 Affective Computing 
Affective computing involves treating human emotion as input and generating output which 
either emulates human signals of emotion or which seeks to manipulate human emotions. 
Here ethical concerns derive from the importance of human emotion in communication and 
the risks of manipulation and misunderstanding. 
How affective computing threatens autonomy depends on whether affective computing works 
or not. Unlike some other technologies, there is no guarantee it will ever be possible to build 
systems which can accurately read human emotions (Barrett, Gendron, and Huang 2009; 
Picard 2003). The greatest danger with affective computing lies in the possibility that people 
will think it is working when it is not. We can usually tell when most technologies operate 
incorrectly. However, there is no simple way of checking to see if an affective computing 
system’s assessment of a person’s emotion is accurate. Incorrect assessment of someone’s 
emotions threaten their autonomy when that data is used to make decisions which affect them.  
If ICT’s can successfully understand human emotions, affective computing threatens privacy 
through the ability to glean information about people which they do not wish revealed. 
Wherever such information is used to make decisions affecting the person, it may constitute a 
restriction of their autonomy. Here it depends on the form of autonomy one subscribes to. 
Some “second-order” procedural accounts of autonomy hold that autonomy is preserved 
provided one would have agreed with the decision if they had been given the chance (Dworkin 
1988, 2015). However, accounts of autonomy which do not allow for such “second-order” 
assessments hold that any decision denied the person is a restriction on their autonomy. If 
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those decisions were made in an effort to benefit the person, they may be justifiable on the 
grounds of form of paternalism. Otherwise they simply constitute a form of oppression.  
Affective computing therefore constitutes a threat to autonomy whenever affective data is used 
to make decisions about someone, unless one is using a second-order procedural definition of 
autonomy and the person would have agreed with the decision if they had been given the 
chance. 
Emulation of emotion makes possible threats to autonomy in that it offers the chance to 
overwhelm rationality with emotion. Any manipulation of a person’s emotions which prompts 
them to make a decision they would not have made otherwise constitutes a restriction of 
autonomy, irrespective of how autonomy is conceived. The concern is therefore that 
introducing affective output changes the power balance between system and user. If the ability 
to accurately detect emotions is combined with the ability to emulate emotional expression, 
the power of such systems to manipulate and persuade becomes greater than any previous 
human invention. In this sense, affective systems become human manipulation technology.  
4.2 Ambient Intelligence 
Ambient intelligence refers to IC technology which is embedded into the environment. Its 
defining characteristic is the invisibility of the devices, often associated with automated input 
(for example, a change in room temperature) and less-than obvious responses by the ambient 
system (for example, changing the air conditioning settings).  
Ambient intelligence offers the capability of personalising the environment to the individual 
user. Where personalisation is under control of the user, it represents an extension of their 
autonomy. Where personalisation is outside the user’s control, it represents a reduction in 
autonomy under most, but not all, definitions. Second-order accounts allow for the 
preservation of autonomy if the user would have agreed to the personalisation had they been 
given the chance. Only under such accounts is autonomy preserved by automated 
environmental personalisation. If the personalisation is intended to improve the user’s quality 
of life, reductions in autonomy may be justifiable on the grounds of paternalism. However, that 
is a problematic debate which cannot be resolved in terms of universal principles, but will ride 
on the specifics of each case; the type of personalisation, the individuals involved and their 
personal values. 
Ambient intelligence shares several ethical issues with affective computing. Autonomy is 
threatened by poor quality personalization services, either as a result of an inadequate 
understanding of human nature, or by the skewing of personalisation protocols resulting from 
commercial interest or developer ignorance (or bias). Inference of user needs from their 
behaviour is particularly problematic, especially with regard to children. There is the danger 
that users will be forced to change their behaviour to get the best out of ambient systems, and 
so end up being “trained” by their environment’s designers (Soraker and Brey 2007). 
Ambient intelligence creates the risk of the personal environment acquiring power over people. 
Since ambient intelligence makes the personal environment controllable by third parties, the 
personal environment becomes a contestable zone, open to commercial and state interests, 
both in terms of gathering information and seeking control. Some contestation of the personal 
environment has always occurred. For example, disputes over noise can be traced back to the 
earliest cities (Goldsmith 2012). However, ambient intelligence represents such a significant 
increase in power that contestation for the personal environment becomes a new type of issue 
– the power to (potentially) totally control someone else’s personal space. 
4.3 Artificial Intelligence 
ETICA examined both “hard” AI (emulation of human thought) and “soft AI” (e.g.: expert 
systems and software agents). Ethical concerns focused on the use of soft AI as an enabler for 
other emerging technologies, such as ambient intelligence and affective computing. While 
issues associated with hard AI were considered, ETICA’s judged that hard AI was unlikely to 
do more than appear in earliest prototypes by 2030 and so was outside the scope of the project.  
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Our discussions of ambient intelligence and affective computing have both shown how human 
autonomy can be threatened by the power of these systems over people. AI significantly 
enhances this power, and so can be an enabler of threats to autonomy wherever it is deployed 
within ICT systems. Particularly problematic is the possibility that AI may enable systems to 
learn things about people not anticipated by designer or user. Implementation of informed 
consent becomes extremely difficult when one does not know what information may be 
acquired. It has been suggested the solution is to build ethical reasoning into AI systems 
(Dennis et al. 2013). However, ethical systems are abstract principles of value, not problem-
solving algorithms (Kraut 2016; Graham 2004). Ethical dilemmas only exist where multiple 
ethical values conflict because it is these conflicting values themselves which create the 
dilemma. AI developers are not, therefore, able to reach for an existing corpus of ethical 
problem-solving algorithms as if the matter were a simple sort task. Any implementation of 
ethical processing will therefore impose someone’s particular ethical values on the system. 
Should such an ethical value set not accord with the user’s set of ethical values, the user’s 
autonomy will be compromised by the actions of their AI-enabled system. The only way to 
counter such a threat would be to allow users to customise their AI-enabled systems with their 
own ethical values and reasoning.  
4.4 Bioelectronics 
ETICA defined bioelectronics as ICT systems which interact directly with the human body. The 
primary ethical considerations were focused on use in health care, but those who see 
bioelectronics as a path to artificial human bodies were also considered. Here bioelectronics 
represents the potential for technological modification of the human form. It therefore directly 
confronts the essence of what it is to be human and impacts core human values, such as 
autonomy, freedom and dignity. 
Bioelectronics can be used to change people’s internal states by delivering medicines and 
intervening in bodily processes and thus has the potential to reduce autonomy. However, this 
concern is dependent on the concept of autonomy used. If one accepts a second-order 
procedural concept of autonomy (Dworkin 1988), autonomy may be preserved post-hoc by 
agreeing with the earlier bioelectronic intervention. However, conceptions which situate 
autonomy at the moment of decision must see any bioelectronic intervention as a reduction of 
autonomy. Whether this loss of autonomy can be justified on paternalistic grounds depends 
on the intent behind the intervention. However, it may be possible to reframe the issue such 
that autonomy is not threatened. Discussions of bioelectronics tend to treat intervention as 
morally equivalent to an intentional act. Under this perspective, each individual bioelectronic 
intervention is treated as a discrete act to which assent may be given or withheld. This raises 
problems for the preservation of autonomy because of the requirement for ongoing consent 
(Agich 2003). However, where this intervention is frequent and automated, such as is the case 
with drug delivery, it may be more productive to think of it as a form of reflex. Some definitions 
of autonomy incorporate reflex into their schema as non-cognitive expressions of the self 
(Meyers 2005, 1989). Treating bioelectronic interventions as artificial reflexes removes any 
threat to autonomy under such definitions.  
The nature of bioelectronic intervention means it is difficult to resist. This places a great deal 
of potential power in the hands of those controlling the devices; granting them the ability to 
control someone to a degree not possible by other means. The capability of bioelectronics to 
change internal bodily states and processes is the same as that of drugs. Accordingly, 
bioelectronics shares many of the same issues pertaining to autonomy as do drugs. There are 
today debates about the advisability of treating some mental states as illnesses, concerns about 
inappropriate use of drugs to control behaviour in elderly and children, and other issues 
relating to appropriate boundaries to medical intervention (Smith 2012). These same issues 
apply to interventions by bioelectronic devices. Threats to autonomy apply here in two ways; 
firstly, “authentic” conceptions of autonomy involve the concept of authenticity (that there is 
some given essential nature to each individual), such that autonomy requires being in 
conformance to that essential self (Kühler and Jelinek 2013). These accounts hold that there is 
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something innate about humans which cannot be changed without harming their authenticity, 
such as particular forms of cognition (Frankfurt 1971). Theological accounts of autonomy may 
also depend upon a divinely-ordained authentic human nature (Wilson 1978; Niebuhr 2004). 
Meanwhile, “coherentist” accounts base autonomy on continuity with personal history, such 
that changes or decisions which radically depart from someone’s previous patterns or tastes 
are inauthentic, and thus reductions in autonomy (Miller 1981; Ekstrom 1993). Bioelectronic 
interventions which take a person away from an essential self, however that self is conceived, 
are reductions to these forms of autonomy. Finally, where bioelectronic interventions are 
unwelcome and forced on the individual, they constitute a clear reduction in autonomy under 
all definitions of autonomy. 
4.5 Human-Machine Symbiosis 
ETICA characterised human-machine symbiosis as the pairing of innate human capabilities 
with ICT. This definition covers an extremely wide range of systems, including haptic 
interfaces, decision-support systems, computer-assisted surgery, augmented reality and direct 
neural interfaces. There is considerable overlap with other technologies, especially bio- and 
neuroelectronics and artificial intelligence. 
Attempts to enhance human beings through the addition of ICT components may constitute 
reductions in autonomy under the authenticist views just outlined. Therapeutic devices, 
designed to replace lost human capabilities rather than enhance them, may be autonomy-
preserving, but other accounts can hold that even these constitute a loss of autonomy (Bublitz 
and Merkel 2009). This is particularly the case where those devices require monitoring or 
control by others. A device may therefore reduce autonomy when it is operated by someone 
else, but enhance autonomy where it is controlled by the user (Sharon 2017). Such concerns 
are not limited to devices implanted into people’s bodies. Use of external devices, for example, 
as aids to memory, may constitute reductions to autonomy, especially under accounts based 
on the concept of an “extended self” (Olson 2011; Rachlin and Jones 2010), in which parts of 
our personal identity are embedded in external objects, such as clothing or mobile phones 
(Ahuvia 2005; Belk 1988; Turkle 2011). For someone who embeds part of their identity in their 
phone, even something as simple as an enforced software update may constitute a reduction 
in their autonomy. 
4.6 Neuroelectronics 
ETICA defined neuroelectronics as technology interfacing between the human nervous system 
and electronic devices. While neuroelectronics clearly overlaps with bioelectronics, ETICA felt 
the intimate connection between the person and their brain meant neuroelectronics could not 
be adequately examined within a general treatment of bioelectronics. 
As with bioelectronics, autonomy is not threatened when neuroelectronics is used to gather 
data, but only when used to induce changes. Since changes cannot be made without knowledge 
of internal states, gathering data is, however, a privacy concern as an enabler of reductions to 
autonomy. Any neuroelectronic system which produces changes within the person constitutes 
a threat under most accounts of autonomy. While this is clearly the case with conceptions of 
autonomy which involve an authentic nature or coherent life-history, it may also be the case 
under second-order procedural accounts (which allow for autonomy preservation if someone 
agrees to a change afterwards). This is because a person’s agreement to a previous procedure 
may be merely the result of the changes they have undergone. Where these devices are installed 
to deal with cognitive impairment, such as dementia, informed consent is impossible and thus 
autonomy must be reduced (though this may be justifiable on paternalistic grounds). As with 
bioelectronics and human-machine symbiosis, any accounts of autonomy which involve a 
divinely-derived authentic human nature will view all neuroelectronic changes as reductions 
in autonomy. 
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4.7 Robotics 
ETICA defined robots as “machines with motor function that are able to perceive their 
environment and operate autonomously” (Ikonen et al. 2010, 114). ETICA’s focused on new 
developments which increase the mobility and intelligence of robotic devices, permitting their 
deployment into wider areas of society, such as the home and healthcare, and focused on robots 
built for specific roles within these contexts. ETICA did not consider general-purpose, fully 
mobile devices controlled by strong artificial intelligence seeking to make war on humanity. 
The degree to which robotics can threaten autonomy depends on the definition of autonomy 
used and the use made of the robot. As has been noted earlier, traditional procedural accounts 
of autonomy as self-determination have been criticised for unrealistically portraying people as 
isolated individuals and leaving no space in the account for communitarian elements such as 
the influence of family or culture (Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Stoljar 2015). On this basis 
some have gone so far as to argue autonomy is an unattainable ideal (Strawson 1994). A more 
common response has been to develop a treatment of autonomy which includes space for the 
influence of others, such as the concept of a “social self” (Meyers 2005, 44). The central premise 
in relational accounts of autonomy is the necessary role of other people in the development of 
one’s values and the centrality of interpersonal relationships to human existence; that it is not 
possible to function autonomously without the influence of others (Mackenzie and Stoljar 
2000; Stoljar 2015; Donchin 2000). Such conceptions of autonomy are threatened when 
robots replace humans in roles which have social externalities, such as health care and 
education. While robots are able to undertake the central tasks, the loss of the human contact 
constitutes a reduction in relational autonomy. The consequence of this is that there may be 
some tasks for which robots are not ethically suitable, for no other reason than that they are 
robots. If the social externalities of a work role are essential for the maintenance of the 
recipient’s autonomy, then that role must be reserved for humans. Were we to replace nurses 
or teachers with robots, we could thus see people argue they have an inalienable human right 
to refuse to be served by a robot and to demand human service.  
4.8 Virtual/Augmented Reality 
ETICA’s union of virtual reality with augmented reality into one technology group was based 
on the common feature they share - the imposition of digital output onto the human sensory 
field. ETICA defined virtual reality as occurring where digital output completely replaced 
sensory data. Where it did not completely replace external sensory data, ETICA used the term 
‘augmented reality’ (Heersmink, van den Hoven, and Timmermans 2010, 114). ETICA’s 
concerns were founded on the fact that such systems mediate or replace interaction with the 
physical environment. 
Autonomy is threatened when virtual or augmented realities depict objects, people and places 
in the real world and thus become involved with the many ethical issues associated with 
depiction, cultural bias and its influence the development of attitudes and taste (Zimbardo and 
Leippe 1991). The imposition of foreign cultural models in virtual realities would constitute a 
threat to relational and social conceptions of autonomy (Tomlinson 1991), while lack of 
alternatives and lack of configuration options threatens all conceptions of autonomy.  
4.9 Summary 
Many of the technologies examined provide personalised services tailored to the individual. 
These technologies threaten human autonomy when they fail to personalise effectively. This 
may result from misreading the user, insufficient granularity within the personalisation, lack 
of user control, inadequate modelling of the user or by imposing on the user ways of living 
which are contrary to their values. A number of the technologies change power balances within 
society, granting for the first time, or greatly increasing, the actant power of the environment 
over the individual. This power threatens autonomy if used to impose on the user or to enable 
autonomy-limiting personalisation. Some conceptions of autonomy contain elements which 
can be disrupted by some ICT’s. Conceptions of autonomy which include inter-personal 
relationships are challenged by robotics, while conceptions of autonomy which make reference 
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to authenticity, coherent life-history, or some form of given human nature, are challenged by 
bio- and neuro-electronics and may also be challenged by human-machine symbiosis. 
Irrespective of the nature of autonomy used, our survey of ETICA’s research suggests there are 
certain characteristics any ICT is likely to have if it threatens autonomy: 
1. Surveillance: Surveillance consists of the obtaining of information pertaining to an 
individual from their behaviour or communication, followed by the use of that data for 
purposes, either unknown to that individual or against their wishes (Lyon, Ball, and 
Haggerty 2012). While it can be used in a paternalistic fashion to enhance the 
individual’s autonomy, our concern is when it is used in a manner which limits the 
individual's autonomy. The presence of a surveillance system is a necessary 
precondition for the use of personal information by others and for personalisation 
services because it constitutes the means by which information supporting 
personalisation is gathered. Control of the outflowing data by the individual is therefore 
an effective way in which to retain autonomy. Thus control of privacy is an enabling 
right to autonomy. 
2. Disparity of Control: Disparity of control occurs when a third party has a greater 
control over the use of one’s personal data and the autonomy-limiting processes than 
oneself. This lack of control can be accomplished through lack of knowledge on the part 
of the individual as to what is occurring, through “take it or leave it” terms of use 
combined with a lack of alternatives, and through the lack (or concealment) of user 
configuration capabilities. In some cases, such as data profiling, not just functions, but 
entire industries may be concealed (Federal Trade Commission 2014; Turow 2011; 
Dainow 2015).  
3. Insufficient Configurability: Autonomy can be threatened by lack of variability in 
configuration options suitable to reflect the variations in the user’s desires, style of 
operation or range of outcomes. This lack of variation can stem from: 
 A lack of recognition by the ICT developers of the need for, or even existence of, 
such variations. 
 Insufficient consideration of need for user variability during the design process. 
 Insufficient granularity of configuration options. 
 Systemic biases within the delivery mechanisms, including business models, 
market competition, regulatory framework or any other factors regarding the 
operational delivery of services. For example, a system might be highly 
configurable, but delivered to users with a standardised configuration which 
cannot be changed in an effort to reduce support costs. 
4. Insufficient variation in operational models: Many new ICT’s are owned and 
operated by a very limited number of providers (Noam et al. 2003; Hillis, Jarrett, and 
Petit 2013). Often a single provider dominates the market to near-monopoly levels. 
This limits choice of service provision, and consequently the model under which it is 
provided. In many cases the business model is identical across all providers within an 
ICT sector, such that change of provider does not change the circumstances under 
which the user accesses the service. For example, social networking is only available 
under a capitalist for-profit model in which service provision is exchanged for personal 
data which is then commoditised (or monetised). Non-profit and privacy-preserving 
social network systems do not exist to the degree that a real choice is available. In 
addition, IP protection promotes walled gardens and suppresses interoperability, 
further limiting options for choice by users because it is not possible to interoperate 
between social network providers.  
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5 Conclusions 
The common feature to all conceptions of autonomy is self-determination. What one self-
decides, how, on what basis, according to what procedure, and subject to which influences, 
varies from account to account. Yet efforts to preserve autonomy are central to ICT ethics 
(Spiekermann 2015). Efforts to reduce the negative ethical impact of ICT’s on people through 
processes such as value-sensitive design need to be cognisant of the various conceptions of 
autonomy relevant to the intended functionality of the system. This is especially the case with 
technologies which enter into spheres of life which have previously been purely human or 
which reduce the power people have over their personal lifeworld. Given the wide range of 
definitions of autonomy, no single definition can possibly cover all cases.  
Because autonomy is frequently central to the ethical status of any technology, it is rarely 
possible to categorise any ICT as threatening or reducing autonomy without reference to the 
form of autonomy used. Methodologies to improve the ethical sensitivity of ICT technology, 
such as value-sensitive design, make frequent reference to the need to specify a particular 
brand of ethics, such as deontology or utilitarianism, from which to draw values (Spiekermann 
2015; Nissenbaum 2001; Winfield, Blum, and Liu 2014), but the application of such values still 
depends on the concept of autonomy being used. It is generally assumed that there is a single, 
fixed meaning to autonomy, at least in any given context, and that preservation of autonomy 
simply requires, at most, identification of the correct version (Manders-Huits 2011). Some 
have noted the meaning of autonomy can vary with different contexts (Burmeister 2016), but 
it is possible that it only appears the meaning has changed because the difficulties perceived 
apply to one version of autonomy and not others, thus making the problematic version of 
autonomy obvious. Our review of ETICA’s survey of threats to autonomy has revealed that 
many versions of autonomy may be applicable within the one context, some of which may have 
problems while others do not. Thus, attempts to find the “correct” version of autonomy for any 
context may be moot. On this basis, it seems more appropriate to develop ICT functionality 
which does not depend on a single definition of autonomy, but adapts to the user’s own 
definition. This implies a loose pairing of system behaviour to coding, such that output can be 
fine-tuned after deployment, either by a user, their technical support staff or through the use 
of soft AI components focused on adapting the system to user feedback.  
All significant emerging ICTs can threaten autonomy, but there is no simple way of avoiding 
this. Efforts such as value-sensitive design stand more chance of success if they focus less on 
incorporating a single set of values and focus instead on ways by which users may adapt ICT’s 
to reflect their own individual values. 
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Abstract
This paper provides a conception of the smart city which takes into account what the 
smart city brings into the world which is new and original.  This approach provides a means 
of dealing with the complex influences humans and digital systems will have on each other in 
the mature smart cities of the future.  I will first review traditional accounts of the smart city 
and derive from them the essential characteristics common to these visions.  I will then show 
how these characteristics can be best understood through Actor-network theory and construct 
an account of the smart city as an autopoietic system in which humans and devices are co-
constituting actants.  Finally, I shall develop this into an original conception of the smart city 
as a new type of thing - an “integrated domain.”  
Keywords: smart  city,  computer,  society,  actor-network  theory,  autopoiesis,  future internet
Accounts of Smart Cities
There is  no single definition of what  constitutes a smart city.  Accounts divide into three 
schools regarding definitions of the smart city.  One school defines the smart city in terms of 
what we can do with it.  Here we find topics such as innovation policy (Komninos, Schaffers, 
& Pallot, 2011), smart governance (Vinod Kumar, 2015), urban planning (Zygiaris, 2013), 
improved  sustainability  (Bowerman,  Braverman,  Taylor,  Todosow,  &  Von  Wimmersperg, 
2000) and similar large-scale management tasks.  Others define the smart city in terms of its 
material construction.  Here the focus is mainly on devices comprising the Internet of Things 
and  their  interactions.   Some  focus  on  issues  of  designing  smart  sensors  and  other 
components,  such as weight  detectors  in roads (Hancke,  Silva,  & Hancke,  2013).  Others 
focus  on the interactions  between components,  such as sensor networks  (Filipponi  et  al., 
2010) and human-sensor interactions (Pettersson et al., 2011).  Others attempt to make sense 
of  both  usage  and  components  through  the  development  of  organisational  models.   For 
example, Jin proposes a four-layer model of sensors, networks, cloud-based data management 
and service delivery (Jin, Gubbi,  Marusic,  & Palaniswami,  2014).   Organising smart city 
components  and operation  into  layers  is  fairly common.   Balakrishna’s  four-layer  model 
(Balakrishna, 2012) is almost identical to Jin’s, while others adopt a three-layer (Atzori, Iera, 
Morabito, & Nitti, 2012) or five-layer (Pettersson et al., 2011) model.  In contrast, some have 
attempted more conceptual organisational models.  For example, Filiponi (Filipponi et al., 
2010) suggests a vertical model based on our understanding of the space in which activity 
occurs, such as car, home, office and civic space.
Attempting to make sense of this range, Smart Cities: Definitions, Dimensions, Performance,  
and Initiatives (Albino,  Berardi,  & Dangelico,  2015) examined twenty-two accounts  and 
cross-referenced these with urban developments which labelled themselves as smart cities. 
Their conclusion was that a single definition was impossible because of wide variations in the 
meaning of common terms.  Attempts to include everything inevitably cover too much or too 
little.  At one extreme we have very broad statements, such as a smart city is that which uses 
“social,  mobile  and  sensor-based  technologies  …  to  create  more  productive  alignments 
between%1 (growing) demand and (constrained) resources.” (Hartswood, Grimpe, Jirotka, & 
Anderson, 2014, p. 3).  At the other extreme, Getting Smarter About Smart Cities defines a 
smart city as: 
“using networked, digital technologies and urban big data to tackle a range of issues, 
such  as  improving  governance  and  service  delivery,  creating  more  resilient  critical 
infrastructure,  growing  the  local  economy,  becoming  more  sustainable,  producing  better 
mobility, gaining transparency and accountability, enhancing quality of life, and increasing 
safety and security.” (Kitchin, 2016, p. 9).
Deployment of smart city technology is more likely to be accomplished by industry than by 
academic researchers.  It is therefore worth considering the vision of the smart city which 
industry offers.  Cobham Plc is a major player in the smart city sector, with annual turnover 
of  $US3 billion (Cobham PLC, 2011).   Their  Tactical  Communications  and Surveillance 
division  provides  a  range  of  smart  city  technologies.   Their  smart  city  sales  brochure 
(Cobham PLC, 2014) offers a 5-layer model, ranging from an “IP mesh” which allows any 
type  of  sensor  to  communicate  with  any  other,  through  several  layers  of  device  type, 
including  integration  of  personal  devices  as  sensors  (with  and  without  user  knowledge), 
through to management systems.
Certain characteristics are held in common throughout all these accounts.  They agree that 
smart cities require a ubiquitous heterogeneous sensor network which provides information 
about the inhabitants, their environment and service delivery. This has been referred to as an 
“IP mesh” (Cobham PLC, 2011, p. 3) and as an “underlying sensor fabric” (Balakrishna, 
2012,  p.  224).   These  sensors  must  report  their  data  to  other  devices.  Some  of  these 
communication patterns can be predesigned, while others must be created on an ad hoc basis 
in response to the movement of the inhabitants and machines such as drones, robots and cars 
(Guo, Wang, Zhang, Yu, & Zhou, 2013; Pettersson et al., 2011).  There is general agreement 
these devices will be embedded in the civic environment, the home and other personal spaces 
(such as the car), worn on the person and implanted within the body.  While many accounts 
assume that all data processing will occur in the cloud, this is not inevitable.  A contrasting 
view can be seen in the concepts of fog computing (Bonomi, Milito, Zhu, & Addepalli, 2012; 
Petrolo, Loscrì, & Mitton, 2015) and user-controlled personal data stores (Service Systems 
Group, 2015b).  Under these views significant data processing can be done locally, either 
within sensor devices themselves or through locally situated data processing units (Service 
Systems  Group,  2015a).   Indeed,  such  local  processing  is  likely  to  be  more  secure  and 
efficient (Dainow, 2015; Langheinrich, 2001).
The aim of this paper to provide a comprehensive definition of the smart city which can serve 
as the foundation for ethical analysis by reconceptualising the smart city.  Current ethical 
concerns  for  the smart  city tend to  be limited  to  specific  issues  associated  with  specific 
technologies  within  the  smart  city,  such as  cars  (Jaisingh,  El-Khatib,  & Akalu,  2016)  or 
location  detection  (Martínez-Ballesté,  Pérez-Martínez,  &  Solanas,  2013).   My aim  is  to 
provide a comprehensive framework for analysis of any ethical issue, especially issues which 
are  emergent  from  the  interaction  of  multiple  systems  and  which  therefore  cannot  be 
predicted from any one sub-system.  This requires developing a new vision of the smart city 
which is able to account for the complex nature of interactions within it. 
The City of the Future
We must first place the smart city within a future studies framework.  This is because the 
smart city does not yet exist, but is rather in an early stage of development.  Given that the 
smart city does not yet exist, current technologies related to smart cities must be regarded as 
interim steps towards what will be the ultimate deployed solutions in mature smart cities of 
the future.  We must therefore regard current smart city technologies as in flux, as unfinished, 
and  their  features  as  mutable  and  almost  certainly  subject  to  change.   Furthermore,  our 
current understanding of the path to the mature smart city is highly uncertain.  The issue of ad 
hoc networking illustrates that even the direction of innovation is in dispute.  Much concern 
in smart city development focuses on issues of communication between devices.  It is widely 
recognised that mobile devices, autonomous systems and moving people will all necessitate 
the dynamic creation and uncreation of unpredictable network patterns.  Known as “ad hoc 
networking”, some see great advantages in this (Boldrini, Conti,  Delmastro, & Passarella, 
2010; Guo, Wang, Zhang, Yu, & Zhou, 2013) seeking only to make it reliable and secure, 
while others (Pettersson et al., 2011) see its chaotic and unpredictable nature as something 
which needs to be controlled.  Clearly, it is difficult to anticipate the ultimate role of ad hoc 
networking in the smart city at a stage when we cannot even agree on whether it should be 
promoted or inhibited. 
Teleological  accounts,  concerned with  urban governance,  typically  focus  on  the  ways  in 
which smart cities can solve today’s problems.  However, it is unlikely that the contentious 
issues of smart city governance are predictable in any detail.  Prior to the invention of the 
world wide web, no one could have anticipated the need for domain name registries, nor the 
political fighting which would emerge around them. We can therefore anticipate that at least 
some important forms of governance of mature smart cities are yet to be imagined.  Similarly, 
the most pressing issues confronting mature smart cities will include those we cannot yet 
anticipate  because  they  will  derive  from  the  unknown  nature  of  currently  unpredicted 
technologies  and the  currently unpredictable  patterns  of  usage  which  will  evolve  around 
them.   Considering  that  new technologies  always  create  negative  side-effects  (Cardwell, 
1994; Derry & Williams, 1993), it is inevitable that the solutions we deploy in creating the 
smart city will generate problems of their own – which we also cannot predict.
Placing the smart city within a futures perspective therefore means understanding that we do 
not know how it will be made, how it will operate, or how it will be managed.  Conceptions 
of this future unknown smart city must therefore frame themselves in terms which are not 
dependent upon knowledge of the specific details of future smart technologies.  Fundamental 
to the futures approach is an understanding that the smart city is not today’s city with some 
digital tech laid over the top of it, any more than the modern city is just a Victorian one with 
cars  instead of  horses.   The mature smart  city will  be a  fundamentally different  type  of 
environment from any we have previously seen.  The key change will be the presence of 
ubiquitous ICT technologies.  Through all of history the human built environment has been a 
largely dumb. It has not had the ability to do things to us except in the most gross fashion and 
it has not had the capability to know us. The capacity of the environment to obtain data and to 
respond  to  human  action  represents  a  fundamentally  new  type  of  built  environment  for 
human living.  
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We can therefore understand the characteristics of the smart city best if we consider it as a 
form of built environment.  Accounts of smart cities focused on the technical infrastructure 
typically  treat  it  as  consisting  of  intelligent  devices  embedded  within  dumb  materials. 
However,  the  number,  ubiquity,  heterogeneity and invisibility of  most  devices  will  cause 
humans to understand and act towards the object in which the devices are embedded rather 
than the devices themselves, and in many cases deal with aggregations of devices rather than 
individual ones.  Attempting to account for this interaction between human and device in 
terms of component types and processes is impossible on two grounds.  Firstly, we cannot 
know the  nature  of  these  future  devices  or  what  patterns  of  usage  humans will  develop 
towards them.  Secondly, the number and heterogeneity of these devices and variability of 
human relations with them across differing contexts renders attempts to understand on the 
basis of technical type impossibly complex.  We must therefore cease to talk in terms of 
technical components and instead identify the functional characteristics which can unite the 
various heterogeneous technical forms.  
The  following  will  identify  the  essential  functional  characteristics  of  the  smart  city. 
Thereafter I will use these to synthesise a conception of the smart city as a new type of being.
Ambient Intelligence
‘Ambient intelligence’ is defined as technology which embeds input, processing or response 
ubiquitously through the environment (Ikonen, Kanerva, Kouri, Stahl, & Wakunuma, 2010). 
With its ubiquitous sensor mesh the smart city is the ideal type for ambient intelligence.  As a  
lived experience, people will know the smart city not as individual components and discrete 
processes isolated within atomised sections  of their  lives.   Instead the smart city will  be 
experienced as a seamless experience as one moves from house to car to work, from one 
context to another.  People will not think of themselves as moving from one discrete situation 
to  another,  they  will  simply  experience  themselves  as  going  about  their  daily  life,  an 
unbroken  stream of  changing  contexts  seamlessly  merging  from one  to  the  other.   The 
following quotes from the auto industry illustrate current steps in this direction:
Matt Jones, Director of Future Technology at Jaguar Land Rover:
"We very quickly discovered that customer expectations really aren't based on our 
Jaguar  Land Rover  competition -  they're  based on the smartphone.  They're  based on the 
tablet. They're based on the home entertainment experience….  Consumers expect to be able 
to download an app, get into the car and discover a seamless integration between the device 
and the automobile." (Bedigian, 2016, p. 7)
John Schnoes, Programme Director of Vehicle Information Technology at Nissan:
"It all comes down to smart device connectivity. People are really looking to have 
that sort of seamless experience when they've been working on their phone and then they 
walk into their car and they expect the platform to know what they've been doing." (Bedigian, 
2016, p. 8) 
Emergent in-car systems reveal that cars will communicate with their environment in a deep 
fashion.  Usage-Based Insurance systems analyse driver behaviour, including time of day, 
acceleration rates,  cornering and locations travelled in order to dynamically set  insurance 
premiums.   Emerging  collision-detection  systems  can  automatically  contact  emergency 
services with essential details, including the identities of the occupants and which seatbelts 
were fastened.  Car maintenance systems will access user calendars to determine the best 
time for maintenance appointments.  Already today, the Ford SyNC systems can accesses the 
driver’s medical data to remind them when to take their medicine (Jaisingh et al., 2016). 
We can see similar cross-context connectivity trends at the urban management level.  For 
example,  Restore  NV provides  demand  management  systems,  such  as  those  controlling 
electrical grids, including five of Europe’s largest grid operators (Restore NV, 2016). Their 
newly announced smart city electricity management system, FlexPond, monitors individual 
home appliances to predict electrical load within individual homes (Restore NV, 2017).  This 
information can be cross-referenced with local weather patterns and the number and type of 
household occupants to greatly improve demand prediction (Hancke et al., 2013).
Other smart city systems treat personal digital devices as mobile components of the smart city 
infrastructure.  This is not limited to using such devices merely as sensors or as personal  
identifiers.   Patterns and content  of social  interaction between people can be analysed to 
anticipate movement patterns, shared use of resources, and even as a way of determining 
appropriate security levels to create between devices (Atzori et al., 2012).  Others have tested 
analysis of social networking to guide structuring of ad hoc networks (Boldrini et al., 2010). 
China plans to take this further, creating a “social credit system” by monitoring many aspects 
of personal conduct, including honesty and conformance to socialist behaviour.  A key aim is 
to  reduce  social   diversity.   This  system  will  offer  rewards  and  punishments  through 
differential access to smart city services (State Council of People’s Republic of China, 2014). 
Some smart city services will even penetrate the physical body.  Already being tested, body 
sensor  networks  embedded  into  the  environment  communicate  with  implanted  medical 
devices,  such  as  heart  monitors,  to  anticipate  and  react  to  medical  emergencies  (Lo, 
Thiemjarus, King, & Yang, 2005). Such health sensor networks can also monitor some vital 
signs externally, such as skin temperature, respiration, sleep patterns and diet (Hancke et al., 
2013; Y. Kim, Kim, & Lee, 2008).  
The  picture  which  emerges  is  one  in  which  smart  city  services  must  take  data  from a 
ubiquitous digital ecosystem, in which digital devices are embedded throughout the fabric of 
the built environment - “transforming everyday objects into information appliances,” (Botta, 
de Donato, Persico, & Pescapé, 2016, p. 691) but also including devices carried by people 
and embedded within their bodies (Balakrishna,  2012; Botta et al.,  2016; Filipponi et  al., 
2010; Jin et al., 2014; Pettersson et al., 2011). This data will be integrated across contexts, 
technology  forms  and  purposes  so  as  to  create  an  integrated  sensing  and  response 
environment (Psyllidis, 2015).  Such an “intelligent information infrastructure” (ITU-T, 2008, 
p. 2) is clearly an ideal type for ambient intelligence.
Artificial Intelligence
Central to the vision of the smart city is algorithmic intelligence, or “soft AI” (e.g.: expert 
systems and software agents) (Ikonen et al., 2010; Komninos, 2006).  It has been estimated 
that a typical smart city will contain around 1 trillion nanoscale devices (Balakrishna, 2012). 
A central paradigm implied within the concept of the smart city is that the smart city will 
generate new data and novel possibilities for action as a result of the integration of data from 
disparate domains (Picon, 2015).  There is a general acceptance that this will require machine 
learning and other forms of soft AI (Balakrishna, 2012; Nam & Pardo, 2011).  In addition to 
common expectations that soft AI will provide core functionality through cloud computing 
and big data, it has been suggested soft AI will need to be embedded at local level to support  
ad hoc networking and to facilitate more rapid system responses due to the sheer scale of data 
(Komninos et al., 2011).
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Robotics
Robotics refers to ICT devices possessing the ability to move autonomously (Ikonen et al., 
2010).   Self-driving  cars  (and  possibly drones)  are  expected  to  exist  within  smart  cities 
(Balakrishna, 2012; Jaisingh et al., 2016; Petrolo et al., 2015).  The home will see robotic 
devices  such  as  vacuum cleaners  and  similar  devices,  sometimes  known  as  mobile  IoT 
(Gubbi,  Buyya,  Marusic,  &  Palaniswami,  2013).   The  specific  details  of  which  robotic 
devices will exist within the smart city need not concern us for the purposes of this analysis. 
The  important  point  is  that  the  smart  city  environment  will  involve  both  humans  and 
machines moving within the same spaces.  Just as the introduction of the car eventually led to 
the  rise  of  pedestrian  crossings,  so  an  environment  of  moving  machines  will  require 
adjustments in human behaviour to take them into account.
The smart city as a socio-technical system
The vision which has emerged of the smart city places technical artefacts and humans as 
equally powerful actants.  Digital devices will communicate amongst themselves and engage 
in negotiations (Atzori et al., 2012; State Council of People’s Republic of China, 2014) as 
they  create  ad  hoc  networks,  including  event-driven  networks  (Filipponi  et  al.,  2010), 
contextual networks (Boldrini et al., 2010) and social networks (Atzori et al., 2012; Boldrini 
et al., 2010). Thus the network structure of the smart city will be created by the devices as 
well as by the humans.  Device activity will respond to human activity.  Humans will respond 
to  these  responses.   Furthermore,  digital  devices  will  have  their  own needs,  which  will 
require consideration by humans.  Accordingly we can view digital devices as causal agents 
in a smart city on the same causal level as humans.  
Systems theory has dominated urban planning since the 1960’s (Taylor, 2005) and permeates 
approaches to the smart city (Söderström, Paasche, & Klauser,  2014), which is seen as a 
complex system, or system of systems (Albino et al., 2015; Chourabi et al., 2012).  Actor-
network theory (ANT) (Latour, 2005) provides a theoretical framework for incorporating the 
smart city’s digital agents and their needs into an interactive relationship with humans.  By 
treating both devices and humans as co-existing within the same structure, ANT provides a 
framework by which  we can  attribute  to  artefacts  causative  properties  within  the  human 
dimension and vice versa (Tabak, 2015).  A further advantage of ANT is the lack of need to 
specify  the  details  of  each  node  within  the  network  (Law,  1992).   This  suits  a  both  a 
heterogeneous device mix and a futures approach which accepts that we cannot know what 
final forms smart city technology will take.  In addition, ANT has been used to account for 
pathways in ICT innovation (R. Kim & Kaplan, 2005; Lamb & Kling, 2003) and so applying 
it to smart cities can be linked to that research.  This offers the potential for an explanatory 
framework which can account  for the dynamics of the innovation which will  lead to the 
mature smart city.
The arrival of an intelligent responsive environment, especially one containing autonomously 
mobile agents, requires changes which must affect people.  This will inevitably bring the 
needs of the digital agent into conflict with the needs of the individual or society, just as cars 
require  roads  and  regulations  which  gives  them  effective  rights  over  people  in  some 
circumstances.  Ambient intelligence systems may also require changes in human behaviour, 
raising the possibility that our environment will train us to suit its needs (Soraker & Brey,  
2007).  In other cases, we can anticipate that personalisation of shared spaces will result in 
differences between people regarding how much any particular personalisation suits them. 
This  may range from the trivial,  such as ambient  temperature,  to the existential,  such as 
access to sensor networks required for medical implants.  As the Chinese social credit system 
shows, some people will be forced to make compromises in order to accommodate aspects of 
personalisation preferred by others within the shared space.  It is not inevitable that spaces 
will be personalised to suit the majority, or that minority needs will be accommodated.  It is 
possible  that  environmental  personalisation will  become a zone of  contention and power 
dynamics.  Given the potential impact alteration of spaces can have on the individual, control 
of  personalisation  of  shared  spaces  could  easily  become a  path  to  domination  of  others. 
Hence control of the digital actants within the smart city’s actor-network can be expected to 
grant influence and power over the human actants.
The fact digital actants have their own needs which require changes by humans raises the 
issue of secondary rights.  Digital objects, while requiring humans change, do not, in and of 
themselves,  originate  that  need.  They are operational  units  whose existence is  caused by 
humans and to whom the benefit of their activity is given to humans.  They are not self-
originating and they are not in receipt of the benefit of their activity. As a result, while it 
appears that the object is competing with the person, in actual fact the object stands in proxy 
to another individual - the beneficial owner.  While the situation may look like competition of 
rights between the individual and the object, it is in fact competition between one individual 
and  another  in  which  the  device  stands  as  proxy  for  the  second  individual.  In  such 
circumstances it is not a new situation.  However, the rise of AI systems may mean that, 
while other humans benefit from the satisfaction of digital needs,  they did not originate those 
needs.  Instead we may encounter needs that were generated by the AI system as a result of 
its own development and self-learning.  Given the expected complexity and scale of a smart 
city’s  ambient  intelligence,  there  are  likely  to  be  many  contexts  in  which  we  cannot 
distinguish between human-originated  and self-determined needs  of  digital  actants.   It  is 
likely that some needs will arise via a combination of human-originated and self-determined 
needs.  It is likely that many human goals will be accomplished via methodologies which 
were self-determined by autonomous systems.  Where a self-determined methodology has 
negative effects on other people, we can expect some form of resistance.  Such a situation 
represents  an  interactive  process  between  human  and  digital  system,  in  which  human 
decision-making contends with the autonomous decisions of a digital actant.  In that ANT 
considers nodes as “black boxes” (Tabak, 2015, p. 37) and does not need to specify their 
internal details, it  is not confounded by the issue of whether an activity derives from the 
device or some beneficial owner.
By treating the human and the digital components of the smart city as equal actants within the 
same environment,  ANT also offers a dimension of analysis  which is  essential  for a full 
understanding of the interactions of the human and the digital – the perspective of the digital 
device.  By its very nature, a digital device cannot know the physical world. What a device 
knows is what its sensors generated as input.  For example, a thermostat does not respond to 
the temperature but what the sensors tell it the temperature is.  If the sensor malfunctions, or 
we game it, the thermostat control will still respond to what the sensor tells it, not what the 
material reality is. Hence digital devices do not know the physical world, but inhabit a totally 
digital environment.  What they know of us and how much they know is determined by our 
representation in digital terms.  Smart city systems will not respond to us; they will respond 
to our digital representations.  If those digital representations are incorrect or incomplete, 
then the analysis of us will be compromised and the delivery of services will suffer.  
Accordingly,  ANT  offers  us  a  conception  of  the  smart  city  as  a  complex  network  of 
heterogeneous actants.   Under this  view we recognise that these actants may be a single 
digital device, an individual person, a group of people, a group of devices, or a mixture of 
both.   We can build on this  conception by considering the logic which must be inherent 
within operational smart cities in order for them to exist.   Doing so will  provide a more 
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detailed understanding of the nature of the smart city system, revealing its essential quality of 
autopoiesis.
Autopoiesis in the Smart City
The concept of autopoiesis originates in theoretical biology in the 1970’s (Varela, Maturana, 
& Uribe, 1974) and accounts for living things, such as cells and bodies, as self-sustaining 
systems.  The concept was made accessible to the social sciences by Luhmann (Luhmann, 
1986) in the 1980’s.  Systems theory holds that the defining characteristics of a system are 
not determined by the properties of the components but by the patterns of their relationships 
(Varela et al., 1974).  Autopoietic systems are those which are self-maintaining in the face of 
changing stimuli, either changes inside the system or within the system’s environment.  To be 
autopoietic,  systems  must  also  regenerate  the  essential  patterns  which  characterise  that 
system  and  internally  generate  the  components  and  processes  required  to  maintain  it 
(Maturana, 1981). 
The original theories of autopoiesis were designed for biology and seemed limited to that 
field by the necessary characteristic that an autopoietic system generate its own components 
(Maturana,  1981;  Varela,  Maturana,  & Uribe,  1981),  a  process  known as  “material  self-
production”  (Di Paolo, 2005, p. 433).  However, this issue is really one of the minimum 
granularity in one’s ontological schema.  Living systems are the ideal type for theories of 
autopoiesis, but they do not create atoms or many of the molecules they depend on.  No 
autopoietic system generates the materials from which the components considered necessary 
for  characterisation  of  that  system  as  autopoietic  are  created.   All  autopoietic  systems 
exchange input  and output  with  their  environment  (Luhmann,  1986).   Hence  autopoietic 
systems need only self-generate the components which are the most proximate cause of their 
characteristics and self-maintenance.
Building on this approach, Luhmann reworked the concept of autopoiesis to bring it into the 
social sciences (Luhmann, 1986).  Under his account social systems are autopoietic systems 
which use communication as their characteristic form of autopoietic generation.  The atoms 
from  which  social  systems  are  constituted  are  communications,  which  are  recursively 
produced and reproduced.  Luhmann defines communications as being composed of three 
elements; information, utterance and  understanding.  As such, a communication is an event. 
A social  system  as  autopoietic  is  a  “network  of  events  which  produces  itself  …  the 
reproduction of events by events.” (Luhmann, 1986, p. 175).  The critical point is that the 
elements  of  an  autopoietic  system  which  make  it  autopoietic  are  those  which  maintain 
autopoiesis  in  the  face  of  destabilising  forces  and  which  give  rise  to  characteristics  of 
autopoiesis  which distinguish it  from other autopoietic systems.  The basic unit  of social 
autopoiesis  is  this  communicative  triad  of  information,  understanding,  and  utterance 
(Luhmann, 1986).  
This pattern is easily visible within the smart city.  It is the minimum necessary characteristic 
of digital device interaction able to constitute any of the essential operational characteristics 
which can constitute  a  defining characteristic  of  an ambient  intelligence.  Within ambient 
intelligence  this  communicative  pattern  is  visible  as  the  ability  to  accept  input 
(“information”), process it in some way (“understanding”) and consequently produce output 
(“utterance”).  In order for any device to participate in an ambient intelligence it must be able 
to perform these three processes.  The actant within the autopoietic system is thus defined by 
its ability to accept input, process it and respond. The response becomes input for a connected 
node and thus the process perpetuates.  
However,  smart cities will  not be constituted by closed communicative systems in which 
digital devices communicate only with each other.  As we have seen, the smart city will be 
characterized by the close integration of digital devices and humans (Bicocchi et al., 2013). 
Much of the digital device’s input will derive from humans, both as intentional commands 
and  as  unconscious  input  (such  as  movement  and  reactions  to  digital  service  delivery). 
Hence both devices and humans will react to each other and stimulate new responses in turn. 
In this way both humans and digital devices will be seen to engage in communicative patterns 
amongst their own kind and across the human-digital divide.  Furthermore, once begun, this 
system becomes self-referential and recursive, as each responds to the response of the other,  
and so the system becomes self-sustaining and autopoietic.
If we accept this communicative triad as the atomic unit of a living smart city, there exists a 
temptation to see this as two societies, one human and one digital, communicating within 
themselves and only interacting with the other by means of constituting its environment – 
humans  embedded  in  a  digital  environment  and  digital  devices  surrounded  by  humans. 
However, significant portions of human communicative action will be mediated by the digital 
environment, while that digital environment’s communicative patterns will respond in myriad 
ways to every human action.  Under such circumstance, few communicative triads can be 
said to be purely human or digital; the overall patterns of communicative flow will be the 
result of both human and digital components.  Some have highlighted the tight interaction of 
the  ICT  and  human  communities  in  smart  cities  under  the  terms  ‘collective  sensing’, 
‘collective awareness’ and ‘collective action’ (Bicocchi et al., 2013).  However, such analysis 
does  not  incorporate  the  deep  fusing  of  both  collectives  which  must  occur.   I  am  not 
suggesting this fusion constitutes some form of hybrid human-machine society, or that we 
should redefine the term ‘society’ to include digital  systems.   Some have used the term 
‘smart society’ to characterise the society within a smart city (Hartswood et al., 2014), but 
this refers to a human society using smart city services.  This is a useful definition to maintain 
because it refers to real issues and to a clearly definable zone of concern.  I therefore believe 
we need a new term for this  new phenomena, one which refers to an autopoietic system 
constituted of communicative triads between nodes which may be digital, human or both.  I 
propose to call this an ‘integrated domain’.
Defining integrated domains
An integrated domain is a socio-technical system in which humans and digital devices co-
mingle in a manner such that it becomes impossible (or even meaningless) to identify the 
origins of patterns within the system as being either human or digital.  An integrated domain 
is autopoietic.  The autopoiesis of an integrated domain derives from a close coupling of 
nodes such that output from one node cannot avoid generating a reaction in another node, 
combined with the unavoidable structure of the atomic node, which is the communicative 
triad event.   An integrated  domain  consists  of  two collectives  integrated into a  mutually 
dependant and co-creative partnership.  One collective consists of a human smart society. 
This is a form of human society existing within an ambient digital environment, such that 
human perceptions, actions and intersubjectivity are unavoidably mediated and influenced by 
this  ambient  digital  environment.   The  other  (non-human)  collective  consists  of  an 
autopoietic  system  of  digital  devices  and  networks  based  on  the  communicative  triad. 
However, neither collective possesses strict boundaries against the other, but rather the two 
intermingle. We can thus describe each as separate for theoretical  purposes, but it is not 
possible to account for characteristics of, or phenomena within, either without reference to 
nodes within the other.  Any discussion of the nature and processes within smart society on 
the human side or the smart city digital components must draw on aspects of the other, and so 
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any  explanatory  discussion  of  either  must  occur  at  the  higher  ontological  level  of  the 
integrated domain.
The concept of autopoiesis includes a persistent demand for regeneration (Varela et al., 1981). 
This holds true for integrated domains as well.  However, whereas in a living organism it is  
the  material  constituents  which  need  regeneration,  in  an  integrated  domain  it  is  the 
communicative  triads.   Communicative  triads  are  events,  not  states  (Luhmann,  1986). 
Patterns  of  communication  thus  form  an  actor-network  in  which  the  nodes  are  events 
constituted of communicative triads, whose material base may be a human, a digital device, 
or a group of either or both.  It is essential that groups of people and/or devices can be treated 
as  equal  actants  within  this  model  because  groups  will  interact  and  communicate  with 
individual devices or people in the smart city, and vice versa.  An example of a combined 
group which would yet constitute a single node is a car in motion.  The car is composed of a 
wide range of interacting devices.  Much of the operation of these devices will be influenced 
by the actions of the driver, and vice versa.  However, this complex system may communicate 
data aggregated from many of these systems in combination with the driver’s actions to a 
single device, such as a traffic light.  Similarly, a single device, such as a traffic light, can be 
expected to communicate with dozens, if not hundreds, of similarly complex entities. We thus 
see that the communicative system is integrated not just across differences of materiality, but 
also spans (or ignores) multiple ontological levels.
Social machines
The primary unit of the integrated domain is the communicative triad. This is a three-stage 
process consisting of input, processing and output. It constitutes an individual node within the 
network structure of the integrated domain.  This network structure is dynamic, variable and 
self-sustaining.  Under this view the smart city is seen as a system possessing autopoiesis. 
Each node is not a state, but a process or an event and their influence on the system’s patterns 
is  not  determined  by  their  material  base.   The  material  base  of  each  node  may  be  an 
individual processing unit, such as an single digital device or an individual person, or it may 
be constituted by a grouping of devices, people or even a combination of both.  Each node 
may also be constituted by the aggregated activity of a group of sub-nodes.  These sub-nodes 
may themselves may be constituted by another group, an overlapping set of groups or an 
individual  person or device.   It  is  likely that the cascade effect of events and responses, 
combined with the volume and complexity of communication will make it impossible, or 
even meaningless, to ask whether a feature of note is the product of one node or many, human 
or digital.  The communicative triad therefore constitutes both the atomic unit for, and the 
essential pattern of, interactions within the smart city.  It provides us with a framework for 
handling the way in which smart city processes can transcend normally distinct ontological 
boundaries  and  frequently  renders  them  meaningless.   This  deep  interconnectedness  of 
materially  indeterminate  nodes  combines  with  ad  hoc  networking  and  human  response 
variability to create a highly complex network structure.  
As an autopoietic system, many of the communicative triads will be concerned with internal 
states of operation within both digital assets and humans.  In the case of digital assets, much 
of the communication can be expected to be concerned with issues such as maintenance and 
management of digital technology. This monitoring represents self-awareness.  This is not 
awareness in the human sense, implying sentience.  However, as a system, the integrated 
domain  is  aware  of  its  internal  processes.   Through  the  component  of  the  human,  the 
integrated  domain  possesses  the  human  level  of  understanding and meaning-giving.   An 
integrated domain is therefore a self-aware, autopoietic system composed of actants who may 
be digital or human, individual or group. 
We are  already witnessing early examples  of  hybrid systems which combine  human and 
digital devices under the label of “social machines”.  Social machines are defined as “socio-
technical systems which involve the participation of human individuals and technological 
components…able  to  extend  the  reach  of  both  human  and  machine  intelligence  [by] 
supporting  capabilities  that  less  integrated  systems  might  find  difficult  to  accomplish” 
(Smart, Simperl, & Shadbolt, 2014, pp. 55–56).  Social machines are the early fore-runners of 
the integrated domain which will form the fabric of future smart cities.
Conclusions
The close integration of a huge number range of devices and systems makes any model of the 
smart  city  which  depends  upon  material  differences  impossibly  complex  and  inevitably 
incomplete.  The deep integration of various ontological levels, from the individual nano-
sensor to the global cloud, makes it impossible to comprehend causes of individual actions 
within the smart city.  Both of these issues are further magnified by the expectation and need 
of the human lived experience to transcend these technical distinctions.  Discussion of smart 
cities in terms of enablers of human activity, such as urban management, do not adequately 
incorporate  into  their  models  the  deep  fusion  of  digital  cognitive  processes  with  human 
deliberations.  This confronts us with the necessity for a model which does away with such 
distinctions.  Instead we have postulated the smart city as an “integrated domain”.  Under this 
view the digital and the human, the individual and the group, all hold equal status as nodes 
within a complex, dynamic autopoietic system known as a smart city.  The concept of the 
smart city as an integrated domain provides a framework through which it  is possible to 
consider  issues  which  transcend  traditional  IT boundaries,  issues  deriving  from complex 
interactions of multiple agents of multiple types.  It provides a unified model by which to 
account for bidirectional interactions between management-level civic aims and individual 
device functions, between groups and individuals, between digital devices and humans.  It 
further provides us with the ability to anticipate issues within mature smart cities without 
knowing the details of the technologies to come.  Models like this, which seek to incorporate 
the human and the digital  into integrated systems, offer our best  hope of anticipating the 
future issues of smart cities.
References
Albino,  V.,  Berardi,  U.,  &  Dangelico,  R.  M.  (2015).  Smart  Cities:  Definitions, 
Dimensions,  Performance,  and  Initiatives.  Journal  of  Urban  Technology,  22(1),  3–21. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10630732.2014.942092
Atzori, L., Iera, A., Morabito, G., & Nitti, M. (2012). The social internet of things 
(siot)–when social networks meet the internet of things: Concept, architecture and network 
characterization. Computer Networks, 56(16), 3594–3608.
Balakrishna,  C.  (2012).  Enabling  Technologies  for  Smart  City  Services  and 
Applications.  In  2012  Sixth  International  Conference  on  Next  Generation  Mobile  
Applications,  Services  and  Technologies (pp.  223–227). 
https://doi.org/10.1109/NGMAST.2012.51
Bedigian, L. (2016).  TU Automotive Detroit 2016 Conference Report. Detroit: TU-
Automotive Ltd (Penton).
ORBIT Journal DOI: 11
Bicocchi, N., Cecaj, A., Fontana, D., Mamei, M., Sassi, A., & Zambonelli, F. (2013). 
Collective awareness for human-ict collaboration in smart cities. In Enabling Technologies:  
Infrastructure  for  Collaborative  Enterprises  (WETICE),  2013  IEEE  22nd  International  
Workshop on (pp. 3–8). IEEE.
Boldrini, C., Conti, M., Delmastro, F., & Passarella, A. (2010). Context-and social-
aware  middleware  for  opportunistic  networks.  Journal  of  Network  and  Computer  
Applications, 33(5), 525–541.
Bonomi, F., Milito, R., Zhu, J., & Addepalli, S. (2012). Fog computing and its role in 
the internet of things. In  Proceedings of the first edition of the MCC workshop on Mobile  
cloud computing (pp. 13–16). ACM.
Botta, A., de Donato, W., Persico, V., & Pescapé, A. (2016). Integration of cloud 
computing and internet of things: a survey.  Future Generation Computer Systems,  56, 684–
700.
Bowerman, B., Braverman, J.,  Taylor,  J.,  Todosow, H., & Von Wimmersperg,  U. 
(2000). The vision of a smart city. In 2nd International Life Extension Technology Workshop,  
Paris (Vol. 28).
Cardwell,  D.  (1994).  The  Fontana  history  of  technology.  London;  New  York: 
Fontana.
Chourabi, H., Nam, T., Walker, S., Gil-Garcia, J. R., Mellouli,  S., Nahon, K., … 
Scholl,  H.  J.  (2012).  Understanding  smart  cities:  An  integrative  framework.  In  System 
Science (HICSS), 2012 45th Hawaii International Conference on (pp. 2289–2297). IEEE.
Cobham  PLC.  (2011).  Cobham  Tactical  Communications  &  Surveillance 
(Brochure). Dartmouth, Canada.
Cobham PLC. (2014). Safe Cities (Brochure).
Dainow,  B.  (2015).  Key  Dialectics  in  Cloud  Services.  Computers  &  Society, 
ETHICOMP Special Issue, 52–59. https://doi.org/10.1145/2874239.2874247
Derry,  T.,  & Williams, T.  (1993).  A short history of technology from the earliest  
times to AD 1900. Oxford: Oxford Paperbacks.
Di Paolo, E. A. (2005). Autopoiesis, adaptivity, teleology, agency.  Phenomenology 
and the Cognitive Sciences, 4(4), 429–452.
Filipponi,  L.,  Vitaletti,  A.,  Landi,  G., Memeo, V.,  Laura,  G., & Pucci,  P.  (2010). 
Smart city:  An event driven architecture for monitoring public spaces with heterogeneous 
sensors.  In  Sensor  Technologies  and  Applications  (SENSORCOMM),  2010  Fourth  
International Conference on (pp. 281–286). IEEE.
Gubbi, J.,  Buyya, R., Marusic, S., & Palaniswami, M. (2013). Internet of Things 
(IoT): A vision, architectural elements, and future directions.  Future Generation Computer  
Systems, 29(7), 1645–1660.
Guo,  B.,  Wang,  Z.,  Zhang,  D.,  Yu,  Z.,  &  Zhou,  X.  (2013).  Opportunistic  IoT: 
Exploring the harmonious interaction between human and the internet of things.  Journal of  
Network and Computer Applications, 36(6), 1531–1539.
Hancke, G. P., Silva, B. de C. e, & Hancke, G. P., Jr. (2013). The Role of Advanced 
Sensing in Smart Cities. Sensors, 13(1), 393. https://doi.org/10.3390/s130100393
Hartswood, M., Grimpe, B., Jirotka, M., & Anderson, S. (2014). Towards the ethical 
governance  of  smart  society.  In  D.  Miorandi,  V.  Maltese,  M. Rovatsos,  A.  Nijholt,  & J. 
Stewart (Eds.), Social Collective Intelligence (pp. 3–30). Springer.
Ikonen,  V.,  Kanerva,  M.,  Kouri,  P.,  Stahl,  B.,  &  Wakunuma,  K.  (2010).  D.1.2.  
Emerging Technologies Report (No. D.1.2). ETICA Project.
ITU-T.  (2008).  Ubiquitous  Sensor  Networks  (USN) (ITU-T  Technology  Watch 
Briefing Report Series No. 4). International Telecommunications Union.
Jaisingh,  K.,  El-Khatib,  K.,  & Akalu,  R.  (2016).  Paving the  Way for  Intelligent 
Transport  Systems  (ITS):  Privacy  Implications  of  Vehicle  Infotainment  and  Telematics 
Systems.  In  Proceedings  of  the  6th  ACM  Symposium  on  Development  and  Analysis  of  
Intelligent Vehicular Networks and Applications (pp. 25–31). New York, NY, USA: ACM. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2989275.2989283
Jin, J., Gubbi, J., Marusic, S., & Palaniswami, M. (2014). An information framework 
for creating a smart city through internet of things.  IEEE Internet of Things Journal,  1(2), 
112–121.
Kim, R., & Kaplan, S. (2005). Co-Evolution in Information Systems Engagement: 
exploration, ambiguity and the emergence of order’. In 3rd Int. Conf. on Action in Language,  
Organisations and Information Systems (pp. 166–180). Limerick, Ireland.
Kim,  Y.,  Kim,  M.,  & Lee,  Y.  J.  (2008).  COSMOS:  A Middleware  Platform for 
Sensor Networks and a U-healthcare Service. In  Proceedings of the 2008 ACM Symposium 
on  Applied  Computing (pp.  512–513).  New  York,  NY,  USA:  ACM. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/1363686.1363812
Kitchin, R. (2016). Getting smarter about smart cities: Improving data privacy and  
data security. Dublin, Ireland: Data Protection Unit, Department of the Taoiseach.
Komninos,  N.  (2006).  The  architecture  of  intelligent  cities:  Integrating  human, 
collective  and artificial  intelligence  to  enhance  knowledge  and  innovation.  In  Intelligent  
Environments, 2006. IE 06. 2nd IET International Conference on (Vol. 1, pp. 13–20). IET.
Komninos, N., Schaffers, H., & Pallot, M. (2011). Developing a policy roadmap for 
smart cities and the future internet. In  eChallenges e-2011 Conference Proceedings, IIMC 
International  Information  Management  Corporation.  IMC  International  Information 
Management Corporation.
Lamb,  R.,  &  Kling,  R.  (2003).  Reconceptualizing  users  as  social  actors  in 
information systems research. MIS Quarterly, 197–236.
Langheinrich,  M.  (2001).  Privacy  by  Design  -  Principles  of  Privacy-Aware 
Ubiquitous Systems. In G. Abowd, B. Brumitt, & S. Shafer (Eds.), Proceedings of the Third  
International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing (pp. 273–291). Atlanta, USA: Springer-
Verlag. Retrieved from http://www.vs.inf.ethz.ch/publ/papers/privacy-principles.pdf
Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the social: an introduction to actor-network-theory. 
Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
Law, J. (1992). Notes on the theory of the actor-network: Ordering, strategy, and 
heterogeneity. Systemic Practice and Action Research, 5(4), 379–393.
Lo, B., Thiemjarus,  S.,  King, R., & Yang, G.-Z. (2005). Body sensor network–a 
wireless sensor platform for pervasive healthcare monitoring. In Adjunct Proceedings of the  
3rd International Conference on Pervasive Computing. Hagenberg, Austria: Springer.
ORBIT Journal DOI: 13
Luhmann, N. (1986). The autopoiesis of social systems. Sociocybernetic Paradoxes, 
172–192.
Martínez-Ballesté, A., Pérez-Martínez, P. A., & Solanas, A. (2013). The pursuit of 
citizens’ privacy: a privacy-aware smart city is possible.  IEEE Communications Magazine, 
51(6), 136–141.
Maturana,  H.  R.  (1981).  The  organization  of  the  living:  a  theory  of  the  living 
organization. Cybernetics Forum, X(2–3), 14–23.
Nam, T.,  & Pardo,  T.  A.  (2011).  Conceptualizing smart  city with  dimensions  of 
technology, people, and institutions. In Proceedings of the 12th Annual International Digital  
Government Research Conference: Digital Government Innovation in Challenging Times (pp. 
282–291). ACM.
Petrolo, R., Loscrì, V., & Mitton, N. (2015). Towards a smart city based on cloud of 
things,  a  survey  on  the  smart  city  vision  and  paradigms.  Transactions  on  Emerging  
Telecommunications Technologies. https://doi.org/10.1002/ett.2931
Pettersson, J., Presser, M., Vercher, J. B., Muñoz, L., Galache, J. A., Gómez, L. A. 
H., & Hernández-Muñoz, J. M. (2011). Smart cities at the forefront of the future internet. In 
The Future Internet Assembly (pp. 447–462). Springer.
Picon, A. (2015).  Smart Cities: a spatialised intelligence. Chichester, West Sussex, 
UK ; Malden, MA: John Wiley & Sons.
Psyllidis,  A.  (2015).  Ontology-based  data  integration  from  heterogeneous  urban 
systems:  A  knowledge  representation  framework  for  smart  cities.  In  CUPUM  2014: 
Proceedings  of  the  14th International  Conference  on Computers  in  Urban Planning and  
Urban Management, Cambrigde, USA, 7-10 July 2015. MIT.
Restore NV. (2016). About Us. Retrieved from https://www.restore.eu/en/homepage
Restore NV. (2017, January 23). Restore deploys Smart Appliances in world-leading 
Smart  City  Project.  Retrieved  from  https://www.restore.eu/en/news/press-release/restore-
deploys-smart-appliances-in-world-leading-smart-city-project
Service Systems Group. (2015a).  HAT briefing paper 1 : Engineering a market for  
personal  data :  the  Hub-of-all-Things  (HAT) (Working  Paper).  Coventry:  Warwick 
Manufacturing Group. Retrieved from http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/65605/
Service  Systems Group.  (2015b).  HAT Briefing  Paper  2 :  The Hub-of-all-Things  
(HAT) economic model of the multi-sided market platform and ecosystem (Working Paper). 
Coventry: Warwick Manufacturing Group. Retrieved from http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/65607/
Smart, P., Simperl, E., & Shadbolt, N. (2014). A taxonomic framework for social 
machines. In E. Mordini, V. Maltese, M. Rovatsos, A. Nijholt, & J. Stewart (Eds.),  Social  
Collective Intelligence (pp. 51–85). Springer.
Söderström,  O.,  Paasche,  T.,  &  Klauser,  F.  (2014).  Smart  cities  as  corporate 
storytelling. City, 18(3), 307–320.
Soraker, J. H., & Brey, P. (2007). Ambient intelligence and problems with inferring 
desires from behaviour. International Review of Information Ethics, 8, 7–12.
State  Council  of  People’s  Republic  of  China.  (2014).  Planning  Outline  for  the  
Construction  of  a  Social  Credit  System  (2014-2020) (Planning  Outline  No.  GF  No. 
(2014)21).  China:  State  Council  of  People’s  Republic  of  China.  Retrieved  from 
https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2014/06/14/planning-outline-for-the-
construction-of-a-social-credit-system-2014-2020/
Tabak, E. (2015).  Information cosmopolitics: an actor-network theory approach to  
information practices. Waltham, MA: Chandos Publishing.
Taylor, N. (2005). Urban Planning Theory Since 1945. London: SAGE Publications.
Varela, F. G., Maturana, H. R., & Uribe, R. (1974). Autopoiesis: the organization of 
living systems, its characterization and a model. Biosystems, 5(4), 187–196.
Varela, F. G., Maturana, H. R., & Uribe, R. (1981). Autopoiesis: the organization of 
living systems, its characterization and a model. Cybernetics Forum, X(2–3), 7–13.
Vinod  Kumar,  T.  M.  (Ed.).  (2015).  E-Governance  for  Smart  Cities.  Singapore: 
Springer Singapore. Retrieved from http://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-981-287-287-6
Zygiaris, S. (2013). Smart city reference model: Assisting planners to conceptualize 
the building of smart city innovation ecosystems. Journal of the Knowledge Economy, 4(2), 
217–231.
ORBIT Journal DOI: 15
